Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 April 2014
This paper presents a metaphysical argument against physicalism based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It argues that the physical, as physicalism must understand it, consists entirely of extrinsic properties, whereas consciousness involves at least some intrinsic properties. It concludes that consciousness has non-physical properties and that physicalism is false. The paper then defends its premises against current physicalist thinking. As much as possible, it offers metaphysical arguments about physical and conscious properties rather than epistemological arguments about our physical and phenomenal concepts.
Cet article présente, contre le physicalisme, un argument métaphysique fondé sur la distinction entre les propriétés intrinsèques et extrinsèques. Il soutient que le physique, comme le physicalisme doit le comprendre, comprend uniquement des propriétés extrinsèques, tandis que la conscience implique au moins certaines propriétés intrinsèques. Il conclut que la conscience a des propriétés non-physiques et que le physicalisme est faux. L’article défend ensuite ses prémisses contre la pensée physicaliste actuelle. Autant que possible, il offre des arguments métaphysiques portant sur les propriétés physiques et conscientes plutôt que des arguments épistémologiques portant sur nos concepts physiques et phénoménaux.
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