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Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2013

HUIYUHL YI
HUIYUHL YI*
Affiliation:
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Republic of Korea
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Abstract

One response to the Frankfurtian attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is to advert to the observation that the agent’s actual action (or the particular event resulting from that action) is numerically distinct from the corresponding action (or the resultant event) he would have generated in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Since this response is based on taking actions and events to be fragile, I shall call it the fragilist account of alternative possibilities. This paper addresses an anti-fragilist argument delivered by John Martin Fischer. I contend that, on close examination, Fischer’s counterargument does not undermine the fragilist account.

Une des réponses possibles à l’attaque frankfurtiene contre le principe des possibilités alternatives consiste à attirer l’attention sur le fait que l’action réelle de l’agent (ou l’événement spécifique résultant de cette action) se distingue numériquement de l’action que ledit agent aurait généré dans la situation contrefactuelle correspondante (ou de l’événement qui en découle). Dans la mesure où cette réponse repose sur le fait de concevoir l’action et les événements comme fragiles, je la qualifierai d’explication fragiliste des possibilités alternatives. Cet article est consacré à l’argument anti-fragiliste soutenu par John Martin Fischer. Après un examen minutieux, j’affirme que le contre-argument de Fischer n’ébranle pas l’explication fragiliste.

Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 787 - 800
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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