1. Introduction
In the third deductionFootnote 1 of the Parmenides, Parmenides attempts to show how change from stasis to kinesis or from kinesis to stasis is possible through the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης.Footnote 2 In the literature on the Parmenides, τὸ ἐξαίφνης has often been identified with eternity in one way or another. My aim in this article is to show, with Martin Heidegger, that the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the third deduction need not be identified with eternity, or a trace of eternity in time, but rather that it signifies a new, or more precisely an “originary,” conception of time.Footnote 3 I will do this by showing that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is introduced in the third deduction to solve the relationship between stasis and kinesis that becomes problematic in the second deduction due the notion of τὸ νῦν (the now) and the understanding of time implicit in this notion of τὸ νῦν. I will show that, for Heidegger, τὸ ἐξαίφνης not only takes the place of τὸ νῦν of deduction two but overturns the whole conception of time implied in it.
This article is divided into three main sections, which are further divided into sub-sections. Section 2 focuses on the concepts of stasis, kinesis, and time. Section 2.1 explicates what is meant by the concepts of stasis and kinesis, as Plato generally understands them, and how τὸ νῦν in deduction two makes change between the two difficult to reconcile. Section 2.2 makes explicit the conception of time implied in the τὸ νῦν of deduction two. Section 2.3 contrasts and compares τὸ νῦν of deduction two with τὸ νῦν in the poem of the historical Parmenides. Section 3 examines how τὸ ἐξαίφνης has been identified with eternity in the literature on Plato's Parmenides. Section 3.1 examines how Ron Polansky and Joe Cimakasky (Reference Polansky and Cimakasky2013) and Søren Kierkegaard (Reference Kierkegaard and Thomte1980) identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with eternity. Section 3.2 analyzes the subtle and complex account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης provided by Spyridon Rangos (Reference Rangos2014). I argue that even though Rangos does not wholly identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with τὸ νῦν of the second deduction, he nonetheless assimilates it into the conception of time implied in τὸ νῦν and identifies it with eternity. Lastly, in Section 4, I turn to Heidegger's account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in Plato's (Reference Plato, Gill and Ryan1996) Parmenides to show how it signifies an originary understanding of time. Section 4.1 outlines what Heidegger calls the “ordinary conception of time” (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger, Macquarrie and Robinson2008, p. 374). Section 4.2 analyzes Heidegger's account of the relationship between τὸ ἐξαίφνης and μεταβολή (change or shift) in the Parmenides. Section 4.3 discusses how Heidegger's interpretation of τὸ ἐξαίφνης implies a belonging-together of past and future with the present signifying an originary account of time. Lastly, Section 4.4 briefly outlines how Heidegger's interpretation of time in the third deduction of Plato's Parmenides mirrors his account of originary temporality in Being and Time.
2. Stasis, Kinesis, and Time
2.1. Stasis Kinesis, and τὸ νῦν
Parmenides, in the third deduction of the Parmenides, endeavours to demonstrate how change from stasis to kinesis and from kinesis to stasis can be accounted for. What is implied in this demonstration, which is not made explicit in the Parmenides, is Plato's understanding of stasis (rest) and kinesis (motion/process) and their relationship to τὸ νῦν. Stasis implies that a thing at rest remains what it is, whereas kinesis implies that a thing in a process never remains what it is but is constantly leaving-off what it is. Furthermore, for Plato, in τὸ νῦν, a thing can only be what it is; whereas in a process, a thing, since it never is what it is but is in a constant process of leaving-off what it is, can never be in τὸ νῦν but must always already be on its way beyond τὸ νῦν towards the future; this is implied by Parmenides when, in the second deduction, he says, “if it was going forward, it could never be grasped by the now …. [A thing going forward is] releasing the now and reaching for the later” (152c).Footnote 4 Kierkegaard has insight into this nature of kinesis when, in reference to Plato's Parmenides, he says, “because every moment, as well as the sum total of the moments, is a process (a passing by), no moment is a present ….” (Kierkegaard, Reference Kierkegaard and Thomte1980, p. 85). However, a serious problem is encountered here because in the second deduction Parmenides also claims that if a thing is in a process, then it cannot “sidestep the now, whenever a thing is at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever it may have come to be” (152d). For a process to be a genuine process, it must always already be on its way beyond τὸ νῦν towards the future; but it is claimed that what is in τὸ νῦν stops “coming-to-be” and can only “be,” and since what is in a process cannot sidestep τὸ νῦν, this means that what is in τὸ νῦν can never go beyond it, and thus a thing can never be in a process. This implies that “the now excludes becoming and by so doing it excludes any possibility of change” (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 546), a thing can only be what it is in the now and can never change into something other than what it is.
