Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T19:38:55.487Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Emotional Disagreement: The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

ISIDORA STOJANOVIC
ISIDORA STOJANOVIC*
Affiliation:
Institut Jean-Nicod - EHESS-ENS-CNRS
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

ABSTRACT: When we describe an event as sad or happy, we attribute to it a certain emotional value. Attributions of emotional value depend essentially on an agent (and on his or her emotional responses); and yet, people readily disagree over such values. My aim in this paper is to explain what happens in the case of “emotional disagreement”, and, more generally, to provide some insight into the semantics of value-attributions.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 99 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Egan, Andy, Hawthorne, John and Weatherson, Brian. 2005 “Epistemic Modals in Context.” In Contextualism in Philosophy. Preyer, G. and Peter, G., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kölbel, Max. 2002 Truth Without Objectivity. Routledge.Google Scholar
Lasersohn, Peter. 2005 “Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 28: 643–686.Google Scholar
López de Sa, Dan. 2008 “Presupposition of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement.” In Relative Truth, ed. by Kölbel, Max and García-Carpintero., ManuelOxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
MacFarlane, John. 2012 Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. UC Berkeley.Google Scholar
Richard, Mark. 2008 When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest. 2010 “The Epistemology of Disagreement.” In Social Epistemology. Haddock, A. et al. ., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stephenson, Tamina. 2007 “Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 487–525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stojanovic, Isidora. 2007 “Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth.” Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 691–706.Google Scholar
Stojanovic, Isidora 2008 What is Said: An Inquiry into Reference, Meaning and Content. VDM Verlag.Google Scholar
Stojanovic, Isidora 2011 “When (True) Disagreement Gives Out.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 32: 181–193.Google Scholar
Stojanovic, Isidora 2012 “Domain-Sensitivity.” Synthese 184: 137–155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sundell, Timothy 2011 “Disagreements About Taste.” Philosophical Studies 155: 267–288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar