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Psychology: Autonomous or Anomalous?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Andrew Kernohan
Andrew Kernohan
Affiliation:
Mount Allison University
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Extract

In a recent series of papers, Donald Davidson has put forward a challenging and original philosophy of mind which he has called anomalous monism. Anomalous monism has certain similarities to another recent and deservedly popular position: functionalist cognitive psychology. Both functionalism, in its materialist versions, and anomalous monism require token-token psychophysical identities rather than type-type ones. (Token identities are identities between individual events; type identities represent a stronger claim of identities between interesting sorts of events.) Both deny that psychology can be translated into, or scientifically reduced to, neurophysiology. Both are mentalistic theories, allowing psychology to make use of intentional descriptions in its theorizing. Anomalous monism uses a belief/desire/action psychology; cognitive science makes use of information-bearing states. But these similarities must not be allowed to conceal an essential difference between the two positions. Cognitive psychology claims to be a science, making interesting, lawlike generalizations for the purpose of explaining mental activity. Anomalous monism denies that psychology is a science by denying that psychological laws can be formulated. Davidson has other ideas for psychology connected with his work on meaning and truth. Hence, the title of one of his essays on anomalous monism is “Psychology as Philosophy”.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , Autumn 1985 , pp. 427 - 442
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

1 See Davidson, D., “Mental Events” (ME), in Block, N., ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (2 vols.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 107–119:Google Scholar“The Material Mind” (MM), in Haugeland, J., ed., Mind Design (Montgomery, VT: Bradford, 1981), 339–354;Google Scholar“Psychology as Philosophy” (PP), in Glover, J., ed., The Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 101–110;Google ScholarDavidson's, three essays are collected in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Interesting discussions of Davidson's position can be found in:Google ScholarHaugeland, J., “Weak Supervenience”, American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January 1982), 93–104;Google ScholarHess, P., “Reasons and Humean Causes”, Analysis 41 (March 1981), 77–81;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHonderich, T., “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis 42 (January 1982), 59–64;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKatz, B., “Davidson on the Identity Theory”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (March 1977), 81–90;Google ScholarLycan, W., “Psychological Laws”, Philosophical Topics 12 (Spring 1981), 9–38;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcGinn, C., “Philosophical Materialism”, Synthese 44 (June 1980). 173–206;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcGinn, C., “Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws”. Proceedings of the A risiotelian Society, Suppl. 52(1978), 195–220;Google ScholarSeager, W., “The Anomalousness of the Mental”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (Fall 1981). 389–401CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 The literature on functionalism and cognitive science is immense. A paradigm author is Fodor, J. A.. The Language of Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1979). originally published byGoogle ScholarCrowell, in 1975, and Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1981)Google Scholar.

3 Davidson, PP; Lycan, “Psychological Laws”, makes this point on 11.

4 ME, 108.

5 Katz, . “Davidson on the Identity Theory”, 83.Google Scholar

6 ME. 117.

7 MM. 346.

8 ME. 112.

9 Armstrong, D. M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1968). 84.Google Scholar

10 Lewis, D., “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications”, in , Block, ed., Readings, vol. I, 207.Google Scholar

11 Lewis, D., “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in , Block, ed., Readings, vol. I. 217.Google Scholar

12 For a discussion see Block, Ned, “Troubles with Functionalism”, in , Block, ed., Readings, vol. 1, 283ff.Google Scholar

13 Lycan, , “Psychological Laws”, 9.Google Scholar

14 Lycan, W., “Form, Function and Feel”, Journal of Philosophy 78 (January 1981). 24–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 See also Dennett, D. C., “Intentional Systems”, in his Brainstorms (Montgomery, VT: Bradford, 1978), 3–22.Google Scholar

16 In ME he takes one quotation from Kant on freedom and determinism as his problem and another as his solution.

17 ME, 108.

18 ME. 111.

19 ME, 112.

20 Lycan, “Psychological Laws”.

21 This point is stressed by the eliminative materialists. See, for example. Churchland, Paul, “Eliminative Materialism and the Prepositional Attitudes”. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February 1981), 67–90.Google Scholar

22 ME, 116.

23 See, for example, Lycan's “Form. Function and Feel”.

24 ME. 108.

25 ME, 117.

26 ME, 117.

27 Gregory, Richard, Eye and Brain (3rd ed.: Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 86–91.Google Scholar

28 ME, 108.

29 For example, see Lycan, “Form, Function and Feel”.

30 An example is Wright, Larry, Teleological Explanations (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976).Google Scholar

31 H, P. Grice, “The Causal Theory of Perception”, in Warnock, G. J., ed., The Philosophy of Perception (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 85–112.Google Scholar

32 Pears, D. F., “The Causal Conditions of Perception”, Sviithcse 33 (1976). 25–40.Google Scholar

33 Ibid., 33.

34 Wright, L., “Functions“, Philosophical Review 82 (April 1973), 161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 More detailed discussion of the form of a teleological law can be found in Taylor, C., The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), chap. I;Google ScholarWright, , Teleological Explanations, esp. 39:Google ScholarBennett, J., Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 38–39Google Scholar.

36 MM, 347.

37 Another anomalous monist, Colin McGinn, comes to similar conclusions in ”Philosophical Materialism”.