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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 April 2009
In this article, I support the liberal claim that the state's fundamental responsibility is to ensure that persons are able to interact as equals, that is, on the basis of equal freedom. That persons must be treated as responsible agents leads to an obligation on the part of the state to ensure that its citizens have the necessary conditions (and resources) for responsible agency. I further suggest that this conception of equality and the requirement for responsible agency is the right measure to use for setting limits on the state's obligation to redistribute its resources. I defend this claim by making a parallel argument in moral philosophy that distinguishes the duty to aid from the duty of beneficence and establishes a priority relationship between them.
1 Barbara Herman presents what I take to be a similar view, but uses it to argue for a moral obligation of mutual aid, whereas the duty for the state to redistribute to the level of sufficiency is a political obligation (see “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993], pp. 45–72Google Scholar). Herman argues that persons are dependent and rational beings and as such have “true needs,” such as those it is not rational for an agent to forego; that is, they are ends necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being. Our true needs are “those that cannot be left unmet if [the individual] is to continue in his activity as a rational agent” (ibid., p. 67). Herman's grounds for adopting a duty of mutual aid, like mine, are Kantian; however, the account I put forward does not depend on accepting Kant's entire moral and political framework. We should be able to see why any agent, no matter what her particular comprehensive doctrine, would endorse this principle. The principle need not be endorsed from within any particular comprehensive doctrine, though it certainly may be. The duty of mutual aid, according to Herman and Kant, is required by our very rationality or, according to the account I will present, it is required by our agency.
2 For a discussion of coercion, deception, and the requirements of justice, see O'Neill, Onora, “The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger,” in Matters of Life and Death, edited by Regan, T., 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 294–337.Google Scholar
3 In §4 of this article, I will distinguish traditional libertarians (such as Robert Nozick) from left-libertarians (such as Philippe Van Parijs).
4 “Thoroughgoing” is meant to capture a wide class of egalitarians who may differ on what they believe ought to be the equalisandum but share a commitment to bringing about equality of their chosen equalisandum.
5 Providing a detailed account of the basic goods or filling out what resources are required to keep someone at the level of sufficiency is not necessary to make the theoretical point that the baseline is significant and that the state's obligation is to ensure that its citizens are at the baseline.
6 Herman, Barbara, “Morality and Everyday Life,” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 74, 2 (11 2000): 29–45, esp. p. 26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 In explaining that the fundamental idea of Kant's Categorical Imperative is the mutual consistency of the actions of a plurality of rational beings, O'Neill claims that a commitment to preserving persons' capacities for autonomy requires preservation of both biological and biographical life. The first requires that persons not be deprived of life: “the dead (as well as the moribund, the gravely ill, and the famine-stricken) cannot act”; the second requires that “persons be preserved in forms that offer them sufficient physical energy, psychological space, and social security for action.” She claims that “to act in the typical ways humans are capable of we must not only be alive, but have a life to lead” (“The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger,” p. 330).Google Scholar
8 See Ripstein, Arthur, Equality, Responsibility and the Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 272.Google Scholar
9 This way of understanding and responding to the idea of vulnerable agency has important implications for how we ought to treat children; namely, it gives us resources to argue for more extensive social programs. This is another issue which differentiates my position from the traditional libertarian account, which has standardly not recognized a direct obligation to children because children are not rational contractors.
10 For example, consider Ronald Dworkin's arguments against moral hazards and unilateralism explored in “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, 3 (Summer 1981): 228–40.Google Scholar
11 Herman, , “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons,” p. 67.Google Scholar
12 An alternative way of filling out this account of the necessary basic goods would be to follow John Rawls, for whom the responsibility of the state is to guarantee its citizens the basic liberties and a fair share of social primary goods (see Rawls, , Theory of Justice [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971]Google Scholar). Thus, we treat persons as equals if we give them an equal share of primary goods, and accept deviations from that ideal only when it is to the advantage of those worst-off.
