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The Propositio Famosa Scoti: Duns Scotus and Ockham on the Possibility of a Science of Theology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Stephen D. Dumont
Stephen D. Dumont
Affiliation:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
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Extract

Duns Scotus's famous proposition was first attacked in a short polemical treatise attributed to Thomas of Sutton. By the time of Ockham, the proposition was known as the propositio famosa, so called by Walter Chatton, Ockham's colleague at Oxford and London, who defended it against Ockham's lengthy critique. At Paris, during the same period, it was called the propositio vulgata and was used approvingly by Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Navarre and Durandus St. Pourçain. This “famous proposition” was so controverted because on it depended the acceptance, with Duns Scotus, or the rejection, with Ockham, of theology as a strict, propter quid science. As its detractors and defenders must have realized, it also struck at the heart of the divergent philosophical outlooks of Duns Scotus and Ockham. For all of this, Duns Scotus's famous proposition and its history have all but escaped notice.

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Articles
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Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 31 , Issue 3: Philosophy in the Fourteenth Century , Summer 1992 , pp. 415 - 430
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Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1992

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References

Notes

1 “Et ad probationes suas respondeo, primo ad primum. Quando proponit: ‘Qualis ordo realiter est inter aliqua, si essent realiter distincta, talis ordo per se est inter ea correspondens illi distinctioni, quam habent’, dico, quod ilia est simpliciter falsa. Et cum probat istam primo, sic accipiendo illam: ‘Ubi est distinctio rationis, ibi concludimus ordinem sic distinctorum ex hoc, quod illa, ubi sunt realiter distincta, habent realem ordinem,’ dico, quod qui sic concludunt, sophistice concludunt, quia ubi est distinctio rationis tantum, ibi nulla distinctio est ex parte rei intellectae. Et ideo nullus est ordo et per consequens nee mediatio vel immediatio, sed ubi est distinctio realis, ibi est ordo inter distincta, et ideo in creaturis dicere est immediatius essentiae quam verbum, et memoria est immediatior essentiae quam dicere. In Deo autem nullus esse ordo potest inter essentiam et memoriam, dicere et verbum, quia ibi omnia haec sunt penitus unum. Unum autem non habet ordinem ad se ipsum” (Thomas of Sutton, Contra Quodlibet lohannis Duns Scoti, edited by Schneider, Johannes [Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978], p. 62–63).Google Scholar

2 “In ista quaestione sunt quinque facienda. Primo, videndum utrum de Deo possint haberi plures conceptus. Secundo, movendum est quoddam dubium de quadam propositione famosa.… Secundus articulus principalis quaestionis huius est videre quomodo debeat intelligi ilia propositio, ‘quemcumque ordinem realem habent aliqua ubi distinguuntur realiter, talem habent secundum rationem ubi distinguuntur ratione’” (Chatton, Walter, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, edited by Wey, Joseph C. [Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Mediaeval Studies, 1989], p. 146, 183)Google Scholar. Chatton's defence of the propositio famosa occupies the second article of the third question (ibid., p. 183–88). For an analysis of the second article, see Cova, Luciano, Walter Chatton, Commento alle Sentenze: Prologo – Questione Terzia (Rome: Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1973), p. 26.Google Scholar

3 “Utrum notitia evidens veritatum theologiae sit scientia proprie dicta” (Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.2 [Op.Th. 1.98–102, 119–27]).

4 “Sed hic sunt aliquae difficultates. Prima est ‘qualem ordinem habent aliqua ubi distinguuntur realiter, talem habent ubi sunt distincta formaliter vel secundum rationem’. In creaturis autem ubi potentia et obiectum distinguuntur realiter, potentia principalius concurrit quam obiectum. Ergo, etc.” (Francis of Meyronnes, 1 Sent, d.4 q.3 [Venice: Octavianus Scotus, 1520; rpt. Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966], fol. 30P); “Sed si dicatur sic: insurgit una magna dubitatio de illo ordine, scilicet substantiae, spiritus, et entis in deo, quia omnis ordo qui consequitur rationes formales aliquorum, ubicumque ponantur rationes illae formales, semper ponitur ibi talis ordo. Si ergo ordo quem habent ista in deo fit ex rationibus formalibus, in creaturis tenebunt ilium ordinem, cum habeant easdem rationes formales. Confirmatur per illam propositionem vulgatam, ‘qualem ordinem habent aliqua ubi distinguuntur secundum rem, talem habent ubi distinguuntur secundum rationem.’ Sed in creaturis habent ilium ordinem quod communiora sunt priora; ergo eodem modo in deo. Hoc difficile est, oportet enim alteram duarum viarum tenere, vel dicere ordinem simpliciter eundem non esse in deo et in creaturis, quod non bene intelligibile est, quia ordo consequens rationes formales est demonstrabilis de eis. Sed quandocumque aliqua sunt eiusdem rationis formalis, quidquid est demonstrabile de uno, et de reliquo. Vel oportet dicere quod sola deitas est prior; alia autem superiora tenent ordinem in deo, quem habent in creaturis” (ibid., d.13 q.1 [fol. 65F]).

