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On How (Not) to Argue for Preferring God’s Non-Existence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2018

KIRK LOUGHEED
KIRK LOUGHEED*
Affiliation:
McMaster University
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it’s rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it’s difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall.

Considérons deux mondes épistémiquement possibles qui sont aussi similaires que possible, sauf que l’athéisme est vrai dans un monde et que le théisme est vrai dans l’autre monde. Quel monde est-il rationnel de préférer? J’examine la défense la plus forte de l’affirmation quelque peu contre-intuitive selon laquelle il est rationnel de préférer le monde athée. Je discute également de la conclusion opposée, à savoir qu’il est rationnel de préférer le monde théiste. Étonnamment, ma conclusion est qu’il est difficile de dire s’il faut préférer le théisme ou l’athéisme en général.

Keywords

axiology of theismanti-theismpro-theismatheistic goods
Type
Original Article/Article original
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 677 - 699
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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