Since τὸ νῦν excludes any process/becoming and change (μɛταβολή), then a thing cannot undergo a μɛταβολή from stasis to kinesis and from kinesis to stasis in τὸ νῦν; no transition is possible in τὸ νῦν. What Parmenides seeks to grasp in the third deduction is how a μɛταβολή from stasis to kinesis and from kinesis to stasis, that the concept of τὸ νῦν makes impossible, can be possible. To solve this problem, Parmenides attempts to make sense of the concept of μɛταβολή itself. How can a thing that continues to be what it is (stasis) change (μɛταβάλλɛιν) to leaving-off what it is (kinesis) and how can a thing that continues to leave-off what it is change to being what it is; what allows for this μɛταβολή? Since this μɛταβολή from stasis into kinesis and vice versa cannot be made sense of in τὸ νῦν, the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης is introduced to account for it. For Heidegger, τὸ ἐξαίφνης, in his seminar on the Parmenides, not only takes the place of τὸ νῦν of deduction two but overturns the whole conception of time implied in it.Footnote 5 An in-depth analysis of τὸ ἐξαίφνης requires a further clarification of Plato's understanding of time implicit in the conception of τὸ νῦν that appears in deduction two.
2.2. τὸ νῦν and Time
Implicit in the understanding of τὸ νῦν outlined above, that makes μɛταβολή between kinesis and stasis impossible, is a certain conception of time. Parmenides conceives of the “now time” as lying in-between “was and will be” (152b) — or, in other words, Parmenides conceives of the present as lying in-between and separated from the past and the future that are only externally related to the present. Here past, present, and future are completely separated from each other, occupying their own distinct domains. The implication of the terms “was” and “will be” in deduction two are key to understanding why this is so. “Was” implies that a thing in the past is understood as already “having been,” with “having been” indicating that it is not. “Will be” implies that a thing in the future is understood as “yet to be,” with “yet to be” indicating that it is not yet. Effectively, the present is the only place where something properly is, the present only possesses a relationship to being, and whatever is in the past and future cannot be. The non-being of past and future are excluded from the being of the present. This exclusion is responsible for the fact that nothing can undergo a μɛταβολή in τὸ νῦν. Change requires that “what is” (being) can leave-off what it is; this “leaving-off” is only possible if being has a relationship with non-being. For something to undergo a μɛταβολή from stasis to kinesis, the being of the present has to have a relationship to the non-being of the future and past, and for something to undergo a μɛταβολή from kinesis to stasis, the non-being of the future and past has to have a relationship to the being of the present, this is what the concept of τὸ ἐξαίφνης makes possible on Heidegger's account.
In deduction three, since μɛταβολή cannot be accounted for through the understanding of time that is divided into past, present, and future, Heidegger argues that μɛταβολή is transposed into τὸ ἐξαίφνης by Parmenides. For Heidegger, this transposition implies an originary account of time. To make sense of μɛταβολή proper, there needs to be a transformation of how the relationship of past and future with the present is thought. They have to be thought as belonging-together, or internally related. Time implied in τὸ νῦν of deduction two divides past, present, and future where only the present is what properly can be said to be, excluding it from the non-being of the past and future; whereas τὸ ἐξαίφνης brings them together in a belonging-together. Let's take a brief detour to examine how the understanding of τὸ νῦν in deduction two and the conception of time implicit in it mirror the understanding of τὸ νῦν and time in the poem of the historical Parmenides. This will help us get an insight into three things: (1) the conception of time that Plato is struggling with is already implicit in and inherited from the thought of the historical Parmenides; (2) the relationship between the historical Parmenides and the character Parmenides that Plato employs in the dialogue Parmenides; and (3) why τὸ νῦν in the thought of historical Parmenides as well as in Plato's Parmenides should not be identified with eternity.
2.3. Historical Parmenides and τὸ νῦν
ParmenidesFootnote 6 says that being “was not, nor will it be at some time, since it is now, together, whole, One, continuous” (D8, 10).Footnote 7 Here, being is possessed only by τὸ νῦν; this “possession” leads to precisely the same conception of time that is implied in the “now time” of deduction two of the Parmenides (which has been outlined in the previous sub-section). Parmenides, just like Plato's Parmenides in deduction two, assumes that it is only in τὸ νῦν that something can be. Whatever is in the past or future cannot be. This is why Parmenides says, “For what birth could you seek for it? … from what could it have grown? Not from what is not — I shall not allow” (D8, 10–15); in these passages, Parmenides identifies “is” with τὸ νῦν and past and future with “is not.” Thus, the only thing that can be is what τὸ νῦν possesses, wherein the past and present are non-being with no inherent relationship to τὸ νῦν. It can be concluded that, for Parmenides, if being is to be being, it must be without a past or future and only possess a relation to τὸ νῦν.