5 “Tertio sic: qualis ordo esset realis inter aliqua, si distinguerentur realiter, talis est ordo cognoscibilitatis inter ipsa in esse cognoscibili, si solum cognoscibiliter distinguantur; sed divina essentia et perfectiones attributales et proprietates personales si essent realiter distinctae, talis ordo realis esset inter illas, quod qui intelligeret divinam essentiam abstractive et evidenter posset intelligere abstractive et evidenter alia, et sic haberet consequenter scientiam proprie dictam de eis; ergo, a simili, cum ilia sint distincta cognoscibiliter, in esse cognoscibili erit ordo cognoscibilitatis inter ipsa, et qui poterit intelligere intellectione abstractiva et evidenter divinam essentiam, poterit intellectione abstractiva et evidenter intelligere alia, et per consequens habere scientiam proprie dictam de ipsis; constat autem quod Deus sub ratione deitatis potest intelligi intellectione abstractiva …” (Peter of Navarre, 1 Sent. prol. p.l q.4, in Doctoris fundati Petri de Atarrabia sive de Navarra In primum Sententiarum scriptum, edited by Pío Sagüés Azcona, 2 vols. [Madrid: Institute Francisco Suarez, 1974], 1.37–38).

6 “Hoc supposito, dicendum est ad quaestionem, quod ipsa potest quaerere de priori et posteriori secundum rationem seu intellectum tantum, vel secundum rem. Si primo modo, sic dicendum est quod in divinis est ordo prioris et posterioris secundum rationem, comparando absoluta inter se, et essentiam et relationes, et unam relationem disparatam et aliam, et personas per eas constitutas. Constat, enim, quod in divinis praeintelligimus intellectum voluntati, quorum utrumque est absolutum. Nam, sicut in nobis intellectus realiter prior est voluntate, sic in Deo prior est secundum rationem, quia qualem ordinem realem habent aliqua, ubi different realiter, talem ordinem rationis habent ubi differunt solum secundum rationem” (Pourçain, Durandus St., Quodlibeta avenionensia tria additis correctionibus Hervei Natalis supra dicta Durandi in primo Quolibet, edited by Stella, Prospero T. [Zurich: PAS, 1965], p. 69–70).Google Scholar

7 For Scotus's Oxford commentaries, see 1 Lect. prol. n.107–21 (Vat. 16.39–43) and 1 Ord. prol. n.208–16 (Vat. 1.141–49). For the Parisian commentary, see 1 Rep. par. prol. q.1–3 (Vivès 22.6–54). The text printed as the Reportatio parisiensis in Vol. 22 of the Vivès edition is, as Wadding himself indicates, based upon Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 876 (Censura Lucae Waddingi [Vivès 22.4–5]). For the first book, however, this manuscript carries Additiones magnae extracted by William of Alnwick from Duns Scotus's Parisian and Oxford lectures, not a Reportatio parisiensis. See “De Ordinatione I. Duns Scoti: Disquisitio historico-critica” (Vat. 1.38*–42*, 145*); “Adnotationes” (Vat. 7.4* note 2). I have consulted the Reportatio parisiensis examinata contained in Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1453 for our text of Scotus's Parisian commentary. In fact, the prologue in the Vivès edition closely follows the Reportatio examinata, and thus for convenience references are to the former text.

8 Scotus, 1 Ord. prol. n.208 (Vat. 1.141), and 1 Rep. par. prol. q.l a.l n.4 (Vivès 22.7–8); Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.2 (Op.Th. 1.87–88).

9 The contingent nature of many theological truths, e.g., the Incarnation, was also a difficulty, but not one at issue here. For Duns Scotus's attempts to accommodate contingent truths, see 1 Ord. prol. n.210–212 (Vat. 1.144–46).

