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Intention et faiblesse de la volonté

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Renée Bilodeau
Renée Bilodeau
Affiliation:
Université Laval
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Abstract

Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgement is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgement that conforms to her best judgement “all things considered,” the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show how practical and theoretical reasonings concur in the production of action, and why akrasia is a problem for the philosophy of action before being a problem for moral philosophy.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , Winter 2002 , pp. 27 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2002

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