The main difference between Plato's Parmenides and the historical Parmenides is that Plato's Parmenides does not deny process (kinesis) and change (μɛταβολή) but rather just assumes it and seeks to give an account of it. But this presumption is precisely what leads to the difficulty in understanding how a μɛταβολή between kinesis and stasis and vice versa is possible: Plato has inherited the conception of time where only τὸ νῦν possesses a relationship with being from Parmenides. Parmenides, on the one hand, does not fall into this contradiction because he outright denies kinesis and μɛταβολή. Plato's Parmenides, on the other hand, does not deny kinesis and μɛταβολή but brings in the concept of τὸ ἐξαίφνης to explain them by overcoming the understanding of time implied in τὸ νῦν, which separates the past, present, and future into their own distinct domains.
This account of being as pastless and futureless by Parmenides has led many to suggest that he is asserting timeless being, wherein “timeless” presumes that “what is” without time is eternal. However, Heidegger instead postulates that, “Parmenides never claims … that Being is timeless, without temporal relation; a fortiori there is nothing here about eternity” (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger and Rojcewicz2015, p. 127). In effect, the determination of being as “it is now” is not a determination of timelessness or eternity but a determination of time itself being identified with τὸ νῦν. τὸ νῦν, for Parmenides, is an element of time and not of eternity. This is likewise how τὸ νῦν is understood in the second deduction of the Parmenides and is the reason that Plato's Parmenides explicitly refers to it as the “now time” (152b, emphasis mine). Before I turn to Heidegger's account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, a further examination of how τὸ ἐξαίφνης has often been identified with eternity in the literature requires our attention.
3. τὸ ἐξαίφνης and Eternity
Parmenides describes τὸ ἐξαίφνης as being “in no time at all” (156e) and as being literally “out of place” (atopon) (156d). This identification of τὸ ἐξαίφνης with “no time” and atopon has led many scholars to assume that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is linked with eternity. Atopon seems to imply a link to eternity because in time a thing is understood to be in some definite state or another, that is to say a thing has a place (topos). The description of τὸ ἐξαίφνης as atopon (or a-topos) has led to suggestions that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is “out of place” in the sense that it has no place in time, and since it has no place in time, then it must be out of time, i.e., eternal.
3.1. Polansky and Cimakasky and Kierkegaard
Polansky and Cimakasky, in their article “Counting the Hypotheses in Plato's Parmenides” identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with eternity, in the sense that τὸ ἐξαίφνης signifies “the moment of transition [that] is not extended in time” (Polansky & Cimakasky, Reference Polansky and Cimakasky2013, p. 236). For them this “not extended in time” implies that the conception of time as extension (time as a mere aggregate of nows separated into past, present, and future as distinct domains) is maintained and τὸ ἐξαίφνης as non-extended is completely removed from the temporal stretch. In being removed from time, τὸ ἐξαίφνης is taken to be the opposite of time, namely eternal. Polansky and Cimakasky explicitly refer to it as “the eternal ‘instant’” (Polansky & Cimakasky, Reference Polansky and Cimakasky2013, p. 240) and that which is in τὸ ἐξαίφνης as “unchangingly outside time” (Polansky & Cimakasky, Reference Polansky and Cimakasky2013, p. 237). Thus, the conception of τὸ ἐξαίφνης here is not understood to imply a new understanding of time but is instead identified with the eternal to make sense of its being in “no time” and its atopon character. Furthermore, Polansky and Cimakasky's adherence to the conception of time as a stretch where τὸ νῦν is the only real part of the time is implied, although not explicitly stated, in their statement that the “‘now’ is the sensible analogue to the ‘instant’, which is not in time at all” (Polansky & Cimakasky, Reference Polansky and Cimakasky2013, p. 239). The issue with Polansky and Cimakasky's conception is that Parmenides never explicitly identifies τὸ ἐξαίφνης with eternity; instead, it is simply assumed that the concept of τὸ ἐξαίφνης being in “no time” means that it ought to be identified with eternity.