10 Scotus, 1 Ord. prol. n.168 (Vat. 1.110–12), and 3 Ord. d.24 q.l (Vivès 15.34–53); Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.T (Op. Th. 1.192–94).

11 1 Rep. par. prol. q.2 n.15–19 (Vivès 22.41a–43b); cf. Quod, q.7 (Alluntis n.19–28, p. 257–63; Vivès n.7–10, 25.289a–91b). On this development in Scotus's treatment of theology as a science, see my “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus's Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” Speculum, 64 (1989): 579–99.

12 Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.l (Op.Th. 1.49 lines 4–13, 72 lines 9–11); q.2 (Op.Th. 1.72 lines 9–12).

13 Scotus, 1 Rep. par. prol. q.l n.50 (Vivès 22.32a–33b); Ockham, 1 Ord. d.3 q.3 (Op.Th. 2.419–20).

14 Scotus also gives two forms of the proposition at 2 Ord. d.16 q.l n.18 (Vivès 13.43b) when discussing the order of the transcendental properties of being: “Praeterea, accipio hanc propositionem positam in principio primi Sententiarum: Quaecumque habent aliquam distinctionem realem, si essent separata realiter, illam distinctionem habent secundum rationem, ubi non sunt distincta realiter.… Vel forma sic rationem: Quaecumque habent aliquam ordinem inter se, ubi sunt distincta realiter, eumdem ordinem habent ubi sunt unitive contenta.” This occurrence would appear later, since ‘primi Sententiarum’ refers to the Parisian prologue. In any case, distinctions 15–26 of the second book are not thought to be a part of Scotus's Ordinatio. See “De Ordinatione I. Duns Scoti: Disquisitio historico-critica” (Vat. 1.25*).

15 “Utrum Deus sub propria ratione Deitatis possit esse subjectum alicuius scientiae” (Scotus 1 Rep. par. prol. q.l [Vivès 22.6a–33b]).

16 1 Rep. par. prol. q.l n.3, 49 (Vivès 22.7b, 32a).

17 “Minor probatur, qualis ordo realis esset inter aliqua, si essent distincta realiter, talis est ordo illorum secundum rationem, ubi sunt distincta secundum rationem …” (1 Rep. par. prol. q.l a.4 n.39 [Vivès 22.28a]); “Quaecumque enim ordinem realem haberent aliqua distincta realiter, similem ordinem secundum rationem habent, ubi essent distincta ratione …” (ibid., n.43 [Vivès 22.29b]).

18 “Nunc autem si intrinseca Deo essent distincta realiter ab essentia divina, omnino primum esset essentia sub ratione essentia, et reliqua essent posteriora et quasi passiones et accidentia ipsius essentiae. Si ergo est illa distinctio rationis, omnino primum erit ibi essentia sub ratione essentiae” (ibid., n.39 [Vivès 22.28a]).

19 Ibid., n.43–49 (Vivès 22.29a–32b).

20 “Infinitas enim non destruit formalem rationem illius cui additur…” (1 Ord. d.8 n.192 [Vat. 8.261]).

21 Duns Scotus summarizes his position on these various relations in God at 1 Ord. d.34–34 n.2 (Vat. 6.243–44).

22 See especially 1 Ord. d.2 n.396–406 (2.353–58).

23 “Ista probatur, quia ordo distinctorum secundum rationem non concluderet, nisi ex ordine qui natus esset competere illis secundum rem, si essent distincta realiter” (1 Rep. par. prol. q.1 a.4 n.39 [Vivès 22.28a]).

24 Scotus also uses his famous propostition in questions 4, 6 and 7 of his Quodlibet: “Ubi enim aliqua sunt distincta secundum rationem, similem habent ordinem rationis qualem haberent realem si essent distincta realiter, sicut alias dictum est” (q.4 [Alluntis, n.59, p. 156; Vivès n.27, 25.186a]); “… qualis ordo realis esset inter aliqua, si ilia essent distincta realiter, talis ordo est inter ea, ubi sunt eadem solum distincta ratione” (q.6 [Alluntis n.46, p. 229; Vivès n.20, 25.264b]); “Qualis est ordo realis inter aliqua distincta realiter, talis est ordo cognoscibilitatis inter eadem, qualitercumque distincta in esse cognoscibili” (q.7 [Alluntis n.16, p. 256; Vivès, n.5 25.287a]).