13 I will not take a stand here on what I think is the best way of realizing the baseline in practice. The principle of treating persons as equals is not in itself determinate, but we make the norms determinate through the specific features of our institutions. One possible approach is to argue, as Philippe Van Parijs does, for a universal basic income (UBI) grant, or perhaps for a combination of UBI with some more targeted programs such as health care and education. For a strong defence of the UBI, see Van Parijs, Philippe, Real Freedom for All (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. For an excellent debate on the UBI, see Anderson, Elizabeth's What's Wrong with a Free Lunch? (Boston, MA: Beacon Hill, 2001)Google Scholar, where she argues in favour of social programs tailored to the needs of the disabled and disadvantaged and against the UBI. I discuss Van Parijs's position further in §5.
14 Frankfurt, Harry, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 134–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
15 Ibid., p. 146.
16 Ibid., pp. 152–54.
17 Examples include Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen.
18 For a more in-depth discussion on the distinction between our moral obligation to aid and our moral obligation to benefit, see my “Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Aid,” Social Theory and Practice, 32, 3 (2006): 439–66.Google Scholar
19 More specifically, it is a duty to rescue, but I will not get into these fine distinctions here.
20 For excellent discussions of needs, see Rawls, , Theory of Justice, pp. 62, 92–95Google Scholar; Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chap. 12Google Scholar; Scanlon, Thomas, “Preference and Urgency,” Journal of Philosophy, 72, 19 (1975): 655–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sen, Amartya, Commodities and Capabilities (New York: North-Holland, 1985), pp. 45–48Google Scholar; and Sumner, Wayne, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 53–60.Google Scholar
21 Thomas Nagel's famous Mount Kilimanjaro example makes a similar point. You would be helping me achieve one of my projects and would make me better off if you help me climb Mount Kilimanjaro, but this is not what we mean when we say you have a duty to aid. I also take my view to be in line with the view Nagel and Liam Murphy express in “Taxes, Redistribution and Public Provision,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, 1 (Winter 2001): 53–71Google Scholar. In making reference to Scanlon's account in “Preference and Urgency,” Nagel and Murphy claim that “we may feel we owe each other the conditions of fair equality of opportunity, or a decent standard of living, but that does not mean we owe an individual help in obtaining something else just because the individual values it even more” (ibid., p. 67).
22 Feinberg, Joel, “The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan,” in Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 175–96.Google Scholar
23 It may be nice of you to help me in the pursuit of my ends—and, on some accounts, it may even be morally required. Even if one was to make the case that it is required, I still think that aiding has priority over benefiting.
24 There are various competing accounts of where the baseline should be set. Michael Walzer argues that the baseline is the level at which persons are enabled to be equal democratic citizens or have full membership in society (Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality [New York: Basic Books, 1983]).Google Scholar Martha Nussbaum argues that there are certain necessary functionings or capabilities for functionings that we must have in order to live a decent human life in “Aristotelian Social Democracy” (in Liberalism and the Good, edited by Douglas, R. B., Mara, G. M. and Richardson, H. S. [New York: Routledge, 1990], pp. 203–52).Google Scholar
25 Wil Waluchow brought this concern to my attention.
26 A referee for Dialogue has pointed out some of the political and practical complexities of this example. I agree that the issue is complicated by the fact that the underlying problem may have to do with mental illness or abuse. The philosophical point I am making is merely that individuals get to choose how to live their lives, even if we may not see the value in their choices. In the case of mental illness, for example, we would not say that the agent has freely chosen that course; nor would we think that this person is acting as a responsible agent. And so, the state would be obligated to bring him up to the baseline. (In cases where it is not possible to establish the baseline for physical or psychological reasons, the state would be obliged to provide care. What and how much is required of the state to help its members who can never be responsible agents is an interesting problem I will not take on here; however, I will say that the state's obligations in those instances are not grounded in the requirement to treat persons as equal agents.)