Kierkegaard, in speaking of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, says, “Nothing is as swift as a blink of an eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal …. What we call the moment, Plato calls τὸ ἐξαίφνης [the sudden] …. The moment is not properly an atom of time but an atom of eternity” (Kierkegaard, Reference Kierkegaard and Thomte1980, pp. 87–88).Footnote 8 τὸ ἐξαίφνης for Kierkegaard is not completely removed from time as stretch, as it is for Polansky and Cimakasky; rather, he identifies it as a trace of eternity within time (Kierkegaard, Reference Kierkegaard and Thomte1980, p. 87). This is because time for Kierkegaard is not conceived of as mere aggregate of atomistic nows but is conceived of as a process of passing by where no moment properly is, no moment is properly present (Kierkegaard, Reference Kierkegaard and Thomte1980, p. 85). The present moment understood as τὸ ἐξαίφνης is not an atom of time through which the past moves into the future; rather, for Kierkegaard, if the present moment is to have real presence, it must be understood as a trace of eternity which allows for eternity amidst the passing by of time. Thus, the present, τὸ ἐξαίφνης, is “not properly an atom of time but an atom of eternity.” Again, Kierkegaard likewise makes the mistake of connecting τὸ ἐξαίφνης with eternity, which is part of time understood as a stretch, but he nonetheless offers the important insight that Parmenides seeks to retain a temporal relation with this concept.Footnote 9
3.2. Rangos
Rangos (Reference Rangos2014) provides a subtler account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in his article “Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the Parmenides” than the ones mentioned above. It is, in many respects, quite close to Heidegger's own account. The key difference, however, is that while Rangos understands τὸ ἐξαίφνης as not wholly identified with unchanging eternity, it is nonetheless assimilated into the conception of time as a stretch and connected to eternity. In this section, I will show how this is the case. Rangos does not identify τὸ ἐξαίφνης with unchanging eternity because he is aware of the contradiction that the understanding of τὸ νῦν in deduction two creates between stasis and kinesis that has been outlined in Section 2. He argues that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is introduced to solve this contradiction. Rangos claims that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is not identical with τὸ νῦν because τὸ νῦν is closed off to kinesis whereas τὸ ἐξαίφνης is open to, and makes possible, kinesis.Footnote 10 So, a complicated account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης that is open to becoming is given. But nonetheless, I would like to show, it is tied to the concept of time implied in τὸ νῦν of deduction two and to eternity for Rangos. Let's briefly outline Rangos's insightful account so it can be shown why this is so.
3.2.1. τὸ ἐξαίφνης and Time as a Stretch
Rangos argues that in the Parmenides time is inherently understood as a stretch. However, τὸ ἐξαίφνης is claimed to be “in no time.” This means that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is in “no time” in the sense that it is inherently not a stretch. Nonetheless, τὸ ἐξαίφνης is not “outside” the temporal stretch (which can be represented on a line) because Rangos conceives of it as a non-extended point within the temporal line or stretch. Even though τὸ ἐξαίφνης cannot be part of time as stretch, this does not mean that it cannot be a “duration-less point in the temporal flow” (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 545). So, τὸ ἐξαίφνης is not in time because it does not possess what any part of time must inherently possess, namely stretch, extension, or duration, but it is nonetheless an element of this temporal line as an un-extended point. Un-extended points lack the most important feature of a temporal line, namely extension, but it can nonetheless be said that there are un-extended points everywhere and anywhere on the line. In his own words:
From the account of τὸ ἐξαίφνης that I have given so far, it follows that the sudden moment must be everywhere along the temporal axis without however being part of time as duration. (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 546)
It can already be seen here that for Rangos τὸ ἐξαίφνης does not imply the overcoming of the understanding of time as a stretch but is rather assimilated, as a dimensionless point, into it, mirroring Kierkegaard's account in many ways. But how is this notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης connected to eternity? To understand this, Rangos conception of the relationship between τὸ ἐξαίφνης and τὸ νῦν needs to be discussed.