25 “Utrum in divinis essentialia sint immediatiora essentiae divinae vel notionalia” (Quod, q.l [Alluntis, p. 5–41; Vivès 25.5–58]).

26 Ibid. (Alluntis n.42–49, p. 27–30; Vivès n.16, 25.34a–36b).

27 “Qualis ordo per se realis esset inter aliqua si essent distincta realiter, talis per se ordo est inter ilia correspondens i11i distinctioni quam habet, utpote rationis si distinguantur ratione; et hoc sive ratione sumpta ex parte rei sive mere causata per actum intellectus” (ibid., n.45, p. 28; Vivès n.16, 25.35a).

28 For Scotus, demonstrations a posteriori and a priori correspond to demonstrations quia and propter quid respectively. On the latter distinction, see Scotus, Quod, q.7 (Alluntis, n.7, p. 252–53; Vivès n.3, 25.283b–84a).

29 “Maior probatur a posteriori sic: ubi est distinctio rationis sive uno modo sive alio accipiendi rationem, ibi concludimus ordinem sic distinctorum, ex hoc quod ilia sic distincta haberent talem ordinem realem ubi essent distincta realiter” (Quod, q.1 [Alluntis n.46, p. 28; Vivès n.16, 25.35b])

30 “Secundo, probatur a priori maior: ‘Per se ordinem’ intelligo qui est ex per se rationibus extremorum; et hoc accipiendo ‘per se rationem’ essentialem sive quidditativam, non denominando illud cuius est ratio ad esse in re vel in intellectu; siquidem illud quod indifferenter potest habere utrumque esse, videtur habere rationem quidditativam intelligibilem non determinando ad hoc vel illud esse” (ibid.).

31 “Ex hoc patet maior: nam ubi manet per se ratio similis ordinis ibi manet similis ordo; sed in istis distinctis in tali vel in tali esse manet per se eadem ratio consimilis ordinis, quia ratio quidditativa A et ratio quidditativa B; ergo etc. Non enim esse in intellectu dat ipsi A rationem quidditativam” (ibid.). The same proof is restated in response to an ensuing objection: “Et iuxta hoc, arguendo ad oppositum, assumo hanc maiorem: Ubi manet prima per se ratio ordinis eadem ibidem manet idem per se ordo; sed prima per se ratio istorum ordinis, scilicet ‘memoriae’ et ipsius ‘dicere’, est ex per se rationibus istorum, scilicet quod memoria est memoria et dicere est dicere; in quocumque ergo esse, reali sive diminuto, ista concipiuntur, statim habetur ex rationibus istorum quod memoria est immediatior ipsi essentiae quam dicere; ergo, manentibus per se rationibus istorum duorum extremorum occurrentium intellectui, sive habentium esse reale sive rationis quodcumque, semper manet eadem vel similis per se ratio ordinis” (ibid., n.57, p. 33–34; Vivès n.19, 25.46b–47a).

32 On Scotus's special treatment of the common nature, see Owens, Joseph, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Scotistic and Thomistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957): 1–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rudavsky, Tamar M., “The Doctrine of Individuation in Duns Scotus,” Franziskanische Studien, 59 (1977): 320–77 and 60 (1980): 62–83.Google Scholar

33 Scotus, 2 Lect. d.3 n.29–32 (Vat. 18.237); 2 Ord. d.3 n.31–34 (Vat. 7.402–405). Cf. Avicenna, , Liber de philosophia prima sive Scientia Divina, edited by van Riet, Simone, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977–80), Vol. 2, p. 228–29.Google Scholar

34 See Owens, “Common Nature,” p. 1–2.

35 “… [E]t hoc sive ratione sumpta ex parte rei sive mere pausata per actum intellectus” (Quod, q.1 [Alluntis n.45, p. 28; Vivès n.16 25.35a]).

36 Duns Scotus explicitly says that his formal distinction can be called ‘rational’ as long as this does not mean it is caused by reason alone: “Et ideo vocant aliqui istam differentiam ‘differentiam secundum rationem’, non quia sit facta a ratione, sed quia est differentia secundum rationem quiditativam ante operationem intellectus considerantis” (1 Lect. d.2 n.275 [Vat. 16.216]); “Potest autem vocari ‘differentia rationis’, sicut dixit doctor quidam; non quod ‘ratio’ accipiatur pro differentia formata ab intellectu, sed ut ‘ratio’ accipitur pro quiditate rei secundum quod quiditas est obiectum intellectus” (1 Ord. d.2 n.401 [Vat. 2.355]).

