No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Socrates argues in the Republic that a certain condition of soul is both best for its possessor and the source of just or right action towards others. He calls this condition ‘justice’, but in order not to beg the question I shall refer to it as the prescribed condition. I shall not be concerned in this paper with the first half of Socrates' thesis, but only with the way the prescribed condition of soul expresses itself in action. A number of questions arise here, for Socrates' conception of just action extends beyond the common understanding to include the performance of that social function for which one is fitted by nature. I shall disregard this extension, however, and restrict myself to one crucial question: what grounds are there of a non-analogical kind for the assertion that a person whose soul is in the prescribed condition will never act in a way which would be agreed by Socrates and the vulgar to be wrong?
1 I here exclude as a source of support for the assertion the extended analogy between polis and soul by means of which the prescribed condition is initially identified. I discuss the analogy in ‘The Argument of Republic IV’, Philosophical Quarterly, 26 (1976).
2 Sachs, D., ‘A Fallacy in Plato's Republic’, in Plato, II, edited by Vlastos, G. (New York, 1971)Google Scholar, reprinted from Philosophical Review, 72 (1963).
3 Sachs, p. 47.
4 Cornford, F.M., The Republic of Plato (Oxford, 1941Google Scholar). All quotations are from this translation unless otherwise stated.
5 Cf. Cross, R.C. and Woozley, A.D., Plato's Republic (London, 1964), p. 118Google Scholar.
6 Field, G.C., The Philosophy of Plato, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1969), p. 71Google Scholar.
7 Weingartner, R.H., ‘Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 25 (1964/1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 Weingartner, p. 250.
9 Cf. G. Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness in the Republic’, in Plato, II, edited by G. Vlastos, pp. 66–67. Vlastos himself suggests that Plato has all the materials necessary to construct an argument of the kind required, the first part of which ‘would seek to convince us that if reason is “doing its own” it will be making correct moral judgments’ (p. 89), but he does not try to report this part.
10 R. Demos, ‘A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?, in. Plato, II, edited by G. Vlastos, reprinted from Philosophical Review, 73 (1964).
11 Demos, p. 55.
12 Ibid.
13 I ignore possible complications concerning the material prerequisites for knowledge, such as books. On the problem of why philosophers should interrupt their pursuit of knowledge to carry out their civic duties, see e.g. Adkins, A.W.H., Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960), pp. 290–92Google Scholar and Aronson, S.H., ‘The Happy Philosopher — A Counterexample to Plato's Proof’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 10 (1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 These are also discussed by Kraut, R. in his article ‘Reason and Justice in Plato's Republic’, in Exegesis and Argument edited by Lee, E.N., Mourelatos, A.P.D., and Rorty, R.M. (Assen, 1973), pp. 214–16Google Scholar. He does not in my view deal adequately with the difficulties I raise below.
15 See Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness in the Republic’, pp. 89–91.
16 Though Socrates does not invoke the fixed sum of desire in this connection, nor does he explicitly cope with the thumos as I have done.
17 Kraut brushes such examples aside by invoking ‘certain background assumptions’ : ‘the philosopher is assumed to have a convenient may of satisfying his basic biological needs without resorting to theft’ (p. 215). But if the argument depends on such contingencies, it is hardly satisfactory. Kraut, furthermore, takes no account of the point raised in the next paragraph.
18 All existing poleis fall short of the ideal, but even a defective polis is better than no polis at all.
19 See my article “The Basis of Plato's Society’, Philosophy, 52 (1977)Google Scholar.
20 Shorey's translation: Shorey, P.. Plato: The Republic, Vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1930)Google Scholar.
21 See e.g. 378C-D, 386A. For an illuminating discussion of the role of philia in Plato's thought, see Vlastos, G., ‘The Individual as Object of Love in Plato’, in Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973)Google Scholar.