3.2.2. τὸ ἐξαίφνης as Eternal
Rangos argues that τὸ ἐξαίφνης of the third deduction should not be identified with τὸ νῦν of the second deduction. It has been shown earlier that τὸ νῦν of the second deduction is that aspect of the present that excludes all kinesis and, thus, denies any possibility of change (μɛταβολή). Rangos acknowledges this point and argues that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is introduced in the third deduction precisely to overcome this difficulty. As he says:
The now cannot be the locus of becoming, i.e., of change as a process. The now can only host Being. With the introduction of the notion of the now Parmenides, and by implication Plato, wanted to indicate that in the midst of Becoming there is always a trace of Being. It is this conclusion of the second deduction, I take it, that led Parmenides to introduce, in the third deduction, a new concept which would allow the interplay of Being and Becoming to occur. And this new concept is no other than the sudden moment [τὸ ἐξαίφνης]. (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 547)
For Rangos, τὸ ἐξαίφνης is the odd aspect of the present that is open to μɛταβολή and allows for it, whereas the now (τὸ νῦν) is the other aspect of the present that is closed off to μɛταβολή and as a consequence to kinesis. A thing is always in the now in the sense that it has being and does not become, but at the same time a thing is always in τὸ ἐξαίφνης in that it is open to and has the potential to become other, to leave-off what it is. τὸ ἐξαίφνης is that which is open to and allows for becoming to be and being to become, it makes possible the interplay between being and becoming (stasis and kinesis) that τὸ νῦν of the second deduction is unable to permit. What is implied in the claim that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is that aspect of the present that is open to kinesis? What is the nature of this kinesis as understood by Rangos?
Whatever is advancing in time is in τὸ νῦν in the sense that it is, and it is in τὸ ἐξαίφνης in that this “it is” is open to and always has the potential to become other, to leave-off what it is. This means that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is an ever-present element as the potential to become other. However, τὸ ἐξαίφνης fully manifests itself only occasionally for Rangos. When a thing is in motion, it is ascribed the predicate of motion, no matter how fast or slow or whichever direction it is moving. This predicate does not apply to the same object only when it comes to rest. So, even though τὸ ἐξαίφνης is in principle present in all minor and/or major changes of speed and direction, making these changes possible, it only fully manifests itself in major shifts when certain key predicates (forms) are gained or lost (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 551). What this gaining and losing of predicates implies is that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is that aspect of the present that makes possible the transition of participation from one eternal form to the other.
So, τὸ νῦν is that aspect of the present that allows the thing to be what it is. τὸ ἐξαίφνης is that other aspect of the present that allows this “it is” to lose or gain key property(s) and become other. This means that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is that aspect of the present moment that allows for an eternal form or property of a thing to leave-off and for another form or property that is not yet to come to be. But what is the status of the property that “leaves-off” and the property that is not yet that “comes to be” here? Does the property that leaves-off vanish into the non-being of the past? Does the property that is “not yet” come to be from a non-existing future? It seems to me that this is not the case. Rather, the forms that leave-off the present and the forms that come-to-be in the present, come and leave directly out of and into eternity through τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ ἐξαίφνης for Rangos has no connection with past or future but with the eternal forms themselves. If my interpretation of Rangos is correct, then it is evident that all that is actual is the present-time alone and past and future are divided off as unreal (non-being). τὸ ἐξαίφνης is connected to eternity in the sense that it lets eternal forms leave-off and come-to-be in the present time and it is in this sense then that τὸ ἐξαίφνης makes kinesis and μɛταβολή possible for Rangos. This is what seems to be implied in Rangos's claim that “Both the now and the sudden are traces of eternity in time” (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 552). τὸ ἐξαίφνης does not open us to future or past, but it connects us to the eternal forms that are not in time, and in this sense, it is understood as a trace of eternity in time. For Heidegger, by contrast, as I explain in the next section, it cannot be said that the “sudden moment [τὸ ἐξαίφνης] is always in the present” (Rangos, Reference Rangos2014, p. 546) excluding past and future, but rather that the τὸ ἐξαίφνης signifies the belonging-together of the present with the past and future.
4. Heidegger's Interpretation of τὸ ἐξαίφνης
It has been shown that the understanding of time implied in τὸ νῦν of deduction two assumes a complete separation of the present from the past and the future. This understanding of time does not allow for a μɛταβολή from statis to kinesis and vice versa. According to Heidegger, this is solved by τὸ ἐξαίφνης of deduction three by presenting a new, or rather a more originary, conception of time where past and future are thought of as belonging-together with the present. Let's look at what this new conception of time is and how it is tied to the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης.
4.1. Ordinary Conception of Time
The understanding of time implicit in τὸ νῦν of deduction two signifies what Heidegger in his own work calls the “ordinary conception of time” (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger, Macquarrie and Robinson2008, p. 374), and which I will refer to as the “representational understanding of time.” Representational understanding of time is derived out of the measurement of change. Entities are seen changing from one state to another and out of this perception arises the measurement of change, which entails the representational understanding of time. Take the example of a ball that was hot but now is cold; perception categorizes this change into the past which is no longer (perception of ball that was hot); present which only is (perception of ball which is cold); and the future which is not yet. Through this measurement of change, by means of perception, an understanding of time emerges that prioritizes the present since it is only what properly is, separating it from was (the past) and will be (the future) that occupy distinct domains that are not, and are external to the present. This representational understanding of time, emerging through perception of change, inherently leads to the problem of μɛταβολή, as discussed earlier.
