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A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 April 2009
Abstract
Robert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.
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- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 3-4 , Summer-Fall 2008 , pp. 565 - 582
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- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008
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