37 2 Lect. d.3 n.32 (Vat. 18.237); 2 Ord. d.3 n.34, 188 (Vat. 7.404, 483–84).

38 1 Ord. d.2 n.390 (Vat. 2.349–50); d.8 n.191–92 (Vat. 4.260–61).

39 It has been argued that at Paris Scotus modified his earlier, Oxford view of the formal distinction, at least as it applied to the persons in the Trinity. According to his earlier view, the formal distinction entailed extramentally distinct entities or realities in one and the same thing. See Gelber, Hester Goodenough, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought 1300–1335,” 2 vols. (Ph.D. dissertation, Wisconsin, 1974Google Scholar; rpt. 1979, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms), Vol. 1, p. 71–102, and Vol. 2, p. 526–44; Adams, Marilyn McCord, “Ockham on Identity and Distinction,” Franciscan Studies, 36 (1976): 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40 See, for example, the text of Thomas of Sutton quoted in note 1.

41 “Utrum notitia evidens veritatum theologiae sit scientia proprie dicta” (Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.2 [Op.Th. 1.75–128]). On Ockham's conception of theology generally, see Guelluy, Robert, Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris: Vrin, 1947), especially p. 131–74.Google Scholar

42 Ockham, Ord. prol. q.2 (Op.Th. 1.111–117). Ockham appears to permit only two types of concepts to be demonstrable of God: (1) negative or connotative ones common to God and creature and (2) concepts proper to God which are naturally formed by us in the present state. Only in the latter case is Ockham explicit that there can be propter quid demonstration.

43 Ockham, 1 Ord. d.3 q.3 (Op.Th. 2.419–20).

44 “… [D]ico quod non est talis ordo illorum conceptuum qualis requiritur ad demonstrationem simpliciter et a priori” (1 Ord. prol. q.2 [Op.Th. 1.119]).

45 Ibid. (Op.Th. 1.120 lines 18–20).

46 “… [C]onsimilem ordinem haberent talia secundum rationem ubi sunt distincta secundum rationem, et tamen sunt unum realiter” (ibid. [Op.Th. 1.121]). This is similar to the first interpretation of the proposition given by Chatton. See Chatton, 1 Sent. prol. q.3 a.2 (edited by Wey, p. 184).

47 Ibid. (Op. Th. 1.120–21).

48 1 Ord. d.2 q.3 (Op.Th. 2.75–79).

49 “… [Q]ualem ordinem haberent aliqua si essent distincta realiter, talem ordinem rationes vel conceptus correspondentes illis rebus …” (1 Ord. prol. q.2 [Op.Th. 1.121]).

50 Ibid. (Op. Th. 1.121–22).

51 “Ad primam rationem [sc. ipsius Ockham]. Consequentia non valet, quia non dicitur quod conceptus inter se talem habent ordinem in essendo qualem sua significata; et ideo licet significatum unius sit subiectum significati alterius, non tamen est sic in conceptibus” (Chatton, 1 Sent. prol. q.3 a.2 [edited by Wey, p. 187]).

52 Cf. Scotus, 1 Ord. d.36 n.32–36 (Vat. 6.283–85).

53 Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.2 (Op.Th. 2.105–107).

54 On Ockham's rejection of the nature as common, see Adams, Marilyn, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Kretzmann, Norman et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 411–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “William Ockham: Voluntarist or Naturalist” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Wippel, John F., Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, Vol. 17 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), p. 223–25Google Scholar; Maurer, Armand, “Method in Ockham's Nominalism,” Monist, 61 (1978): 436–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55 Ockham, 1 Ord. d.2 q.6 (Op.Th. 2.219–20), and Maurer's article cited in the previous note.

56 Ockham, 1 Ord. d.3 q.3 (Op.Th. 2.418–20).

57 Ockham, 1 Ord. prol. q.2 (Op.Th. 1.112 lines 6–8, 114 lines 9–10)

58 On the shifting content and scope of commentaries on the Sentences in England after Ockham, see Courtenay, William J., Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 250–58, 276–80Google Scholar. As Courtenay demonstrates, many factors led to the change in commentaries on the Sentences.