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Necessitate Without Inclining

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

André Gombay
André Gombay
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

Imagine this sequence of events. I am at the wheel of my car at an intersection, waiting for the lights to change. Suddenly, a stranger runs out of the bank building at the corner, makes his way into the car, puts a gun to my head and orders me to drive off, on the double. Eventually there's a chase and we are caught.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Winter 1985 , pp. 579 - 587
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

1 It is probable, however, that a wider defence is available to an accused who is merely a party to an offence, and not its principal agent.

2 Stephen, James Fitzjames, History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1883), 107, quoted by Lord Salmon, R. v. Abbott (1976)Google Scholar.

3 Baker, Brenda, “Acting Under Duress”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1973-1974), 516–521Google Scholar.

4 The formula is ubiquitous, never very well explained; the clearest account I know is in part three of the Theodicy, especially §311: in §325, Leibniz argues that action under duress is voluntary.