27 Moreover, there are many people who do have a generous amount of resources but are extremely unhappy. My account does recognize the importance of living a worthwhile life and being able to live a life on one's own terms, but it measures this in terms of responsible agency and not happiness.
28 See Dworkin, 's “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”Google Scholar for a full treatment of these objections to welfare egalitarianism.
29 For a persuasive argument that equality and responsibility are conceptually tied to reciprocity, see Ripstein, , Equality, Responsibility and the Law. This view endorses a Kantian conception of agency.Google Scholar
30 For a full account of these proposals, see Dworkin, Ronald, “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10, 4 (Autumn 1981): 283–345.Google Scholar
31 Frankfurt raises this same criticism against Dworkin, in “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” pp. 147–48.Google Scholar
32 While some versions of resource egalitarianism might seem to be doing the same thing I am doing, there is an important difference. I am assuming that the resource egalitarian is concerned with equalizing the bundle of resources even above the baseline—that is, we would distribute society's resources in a way that we provide everyone with equivalent bundles (by “equivalent,” I mean, as Dworkin, does, “envy-free”).Google Scholar My account, on the other hand, is less concerned with ensuring that persons have an equivalent bundle but rather that they have the resources they need to bring them up to the level of sufficiency. The amount of resources they receive is relative to the baseline and not relative to the amount of resources others have.
33 Arneson, Richard, “Why Justice Requires Transfers to Offset Income and Wealth Inequalities,” in Should Differences in Income and Wealth Matter?, edited by Paul, E. Frankel, Miller, F. D., and Paul, J. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 172–200.Google Scholar
34 Statistics Canada, January 2003.
35 Since Arneson is a prioritarian, his account will also favour person A.
36 In his criticism of the difference principle, Dworkin claims that it should not be exclusively the situation of the worst-off group that determines what is just (“What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” p. 114).Google Scholar I agree with this, but for different reasons. On my account, it cannot be about the situation of the worst-off if the worst-off is above the baseline. And so, what is just is determined by providing persons with the basic resources they need to exercise their agency.
37 This is the basic criticism that Harry Frankfurt makes against Dworkin and Nagel for their views on the moral significance of inequality (“Equality as a Moral Ideal”). He claims that their accounts seem plausible because they focus on the inequality between the very-well-off and the destitute, and that their accounts are much less plausible once we consider the inequality between the rich and the super-rich. Arneson accepts this claim but argues that it does not necessarily lead one to accept a sufficientarian position over other positions, such as his own prioritarianism.
38 There are other grounds on which one may attempt to justify welfare state programs aimed at equalizing resources, or even welfare; these include efficiency and social benefit.
39 This response was brought to my attention by Joseph Heath.
40 One could raise questions about the very conception of independently acquired wealth. While it may not be easy to say what is one's own in the cooperative society in which we live, we may be able to conceptually separate the resources that make up the cooperative surplus from the rest of society's resources.
41 This concern was raised by Philippe Van Parijs.
42 Nagel and Murphy express a similar view when they claim that taxes do not take away from taxpayers what is antecedently theirs (see The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002]). 43Google Scholar I need not take a stand on whether or not the starting point is just and equal here. Disagreement over this point need not lead to disagreement over the principle of just redistribution. Someone who believes that the initial distribution could only be just if it was equal could start there and still accept the principle of redistribution I advance.
44 In this article, my aim is to argue for the normative significance of the baseline. It will also be important to determine how much of the pie is mine once everyone is above the baseline, and how much we each individually have to give to support those below it, but that is not my focus here.
45 See Epstein, Richard,” Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?” (in Should Differences in Income and Wealth Matter? edited by Miller, F. D., Paul, E. F., and Paul, J. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], pp. 140–71)Google Scholar, for a libertarian account of the nature and extent to which the state may use coercion against its citizens. Epstein argues for a flat tax, even though he is sceptical of the social benefits of most redistributive strategies (p. 145).
