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The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima, III, 3–8

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Kevin White
Kevin White
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University of Ottawa
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Extract

Aristotle's account of phantasia in De anima, III, 3, occurs at a critical juncture of his inquiry into the nature and properties of the soul. Having just completed a long discussion of sensation (II, 5-III, 2), and wishing now to turn to a consideration of the power of thought (nous), which he regards both as distinct from and as analogous to sensation, he suggests that an explanation of phantasia is necessary at this point, since there is no thought without phantasia, just as there is no phantasia without sensation.1 But while this sketch of a complex dependency among the soul's cognitive powers makes clear the importance of phantasia and the need for some explanation of it, the intermediate place of phantasia in the discussion and the incidental way in which it is introduced are indications that Aristotle does not treat it for its own sake, but rather is compelled to turn to a consideration of it by the exigencies of the subject-matter at hand. The analysis of sensation, the characteristic power of animals, could, it seems, be adequately carried out with little reference to phantasia, even though Aristotle is elsewhere led to stress the closeness, and even, in some respect, the identity of these two powers; the discussion of thought, on the other hand, and specifically of the human thought which is Aristotle's concern in De anima, III, 4–8, apparently requires a special preliminary treatment of phantasia.

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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , Autumn 1985 , pp. 483 - 505
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

1 427b15-16.

2 De insomnüs, 1, 459a15–22.

3 De anima, I, 1, 402b3–5.

4 The physiological study of the “imagination” seems to have its origins in Galen's medical researches, which make use of Aristotle's remarks on to phantastikon. See the references in Wolfson, Harry Austryn, “The Internal Senses in Latin. Arabic and Hebrew Philosophical Texts”, Harvard Theological Review 28 (1935), 71–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 According to Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index to Plato (Leeds: W. S. Maney & Son, 1976), these are: Republic, II, 382elO; Theaetetus, 152cl, 161e8; Sophist. 260c9. 260e4, 263d6, 264a6. On the possibility that the term may have been used by some of the pre-Socratics, see the first chapter ofGoogle ScholarBundy, Murray Wright, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1927)Google Scholar.

6 De anima. III. 3. 429a3–4.

7 George, Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), “phaò”.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., ad loc.

9 See, for instance, Theaetetus, 152cl, and Metaphysics, IV, 5, 1010bl-4. On the significance of the phainomena for Aristotle, see Nussbaum, Martha Craven, “Saving Aristotle's Appearances”, in Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha Craven, eds., Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 267–293CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Liddell and Scott, Lexicon, “phantasia”.

11 In a manner different from that of the Greeks, modern German philosophy seems also to have had a keen appreciation of the concrete immediacy and human importance of, and of the difficulty in speaking about, the phainomena. For the origins of the discussion in Leibniz' description of bodies as phaenomena realia and in Kant's radical modern revision of the meaning of the phenomena, see the article on “Erscheinung” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1972). For the meaning of “phenomenon” in the various “phenomenologies” of Hegel, Husserl, and HeideggerGoogle Scholar, see Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomenological Movement: An Historical Introduction (2 vols.; 2nd ed.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 14, 126, and 321 respectively. It might be observed that while the history of Greek philosophy proceeds from the Protagorean doctrine of the truth of the phainomena to the crucial Platonic distinction between the phainomena and the onta (Republic, X, 596e4), the history of German philosophy seems to reverse this progression, beginning with Kant's distinction between the phenomena and the noumena, and ending with phenomenology's exclusive attention to the appearances. This latter development also coincides with the growth of “historicism”, a modern version of the Protagorean doctrine that “man is the measure of all things”CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 The continual engendering of unique and unrepeatable appearances by the ever-renewed union of sense and sensible things is a central point in the discussion of the first definition of knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus (151d3–186e12). The fascination to which this perpetual novelty gives rise is, of course, an important Platonic theme.

13 Bonitz, H., Index Aristotelians (2nd ed.; Graz: Akademische Druck—U. Verlagsan-stalt, 1955), “phantasia”.Google Scholar

14 Freudenthal, J., Ueberden Begriffdes Wortes Phantasia bei Aristoteles (Göttingen: Druck der Universitäts—Buchdruckerei von E. A. Huth, 1863), 15–16.Google Scholar

15 It should be mentioned that “look” is the English word chosen by Jacob Klein to translate Plato's terms eidos and idea; see Plato's Trilogy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 3. The visual terminology of species, Erscheinung and “look”, reflects the root meaning of phantasia, but is somewhat misleading, since Aristotle will relate the action of phantasia to sensation in general. The double sense of phantasia is paralleled in the related term doxa, which, in the writings of Plato, also shows both an “objective” and a “subjective” meaning. SeeGoogle ScholarLafrance, Yvon, La Thèorie Platonicienne de la Doxa (Montreal: Bellarmin; and Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981), 22Google Scholar.

16 For other suggestions of what Aristotle has in mind here, see Freudenthal, , Ueberden Begriff, 30, andGoogle ScholarNussbaum, Martha Craven, Aristotle's De motu animalinm: Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretative Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 252–255Google Scholar.

