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Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Botterell

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Neil Campbell
Neil Campbell
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
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Abstract

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Type
Interventions/Discussions
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , Winter 2002 , pp. 163 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2002

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References

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