46 Will Kymlicka argues that Nozick's libertarian view is based on equality and goes on to show that it is inadequate as a conception of equality (Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], pp. 102–65).Google Scholar
47 For a fuller discussion of Robert Nozick's entitlement theory and his views on distributive justice, see his “Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3, 1 (1973): 45–126Google Scholar, and Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 150–82.Google Scholar Concerns ought to be raised when Nozick goes on to argue that taxation is on par with forced labour even in the face of the empirical fact that the initial distribution is not just. The sufficientarian account differs significantly as it supports a patterned distribution. The resources persons are entitled to are not historically determined; no matter what the historical entitlement or the nature of the individual's interactions, she is entitled to be brought up to the baseline.
48 Consider Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example which provides intuitive support for persons' absolute property rights over their holdings. Chamberlain makes an extraordinary amount of money playing basketball. As a result of his natural talents, in combination with the good choices he has made and the hard work he has put in, he is very wealthy. In this same society, there are others who are less fortunate. There will certainly be some who are less fortunate as a result of poor choices they have made, but certainly there will also be some who are less fortunate because of either natural disadvantages or bad luck. Should we do something to help the less fortunate (at least this latter group whose misfortunes are undeserved)? Is it fair or just to take some of Chamberlain's legitimately earned money and give it to the poor and hungry in society? According to the libertarian, it would be unjust to redistribute Chamberlain's income (though no doubt it would be wonderful for him to give charitably) because he owns his talents and the products of his talents, as long as they were not unjustly acquired (Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 160–64).Google Scholar
49 Van Parijs refers to the former as formal freedom and the latter as “real freedom.” Real freedom includes having the means necessary for freedom; or, more precisely, it “incorporates all three components—security, self-ownership, and opportunity” whereas formal freedom only incorporates security and self-ownership. See Van Parijs, Philippe, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 21–24.Google Scholar
50 See Van Parijs, Philippe “Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20, 2 (1991): 101–31Google Scholar, and Van Parijs, , Real Freedom for All.Google Scholar
51 For a clear and straightforward summary of his view and the way it differs from other left-libertarians see an interview by Christopher Bertram which appeared in Imprints, 1, 3 (03 1997).Google Scholar
52 Van Parijs, , Real Freedom for All, p. 32.Google Scholar
53 A. Ripstein uses this same type of example to argue for a relational account of responsibility which he calls a reciprocity conception of responsibility which he contrasts with an agency account of responsibility (“Justice and Responsibility,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 17, 2 [07 2004]: 361–86).Google Scholar My account is similar to his in the respect that I agree that holding the gambler responsible is incoherent because a precondition of responsibility is interacting equally with others—which the destitute gambler is unable to do.
54 Setting up the scenarios as I have would make it seem likely that someone in Beth's condition would fall below the baseline. If so, she would also be given aid.
55 See especially equality of opportunity views such as those by Arneson, Richard, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989): 77–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cohen, Gerry A., “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics, 99 (1989): 906–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Roemer, John E., Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).Google Scholar
56 The libertarian would not give resources to either, but if asked to choose between them would likely give to Beth over Alvin because Alvin chose his condition, thus falling in line with the common intuitive response which is contrary to the one I propose.
57 The state has some latitude in determining the form the resources will take. For example, if Alvin is an addict, it does not make sense to continue to give him his share of resources in cash. Rather, he may need to be given psychological support. This same reasoning can be used to support provisions such as vouchers, food stamps, and housing allowances.
58 Again, it is consistent with everything I have said so far to maintain that aiding has priority over benefiting but not strict priority. That would be to acknowledge that making people better off also matters. But this would require a further argument.
59 I would like to thank audiences at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting at Dalhousie University, the University of Guelph, Laurier University, the Tri-University graduate seminar at McMaster University and the fellowship Hoover en éthique économique et sociale de l' Université Catholique de Louvain for helpful discussions. Special thanks for invaluable comments from Samantha Brennan, Joseph Heath, Dennis Klimchuk, Arthur Ripstein, Philippe Van Parijs, and Wil Waluchow.