Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-mzp66 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-26T03:00:42.949Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

La logique peut-elle mouvoir l'esprit?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Pascal Engel
Pascal Engel
Affiliation:
Université de Caen
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper attempts to take a new look at the famous Lewis Carroll paradox about Achilles and the Tortoise. It examines in particular the connections between Lewis Carroll's regress argument for logical inferences and a similar regress for practical inferences. The Tortoise's point of view is espoused: no norm of reasoning or of conduct can in itself “make the mind move,” only the brute force of belief can. This conclusion is a Humean one. But it does not imply that we renounce altogether the normative force of such principles of reasoning as modus ponens. Connexions with the Wittgensteinian rule-following problem are indicated.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 37 , Issue 1 , Winter 1998 , pp. 35 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Blackburn, S. 1995 «Practical Tortoise Raising», Mind, vol. 104, p. 696–711.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L. J. 1992 An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1969 «How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?», dans Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980, trad, franç. Actions et événements, Paris, PUF, 1993.Google Scholar
Dogson, C. L. 1977 Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic, éd. W. Bartley II, New York, Clarkson Potter.Google Scholar
Dummett, M. 1973 Frege. Philosophy of Language, Londres, Duckworth.Google Scholar
Engel, P. 1989 La norme du vrai. Philosophic de la logique, Paris, Gallimard, trad, angl. révisée et augmentée The Norm of Truth, Harvester, Hemel Hamstead, 1991.Google Scholar
Engel, P. 1994 «Believing, Accepting and Holding-True», rapport du CRÉA, inédit.Google Scholar
Engel, P. 1995 «Les croyances», dans D. Kambouchner, dir., Notions de philosophie, Paris, Gallimard, vol. 2, p. 1–110.Google Scholar
Engel, P. 1996 Philosophic et psychologie, Paris, Gallimard.Google Scholar
Engel, P. 1997 «Normes logiques et evolution», Revue Internationale de philosophie, vol. 51, n° 2, p. 201–219.Google Scholar
Gardies, J.-L. 1987 L'erreur de Hume, Paris, PUF.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geach, P. T. 1965 «Assertion», Philosophical Review, vol. 74, n° 4, p. 449–465, repris dans Logic Matters, Oxford, Blackwell, 1972, p. 254-269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Granger, G. 1992 Formes, opérations, objets, Paris, Vrin.Google Scholar
Johnson-Laird, P. N. et Byrne, R. 1991 Deduction, Londres-Hillsdale, Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Kripke, S. 1981 Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford, trad, franç. T. Marchaisse, Règles et langage privé, Paris, Seuil, 1996.Google Scholar
McGee, V. 1985 «A Counterexample to Modus Ponens», Journal of Philosophy, vol. 82, n° 9, p. 471–488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, P. 1996 «On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning About Belief and Action», ° paraître.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Renaut, A. et Mesure, S. 1996 La guerre des dieux, Paris, Grasset.Google Scholar
Rips, L. 1994 The Psychology of Proof, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. 1950 «If, So and Because», dans M. Black, dir., Philosophical Analysis, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, p. 323–340.Google Scholar
Schueler, G. 1995 «Why “Oughts” Are Not Facts», Mind, vol. 104, p. 712–723.Google Scholar
Searle, J. 1969 Speech Acts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, trad, franç. Les actes de langage, Paris, Herman, 1972.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smiley, T. 1995 «A Tale of Two Tortoises», Mind, vol. 104, p. 725–736.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stroud, B. 1979 «Inference, Belief and Understanding», Mind, vol. 88, p. 179–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar