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Genuine Choice and Blame
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 June 1965
Extract
Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs ofan afternoon—the most favoured alternative method.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , June 1965 , pp. 72 - 81
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1965
References
* Austin, J. L.: Philosophical Papers, edited by Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J., Oxford, 1961, p. 130.Google Scholar
1 Tarski, A., Introduction to Logic, p. 27, Oxford University Press, New York, 1954.Google Scholar
2 An example may be useful here. A department head decides to let another university “steal” his ablest instructor, since to match the other university's offer would involve deviating from his university's appointment system to an extent that would cause dissatisfaction among the remainder of his staff. He might well say that this was clearly the best thing to do on the whole, while refusing to say that he had no choice, and, indeed, even stating that it was a very difficult choice. It must be admitted that he might also claim that he had “no choice;” it would not do for us to rule this out as “improper” in question-begging fashion. If the former possibility is granted, however, I think that is sufficient for my point; on the other hand, the latter possibility certainly indicates an overlap between situations where we use “best choice” and “no choice.”
3 In ordinary discourse, “genuine” and “real” are frequently synonyms; however, as noted below, “real choice” has other meanings than that we are concerned with, so the term genuine choice is preferable on this ground.
4 Presumably (1) would fail where there was really only one practical possibility before the agent, a “Hobson's choice.” It is very difficult to think of examples of this, since apparent examples usually turn out to fall under condition (3). It is worth mentioning that we also speak of the “real choice” in situations where a person thinks there are alternatives x, y and z, where there “really” are only x and y, or, possibly the “real choice” is between v and w, each of which differs somewhat from x and y.
5 It is, for example, not hard to decide which alternative it is “reasonable to expect” will be chosen in the following:
“The people do not have a choice. Either they choose the armaments race with, as the end of this rivalry, the permament risk of nuclear suicide; or they select the progressive trust necessary to the stability of the peace.” From an address to the U.S. Committee for the U.N. by Leon-Joseph Cardinal Suenens, Archbishop of Malines-Brussels. I owe this example to my colleague Father P. W. Nash, S.J.
6 Another example would be the celebrated incident in World War II when the American general in besieged and apparently doomed Bastogne is supposed to have replied to German demands for surrender with a succinct “Nuts!”
7 Concept of Mind, p. 69, Hutchinson, 1958. My italics.
8 Indeed, there can be “technical responsibility” where there is not even simple choice. An example would be that of a cabinet minister who has to resign because of failures in his department of which he was unaware.
9 Op. cit., p. 69.