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Two Dialogues1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1968

D. C. Emmons
D. C. Emmons
Affiliation:
C. W. Post College of Long Island University
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Extract

Place: an academic institution somewhere in the U.S. or U.K.

Time: late one morning.

Simplicitus: Hello there. Nice to see you.

Sophisticus: Good to see you. What have you been up to ?

Sim: I've been wrestling with a nasty epistemological problem.

But I've finally got it figured out.

Soph: What problem?

Sim: The problem of other minds. It's a real teaser.

Soph: And what solution have you worked out?

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 7 , Issue 3 , December 1968 , pp. 410 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1968

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References

2 Cf. Smart, J. J. C, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” Philosophical Review LXVIII (1959) pp. 131–156; Place, U. T., “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?” British Journal of Psychology XLVII (1956) pp. 44–50; and Feigl, H., “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II (1958) pp. 370–497.

3 cf. Strawson, P. F., “Persons,” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol II (1958), pp. 330–353.

4 cf. Ashby, W. Ross, Design for a Brain (New York: 1953).Google Scholar

5 Sagax refers, of course, to Wittgenstein. His account of sensations, as presented in the Philosophical Investigations and ably defended by Norman Malcolm in “Knowledge of Other Minds” (Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LV. 1958), is advanced by Sophisticus in Dialogue I.