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On the Very Idea of a Verbal Dispute

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2013

ANDREW GRAHAM
ANDREW GRAHAM*
Affiliation:
University of Missouri—Kansas City
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Abstract

I argue that Quineans who are sceptical about the analytic/synthetic distinction should be equally sceptical about the distinction between verbal and factual disputes. I develop an objection to the distinction between verbal and factual disputes, derived from objections to the analytic/synthetic distinction. I then explain what the resulting scepticism consists in. Ultimately, such sceptics should agree that there is a distinction between verbal and factual disputes, but think that it cannot perform certain philosophical tasks.

J’argumente que les Quiniens qui sont sceptiques par rapport à la distinction analytique/synthétique devraient aussi être sceptiques quant à la distinction entre conflits verbaux et factuels. Je développe une objection à la distinction entre conflits verbaux et factuels, dérivée des objections à la distinction analytique/synthétique. J’explique ensuite de quoi se compose le scepticisme qui en résulte. En définitive, ces sceptiques devraient reconnaître la différence entre conflits verbaux et factuels, mais pensent que certaines tâches philosophiques ne peuvent être performées.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 53 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 299 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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