4.2. μɛταβολή and τὸ ἐξαίφνης
The difficulty in understanding a μɛταβολή from stasis to kinesis and vice versa — a difficulty that emerges due to the representational understanding of time — is what leads Parmenides to the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in deduction three. To make sense of change from stasis to kinesis and vice versa, there first needs to be an understanding of μɛταβολή itself. Since the conception of the present in the representational understanding of time cannot make sense of μɛταβολή, Parmenides transposes μɛταβολή in τὸ ἐξαίφνης (156d). According to Heidegger, this transposition signifies a conception of measureless time (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 19). “Measureless” signifies a non-representational, pre-perceptual, understanding of time. Prior to the understanding of time that emerges from perceptual measurement of change, representational understanding, there is a more originary understanding of time. This is the understanding of “measureless” time that τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the third deduction signifies. To gain an insight into this, let's first clarify what τὸ ἐξαίφνης precisely entails.
Heidegger points out that τὸ ἐξαίφνης entails two things: (1) the “unforeseen,” and (2) and the “at once.” (1) The “unforeseen” implies that τὸ ἐξαίφνης resists measurement or representation, it has the character of the “unexpected” or it has the character of, as is said in common parlance, “out of the blue.” This is indicated when τὸ ἐξαίφνης is conceived of as being in “no time” (156e) and atopon (156d) by Parmenides. The identification of τὸ ἐξαίφνης with “no time” does not mean that τὸ ἐξαίφνης is outside time, eternal, but only that it does not fit into the conception of time that emerges out of perceptual measurement of change which is perceived as occurring in some determinate entity — i.e., it does not fit into the representational understanding of time. This is implied in the following passage by Heidegger:
The exaiphnes is no characteristic of time, is no time; …. “no time” means only: no time in which and at which a thing is a determinate something, no time through which something could be counted (Aristotle!). (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 18)
(2) The “at once” implies that τὸ ἐξαίφνης takes place “in one moment,” meaning that it is not stretched out in any way but has the characteristic of taking place “all-of-a-sudden.”
So, τὸ ἐξαίφνης has the characteristic of “unforeseen” and the “at once,” and since in deduction three μɛταβολή is transported into τὸ ἐξαίφνης, this means that μɛταβολή must inherently have these characteristics. First, μɛταβολή must be understood as that which is “unforeseen,” as that which cannot be measured or represented, undermining the conception of time that emerges out of the perceptual measurement of μɛταβολή. Second, μɛταβολή must be understood as occurring “at once.” This “at once” signifies that μɛταβολή is not stretched out in any way but occurs all-of-a-sudden. This implies that the three domains of time (was, is, will be) cannot be divided into their own separate domains but are squeezed down to a point — to the “at once.” The two characteristics that μɛταβολή takes up by being transposed into τὸ ἐξαίφνης are pointed out in the following passage by Heidegger:
The all-of-a-sudden [τὸ ἐξαίφνης] has no duration and stretch; it cannot be measured. Unforeseen: it is that which cannot be foreseen, that which resists all measuring …. (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 19)
4.3. Belonging-Together of Past and Future with the Present
The idea that μɛταβολή implies a squeezing down of time to a point by being transposed to τὸ ἐξαίφνης is explained by Heidegger in the following passage:
Through the transposition of metabole in the exaiphnes, time is, as it were, squeezed down to a point so that it loses its character of being stretched out …. Time (as stretch) disappears …. (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 19)
For Heidegger, τὸ ἐξαίφνης does not signify eternity or some abstract dimensionless point on a line. Rather, the transposition of μɛταβολή in τὸ ἐξαίφνης implies that time is no longer understood as separated into distinct domains of past, present, and future, which can be represented on a line; rather, there is a reduction of the past, present, and future to a point, to an “at once.” This reduction does not mean the abandonment of the difference between past, present, and future to some kind of undifferentiated unity. Rather, it implies a belonging-together of the three. This “belonging-together” is hinted at by Parmenides in the following passage, in Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan's and Heidegger's translations, while discussing τὸ ἐξαίφνης:
The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of the two states. (Plato, Reference Plato, Gill and Ryan1996, 156d, emphasis mine)
Out of the sudden what changes, as changing, changes into each of the two. (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 18).
