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Holisme, référence et irréductibilité du mental

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Martin Montminy
Martin Montminy
Affiliation:
Université d'Ottawa
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Abstract

I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about reference and reduction. I show how the irreducibility of the mental follows from the holistic and flexible character of our criteria for attributing beliefs and intentional states.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , Summer 2005 , pp. 419 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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