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Posséder un concept selon Peacocke

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Martin Montminy
Martin Montminy
Affiliation:
Université d'Ottawa
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Abstract

Christopher Peacocke defends a sophisticated version of Conceptual Role Theory. For him, the nature of a concept is completely determined by an account of what it is to possess that concept. The possession conditions he puts forward rest on the notion of primitively compelling transitions or, more recently, on the idea of implicit conceptions. I show that his account is circular and appeals to a dubious distinction between constitutive transitions (or conceptions) and transitions (or conceptions) that depend on factual beliefs. I also point out that his possession conditions violate the Publicity Constraint; and, finally, I raise doubts about the psychological reality of primitively compelling transitions and implicit conceptions.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , Spring 2001 , pp. 219 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2001

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References

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