This is the passage, often glossed over, that for Heidegger hints at a new conception of time. μɛταβολή does not occur in time if time is understood as a stretch separating past and future from the present. Rather, μɛταβολή occurs in and out of τὸ ἐξαίφνης. μɛταβολή occurring in and out of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, for Heidegger, implies that μɛταβολή must be understood through the characteristics of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, meaning that μɛταβολή must be understood as τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Now, since μɛταβολή is identified with τὸ ἐξαίφνης, this entails that the three domains of μɛταβολή are also identified with τὸ ἐξαίφνης, as I have already hinted at. Was, is, and will be must be “unforeseen” and occur “at once.” The “unforeseen” here entails that these three domains of μɛταβολή must be grasped in some way prior to any perceptual measurement, or representation, of determinate entities. The “at once” implies that past and future belong-together with the present, they are internal to the present in some way. But how is one to understand this “belonging-together”? In speaking of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, Parmenides says:
to [ɛἰς] it and from [ἐκ] it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving. (156e, emphasis mine)
This passage, in light of the passage quoted above, implies that the “to” and “from” occurs from out of τὸ ἐξαίφνης. This is what is meant by the claim that time has been squeezed down to a point, meaning that the “to-from” belong-together. This, for Heidegger, means:
That which is becoming is already, before one perceives it, unforeseen, slipping away, already underway, — but it is at once also already arriving. In the ἐκ [from] is already found the ɛἰς [towards] and in the ɛἰς is still found the ἐκ. (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 19, emphasis mine)
Since ἐκ and ɛἰς occur in τὸ ἐξαίφνης at once, it necessarily follows that in τὸ ἐξαίφνης, the ɛἰς is internal to the ἐκ and the ἐκ is internal to the ɛἰς. This means that from which something comes to be, the past, and that towards which something slips away, the future, belong-together in τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Here, past and future are not thought of as being separated from the present occupying their own distinct domains. In τὸ ἐξαίφνης, past does not come first, which afterwards moves to the future, but the future always already includes the past within itself, and the past always already is underway in the future, occurring at once, unforeseen in τὸ ἐξαίφνης; or it could be said to be occurring at once, unforeseen, in the present. Here τὸ ἐξαίφνης signifies a new concept of presence or the present. How are we to understand this new conception of the present and the belonging-together or occurrence at once, of the past, present, and future more concretely?
To grasp this, the future must not be understood as that which is not yet but will be later on. Rather, the future must be understood as that which is to come. Since the future is understood as that which is coming, it must always already be coming back towards (ɛἰς) the from (ἐκ). So, the future is that which is coming, and this coming implies that it is always already coming back towards what-has-been, the past; the ɛἰς is always already coming towards the ἐκ. The past here is not something that is no longer, rather in the future's process of coming is entailed that it is always already in the process of having been, the past is intertwined with the future's coming. This process of future's coming to the past occurs in the present, in τὸ ἐξαίφνης.Footnote 11 In short, the transposition of μɛταβολή in τὸ ἐξαίφνης implies that the future, as that which is coming, is coming towards what-has-been, occurring in and out of τὸ ἐξαίφνης, the present. This, then, is what is meant by the claim that in τὸ ἐξαίφνης, the ɛἰς is internal to the ἐκ and the ἐκ is internal to the ɛἰς and this is the belonging-together of the past and future with the present, signifying a new conception of time. In the ordinary conception of time, past and future, the ἐκ and ɛἰς, are not internal to the present (τὸ νῦν); they do not belong-together with the present, but are external to it occupying their own distinct domains, merely externally related to the present.
This analysis remains quite abstract, and its significance is not immediately evident. To get a brief insight into its significance and to try to bring it down to earth a bit, let's briefly look at Heidegger's account of original temporality in Being and Time, which mirrors the account of time in deduction three of the Parmenides in a different context.
