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Boorse et les antipsychiatres : même combat?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2019

ANNE-MARIE GAGNÉ-JULIEN
ANNE-MARIE GAGNÉ-JULIEN*
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal
*
*[email protected]
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Abstract

Dans le débat portant sur la définition de la santé mentale, trois grandes approches peuvent être distinguées : l’approche normativiste (Szasz, Sarbin), l’approche naturaliste (Boorse) et l’approche hybride (Wakefield). Cet article vise à nuancer cette classification en clarifiant en quel sens Boorse, le représentant de l’approche naturaliste, peut être rangé dans cette catégorie. La conception de Boorse est beaucoup plus critique à l’égard de l’entreprise psychiatrique que ce qui est habituellement admis et les similarités entre Boorse et l’approche normativiste, quant à elles, sont beaucoup plus importantes.

In the debate over the definition of ‘mental health,’ three different approaches are generally distinguished: the normativist approach (Szasz, Sarbin), the hybrid approach (Wakefield) and the naturalistic approach (Boorse). This paper qualifies this classification by clarifying the sense in which Christopher Boorse defends a naturalistic approach vis-à-vis the central concepts of psychiatry. This paper also clarifies in what way Boorse is opposed to the normativist approach advocated by some authors of the anti-psychiatric movement, such as Szasz.

Type
Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 Prize Winning Papers / Gagnants des prix de l’essai 2018 de l’Association canadienne de philosophie
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 197 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2019 

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