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The Language Animal and the Passive Side of the Human Condition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

NIKOLAI MÜNCH
NIKOLAI MÜNCH*
Affiliation:
Johannes Gutenberg-University, Mainz
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In some strains of current philosophy, there is a growing interest in the passive and receptive aspects of the human condition. This interest is often paired with a criticism that ‘Western’ philosophy unduly neglects those aspects because of an ‘agential bias.’ This criticism has also been directed against the philosophy of Charles Taylor. I try to show that this criticism has some force in principle but is not plausible in the case of Taylor. First, I analyse John Rawls’ hugely influential concept of a life plan and show how this ‘agential bias’ applies here. Second, I argue that such a bias does not apply to Taylor’s The Language Animal by showing how active and passive moments are interwoven in his concepts of articulation and narration.

On note, dans certains courants de la philosophie contemporaine, un intérêt croissant pour les aspects passifs et réceptifs de la condition humaine. Cet intérêt s’accompagne souvent d’une critique selon laquelle la philosophie «occidentale» négligerait à tort ces aspects en raison d’un «biais d’agentivité». Cette critique a également été émise à l’endroit de la philosophie de Charles Taylor. J’entends montrer ici que cette critique, bien qu’elle ait en principe une certaine force, ne peut raisonnablement s’appliquer dans le cas de Taylor. J’analyserai dans un premier temps le concept fort influent de «projet de vie» et montrerai comment le biais d’agentivité s’y applique. Dans un second temps, en présentant comment les moments actifs et passifs sont liés dans ses concepts d’articulation et de narration, je montrerai que ce biais ne saurait valoir pour The Language Animal de Taylor.

Keywords

Charles TaylorpassivityarticulationemotionsJohn Rawlslife plans
Type
Special Issue: Charles Taylor’s The Language Animal
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 653 - 667
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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