17 De aninui. III, 3, 428al-2.

18 Republic, VI, 510a1: II, 382a2; Sophist, 236b7; c3, 4, 7; 239c9.

19 Republic, VI. 510a1; IX, 584a9; Timciens, 46a2; Sophist, 267a4.

20 1022a19–20.

21 I, 1, 403a8–10; II, 2, 413b22–23; 3, 414b16, 415a10-II; 8, 420b29–33; III, 2, 425b24–25.

22 “… A. considers himself entitled to use indifferently the terms morion, archê, clyiuunis. and diapliora throughout.” Hicks, R. D., Aristotle: De anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 550Google Scholar.

23 I. 1. 402a7–8.

24 The overall plan of the treatise would seem to be as follows:

1. Introduction (1, I)

2. Historical Background (I, 2–5)

3. Investigation of the Soul

1) Its essence (II, 1–3)

2) Its properties (II, 4–111,13)

25 I. 2. 402b5–9; II. 1, 412a4–6; II. 3. 414b20–21.

26 II, 2. 413a20–25.

27 414a32-b19, 414b33–415a13.

28 II. 3. 414b5–16.

29 Insofar as the original plan is followed, the outline would be: The Soul

1) Its essence (II, 1–3)

2) Its properties

1. Nutrition (II, 4)

2. Sensation (II, 5-III, 2)

Transition from sensation to nous (III, 3)

3. Nous (III, 4–8)

4. Locomotion (III, 9–11)

30 427a17–19, 432a15–17.

31 2, 403b25–27, 404b7–9, 404b27–28; 3, 405b31; 4, 408a35-bl; 5, 404b19–25. At 405b12 and 409b21 a third feature of the soul, its “bodiless” (asômuton) character, is added.

32 403b25–27.

33 404b7–9.

34 427a17–19.

35 432a15–17.

36 Thus the outline would be: The Soul

1) Its essence (II, 1–4)

2) Its “distinguishing” power (to kritikon)

1. to kritikon in itself (II, 5-III, 8)

2. to kritikon and locomotion (III, 9–11)

It is not inappropriate to include II, 4 in the section on the soul's essence, since its discussion of powers, acts, and objects, and of the different ways in which the soul is a “cause”, continue the general account of the soul, and because the discussion of the nutritive power indicates an intrinsic relation between the soul as such and nourishment (416b11–12).

37 402a9–10.

38 I, 1, 403a8; 4, 408b18–29; 5, 411b18–19; II, 2, 413b24–27; 3, 415a11–12.

39 The third and final division of the De anima's latter portion would be: The Soul

1) Its essence (II, 1–4)

2) Its powers

1. Sensation, the power shared by soul and body (II, 5-III, 2)

2. Nous, the power proper to the soul (III, 3–11)

In all three ways of dividing the text, the concluding chapters on sensation (III, 12–13) stand apart. They seem to form a sort of appendix to the treatise (cf. II. 2, 414a 1–2) and a transition to the De sensu et sensato.

40 427a19-b14.

41 428a15–16.

42 427b18–20.

43 Cf. II. 5. 417b18–27.

44 III, 3. 429a4–8. The texts of Aristotle are quoted in the translation by Hett, W. S. in the Loeb Classical Library edition of On the Soul, Parva Natnralia, On Breath (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and London: William Heinemann, 1957)Google Scholar.

45 III, 10, 433a9–12.

46 III, 3, 427b17–24.

47 427b27–29.

48 De anima, III, 3, 429a1–2; De insomniis, 1, 459a17–18; Rhetoric, I, II, 1370a27. It is customary to compare the Rhetoric's definition of phantasia as a “certain weak sensation” (aisthêsis tis asthenês) with Hobbes' remark in Leviathan, ch. 2, that “imagination is therefore nothing but decaying sense”.

49 Metaphysics, IV, 5, 1010b3.

50 The Platonic response to Protagoras is found in Socrates' uncovering of the presuppositions and consequences of Theaetetus' definition of epistêmê as aisthesis (Theae-tetus, 151d3–186e12); phantasia is identified with aisthêsis near the beginning of the argument (152c1). Aristotle alludes to this discussion while opposing to the Protagorean view of the phainoinena the famous “law of non-contradiction” (Metaphysics, IV, 5, 1010b12).

51 III, 3, 427a17-b14; 1, 449b9–30; I, 458b1–22.

52 428a5–16.

53 428b11–13.

54 De anima, II, 5 and 12.

5 5 III, 3, 428b10–11, 429a1–2.

56 428b14, 429a4–5.

57 Cf. note 13 above.

58 Cf. Physics, I, 1, 185a14.

59 De anima. III, 5, 430a17–18.

60 459a28-b23.

61 De insoinniis. 3. 460b28–461a8.

62 1. 459a15–22.

