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The Idea of a Logic of Discovery

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1965

Norwood Russell Hanson
Affiliation:
Yale University

Extract

Is there such a thing as a ‘Logic of Discovery’? Do we even have a consistent idea of such a thing? The approved answer to this seems to be “No.” Thus Popper argues (The Logic of Scientific Discovery) “The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it.” (p. 31.) Again, “… there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process.” (p. 32.) Reichenbach writes that philosophy of science “… cannot be concerned with [reasons for suggesting hypotheses], but only with [reasons for accepting hypotheses].” (Experience and Prediction, p. 382.) Braithwaite elaborates: “The solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here.” (Scientific Explanation, pp. 20, 21.)

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1965

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References

1 That is, given Kepler's T 2 = r 3, and Huygen's F = r/T 2, it follows that the ‘F’ of gravitation must equal 1/r 2.