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On David Gauthier’s Theories of Coordination and Cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2016

ROBERT SUGDEN
ROBERT SUGDEN*
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In 1975, Gauthier discussed Schelling’s pure coordination games and Hodgson’s Hi-Lo game. While developing an original analysis of how rational players coordinate on ‘focal points,’ Gauthier argued, contrary to Schelling and Hodgson, that successful coordination in these games does not depend on deviations from conventional principles of individually rational choice. I argue that Gauthier’s analysis of constrained maximization in Morals by Agreement, which famously deviates from conventional game theory, has significant similarities with Schelling’s and Hodgson’s analyses of coordination. Constrained maximization can be thought of as a pragmatic and contractarian variant of the team-reasoning approach pioneered by Hodgson.

En 1975, David Gauthier a discuté la question des jeux de coordination pure de Schelling et des jeux Hi-Lo de Hodgson. Tout en proposant une analyse originale de la façon dont les joueurs rationnels se coordonnent sur des «points focaux», Gauthier a soutenu contre Schelling et Hodgson que dans ces jeux, une coordination réussie ne dépend pas de déviations par rapport aux principes conventionnels du choix rationnel individuel. J’avance que l’analyse de la maximisation contrainte proposée par Gauthier dans Morals by Agreement, qui s’éloigne de façon notoire de la théorie des jeux conventionnelle, présente d’importantes similarités avec les analyses de la coordination de Schelling et Hodgson. La maximisation contrainte peut être envisagée comme une variante pragmatique et contractualiste de l’approche du raisonnement par équipe introduite par Hodgson.

Keywords

Gauthiercoordinationcooperationsaliencefocal points
Type
Special Topic: Gauthier’s Contractarian Project
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 713 - 737
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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