63 For discussion of this formulation, see Nussbaum, Aristotle's De motu animalium, 234–236.

64 Aristotle's account of the physiology of phantasia in terms of reflected sensations which are borne inward toward a central organ, and sometimes distorted or obscured, by the currents of the blood (461a8–462a8) may be scientifically naive, but is metaphorically precise, since the paradigmatic instance of a phantasma seems to be the visible, inevitably altered reflection of the outer appearances in the fluctuating element of water (cf. Republic, VI, 510a1). See De prophetia in somno, 2, 464b9: the inner appearances (phantasmata) are much like the “images” (eidôla) found in water.

65 Aristotle suggests a division between animals which have phantasia and those which do not (De anima, II, 3, 415a10–11; III, 3, 428a10–11), but finally allows that even the imperfect animals possess an indeterminate phantasia (ibid., III, 11, 433b31–434a4).

66 De anima, III, 2, 425b23–25.

67 Thus Aristotle's phantasia resembles very much the memoria eloquently described by St. Augustine (Confessions, X. 8–26): venio in campos el lala praetoria memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de cuiusce modi rebus sensis invectarum ….

68 429a13–18.

69 431b21–432a1.

70 432a3–4.

71 De memoria et reminiscentia, 1, 450a7–9.

72 Cf. II, 4, 415a20–22.

73 III, 4, 430a6–7; 8. 432a4–5.

74 III, 4, 429b10–22.

75 7, 431a14–15, 431b2; 8, 432a8–10.

76 Physics, IV. 10–14; cf. Nicomachcan Ethics, X, 4, 1174a13–17.

77 Cf. De anima. III, 8, 432a7–9.

78 De memoria el reminiscentia, 1, 450a25–451a14.

79 Aristotle says that objects of noêsis are only incidentally objects of memory (ibid., 450a24–25).

80 De anima. III, 7, 431b2–10. The role of phantasia in practical thinking and animal activity is further developed in De anima, III. 10–11, which is doctrinally parallel to De motu animalinm,6–8. See, for discussion of these passages, Nussbaum. Aristotle's De motu animalium, 232–241.

81 De memoria et reminiscentia, 1, 449b31–450a9.

82 Philhens. 39b 1ff.

83 VI, 511a1, e2.

84 511d8.

85 De anima. III, 5, 430a22.

86 Nicomachean Ethics, X, 7, 1177a23–25.

87 De anima, III, 3, 429a4–8.

88 Aristotle offers some interesting examples of this interaction: the passions of anger, fear, confidence, and shame involve the activity of phantasia (Rhetoric, II, 2, 1378a30-b10; 5, 1382a21ff., 1383a17; 6, 1383b12–1384a22); the cowardly, the erotic, and the angry are easily deceived by slight resemblances between the inner appearances and the objects of their passions (De insomnüs, 2, 460b4–11); phantasia is operative in the “self-image” which is a spur to victory, honour, and excellence (Rhetoric, I, 11, 1370b33; 1371a9, 19); the melancholy are particularly susceptible to the influence of the inner appearances (De memoria el reminiseentia, 2, 453a19).

89 Meteorologica, I, 3, 339a35; 5, 342b23; 6, 342b32; II, 9, 370a 15; 111. 4, 374b8; De mundo, 4, 395b6; Problemata, XV, 4, 911a13; XXVI, 12, 941b22.

90 De sensu et sensato, I, 437a5–7.

91 De coloribus, I, 791b17; 2, 792a6, 8, b15; 3, 793a25; Meteorologica, 111, 2, 372b8; De sensu et sensato, 3, 439b6.

92 The reader interested in pursuing the theme of phantasia in Aristotle might wish to consult the studies already mentioned, as well as the following:

Frohschammer, J., Ueher die Principien der A ristotelischen Philosophie und die Bedeutung der Phantasie in Derselhen (Munchen: Adolf Ackermann, 1881)Google Scholar; Robert, J.Roth, S.J., “The Aristotelian Use of Phantasia and Phantasma”, The New Scholasticism 37 (1963), 312–326;Google ScholarLycos, K., “Aristotle and Plato on ‘Appearing’”, Mind 73 (1964), 496–514;CrossRefGoogle ScholarPhillipe, M.-D., O.P., “Phantasia in the Philosophy of Aristotle”, The Thomist 35 (1971), 1–42;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRees, A. D., “Aristotle's Treatment of Phantasia”, in Anton, John P. and Kustas, George L., eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1971), 491–504;Google ScholarBenardete, Seth, “Aristotle, De Anima III.3–5”, The Review of Metaphysics 28 (1975), 611–622;Google ScholarEngmann, Joyce, “Imagination and Truth in Aristotle”, Journal of the History ofPhilosophy 14 (1976), 259–265;CrossRefGoogle ScholarSchofield, Malcolm, “Aristotle on the Imagination”, in Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield, Malcolm, and Sorabji, Richard, eds., Articles on Aristotle: 4. Psychology and Aesthetics (London: Duck-worth, 1979), 103–132Google Scholar; and Labarriére, Jean-Louis, “Imagination humaine et imagination animale chez Aristote”, Phronesis 29 (1984), 17–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar