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Nozick's Anachronistic Libertarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Brian Zamulinski
Brian Zamulinski
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan
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Abstract

The conclusions on libertarianism Robert Nozick reaches are appropriate for a bygone era. In a modern market economy, libertarianism requires that employable people have the option of taking up a publicly provided income instead of employment. This is the only way to compensate the involuntarily unemployed that a market economy requires and to ensure that all employment is voluntary. Taxation on voluntary exchanges is unobjectionable because it alters prices, not property, and no one has a right to a particular price. The best way to provide state incomes for the capable unemployed is through a negative income tax.

Résumé

Les conclusions de libertarisme que tire Nozick valentpour une époque révolue. Dans une économie de marché moderne, le libertarisme exige que les gens aptes au travail puissent opter pour un revenu de source publique plutôt que pour un travail. Voilà le seul moyen de compenser les sans-emploi involontaires que requiert l'économie de marché et de s'assurer que chacun travaille volontairement. Imposer les échanges volontaires est acceptable parce que cela affecte les prix, non la propriété, et que nul n'a droit à un prix prticulier. Le meilleur moyen pour l'État defournir un revenu aux sans-emploi aptes au travail passe par un impôt sur le revenu négatif.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , Spring 2005 , pp. 211 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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References

Notes

1 Exdell, John, “Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights,” Ethics, 87 1977: 142–49, esp. p. 145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). p. 169.Google Scholar

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4 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 33.

5 Ibid., p. 178.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

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9 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 178–79 (unnumbered note).

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11 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 226.

12 Ibid., p. 172; emphasis in original.

13 Arrow, Kenneth writes, “once it is recognized that labor is specific in nature and that there are many kinds, it becomes clear that the freedom of choice under a tax is vastly greater than that under compulsory labor” (“Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice,” Philosophia [Israel] 7, [1978]: 265–79, esp. p. 270)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Forced labour does not become free because the labourer is given a choice of tasks to do for the master, however. It is forced labour because another compels him to work for the latter's benefit.

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17 van Parijs, Philippe, “Basic Income Capitalism,” Ethics, 102 1992: 465–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991): 101–31.Google Scholar

18 I am grateful to the participants in a faculty seminar at the University of Saskatchewan and to two anonymous referees for their comments on and criticisms of earlier versions of this article.