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Conceptual Disagreement about Justice: Verbal, but Not Merely Verbal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2020

KYLE JOHANNSEN Open the ORCID record for KYLE JOHANNSEN [Opens in a new window]
KYLE JOHANNSEN*
Affiliation:
Trent University
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*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

In this paper, I introduce the articles contained in this special issue, and I briefly explain some of the main arguments presented in my book A Conceptual Investigation of Justice. A central claim in my book is that a verbal and yet also philosophically substantial disagreement over the word ‘justice’ lies at the heart of a number of issues in contemporary political philosophy. Over the course of introducing my book’s arguments and the commentaries in this issue, I also offer an account of what it means for a dispute to be verbal, but not merely verbal.

Ce texte offre un aperçu des articles composant ce numéro spécial et présente brièvement les principaux arguments avancés dans A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, dont une des thèses centrales veut qu’un important désaccord à la fois sémantique et philosophique sur la définition du terme «justice» soit au cœur de plusieurs questions en philosophie politique contemporaine. Cette présentation nous amène par ailleurs à décrire les caractéristiques d’un débat sémantique dont la portée dépasse la stricte sphère linguistique.

Keywords

Isaiah Berlinluck egalitarianismJohn Rawlsprocedural fairnessconcept-conception distinctionverbal disagreement
Type
Book Symposium: Kyle Johannsen’s A Conceptual Investigation of Justice
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 2019 , pp. 701 - 709
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2020 

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