4.4. Plato's Parmenides and Heidegger's Being and Time
Having explained the conception of time implied by the transposition of μɛταβολή in τὸ ἐξαίφνης, Heidegger goes on to claim that “the inner connection between time and psyche becomes evident; Aristotle: without the soul there is no time!” (Marcuse, Reference Marcusen.d., p. 19). However, it is not clear what this means; Heidegger does not justify or explain this claim at all in the seminar. One can get a hint of what this identification of time with the soul means as well as a deeper insight into Heidegger's analysis of time in deduction three of the Parmenides by looking at Heidegger's account of originary temporality in Being and Time. In Being and Time Heidegger's aim, at least in the part of the book that was published, is not to make sense of how kinesis and μɛταβολή are possible as it is in the second and third deduction of the Parmenides. Rather, he seeks to understand the being of the human being. His analysis penultimately leads him to a conception of originary temporalityFootnote 12 that mirrors his analysis of time in the third deduction of the Parmenides:
Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a “succession”. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in a process of having been. (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger, Macquarrie and Robinson2008, p. 401)
The ordinary conception of time implies that the past is no longer, the future is not yet and only the present is what properly is. This ordinary conception prioritizes the present because it is only what is, separating it from past and future as that which are not. This assumes a series of now moments to which past and future remain external. For Heidegger, however, prior to this ordinary conception, the human being is always already in anticipation of the future, which is coming towards us. Future does not mean a “now” that is not yet actual but will be actual for the first time later. Rather, the future is that which is coming (Kunft); it is coming back to us. This anticipation of the future, which is coming back to us, is coming back to us who are as we already were; as carrying what-has-been, the past, within ourselves (Heidegger, Reference Heidegger, Macquarrie and Robinson2008, p. 373). “What has been” here signifies that which the future is coming back to is us who are the product of their past, carrying the past within themselves, the past being the culture and the history in which one finds oneself. In this sense, the past is always already entailed in the futures coming towards us. That which is opened up in the anticipation of the future is our having-been-ness (Gewesenheit), which is “released” into the present moment of action or encounter. This present moment can be referred to as the “ecstatic moment,” mirroring the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the Parmenides. What does this being “released” in the present moment of action or encounter mean? It is only in the present that one's acts or encounters have presence. Any present encounter or action always already implies future anticipation that opens itself to the past that is released into the present encounter or action. To use an ontic example, when I pick up the hammer to hammer a nail, there is an anticipation of that for which I am hammering. This anticipation of that which is to come from hammering a nail opens me up to my past know-how of how to hammer. This anticipation that opens itself to the past know-how is released into the present action of hammering. It is in this sense, then, that the future and past is always already there assumed in all present action or encounter. The hammer does not merely lie there present-at-hand indifferent to the past and future.
In this all-too-brief sketch, it can be seen that the original phenomenon of time in Being and Time mirrors Heidegger's analysis of time as τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the Parmenides. Deduction three of the Parmenides argues that the from and towards of the μɛταβολή occurs in τὸ ἐξαίφνης. The future as that which is coming is always already in the process of having been, occurring, or it could be said being released, in τὸ ἐξαίφνης. Being and Time argues that anticipation of the future is always already in the process of coming towards us, us who are their “has been,” their past, which is released, or it could be said occurs, in the ecstatic moment. Both accounts mirror each other and imply a simultaneous belonging-together of the past and future with the present. What is also evident in our analysis of originary temporality in Being and Time — which is not immediately evident in the Parmenides — is that this “originary temporality” describes the most primordial structure of human existence. This perhaps is what is meant by Heidegger's claim about “the inner connection between time and psyche” in the seminar on the Parmenides. However, it is not at all clear what leads him to claim this based on what is said in the Parmenides. What is it that is said in the Parmenides that hints at this inner connection between time and psyche? Is it because τὸ ἐξαίφνης is inherently an occurrence of human existence? Or can τὸ ἐξαίφνης be conceived of as a part of human independent “reality” in some way? The answer to this question is not clear.
5. Conclusion
In this article, I have argued, with Heidegger, that the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the third deduction does not signify eternity, or a trace of eternity in time, but rather implies a radically new, or an originary, conception of time, which implies the belonging-together of the past and future with the present. First, I showed how in the second deduction the relationship between stasis and kinesis becomes problematic due to the notion of τὸ νῦν. Second, I showed that the conception of time implicit in τὸ νῦν of the second deduction leads Parmenides to posit τὸ ἐξαίφνης in order to solve the problematic relationship between stasis and kinesis. Third, I showed how τὸ ἐξαίφνης has often been identified with eternity in the literature. Lastly, I showed how, on Heidegger's view, τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the third deduction of the Parmenides does not signify eternity in any sense but rather signifies an originary conception of time — the belonging-together of past and future with the present.
Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Professor Francisco J. Gonzalez for conducting an insightful seminar on Plato's Parmenides during the Fall semester of 2022 at the University of Ottawa. The seminar piqued my interest in this project. Additionally, I extend my appreciation to Jill Flohil for her valuable assistance, and to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. Lastly, I would like to thank my friend Amy Hull for her editing support with the paper, and Professor Boris Hennig for his feedback.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
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