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Ontological Entanglement in the Normative Web

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2017

BENJAMIN WINOKUR
BENJAMIN WINOKUR*
Affiliation:
York University (Toronto)
*
*<[email protected]>
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Abstract

Terence Cuneo has recently argued that we have to be committed to the existence of epistemic facts insofar as they are indispensable to theorizing. Furthermore, he argues that the epistemic properties of these facts are inextricably ‘ontologically entangled’ with certain moral properties, such that there exist ‘moral-epistemic’ facts. Cuneo, therefore, concludes that moral realism is true. I argue that Cuneo’s appeal to the existence of moral-epistemic facts is problematic, even granting his argument for the existence of indispensable epistemic facts. I conclude, therefore, that Cuneo’s argument fails to justify moral realism.

Terence Cuneo a récemment soutenu que nous devons accepter que les faits épistémiques existent dans la mesure où ils sont indispensables pour théoriser. De plus, il soutient que les propriétés épistémiques de ces faits sont «ontologiquement enchevêtrées» de façon inextricable avec certaines propriétés morales, de telle manière qu’il existe des faits «moraux-épistémiques». Cuneo conclut ainsi que le réalisme moral est vrai. Je défends que l’appel de Cuneo à l’existence des faits moraux-épistémiques est problématique, et ce, même si nous acceptons son argument en faveur de l’existence de faits épistémiques indispensables. Je conclus, ainsi, que l’argument de Cuneo échoue à justifier le réalisme moral.

Keywords

Cuneoindispensabilityhybrid factsmetaethicsmetaepistemology
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 483 - 501
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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