Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T08:34:04.939Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Moraliser les conventions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2011

Benoit Dubreuil
Benoit Dubreuil*
Affiliation:
Université du Québec à Montréal
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

ABSTRACT : Many philosophers and psychologists think that moral norms have a different nature as rules from convention: while we are obliged to respect moral norms because of what they are in themselves, our respect for conventions depends on our attitude toward a particular social context. I question this distinction between moral norms and conventions and argue that conventions depend on social context because the context structures the agents’ expectations, sets reference points for the assessment of gains and losses, and helps the observer to infer the presence and the seriousness of harms.

Résumé : De nombreux philosophes et psychologues considèrent que les normes morales et les conventions sont des règles de nature différente : alors que nous sommes obligés de respecter les normes morales pour elles-mêmes, notre respect des conventions dépend de notre attitude par rapport à un contexte social particulier. Je conteste cette distinction entre normes morales et conventions. Je soutiens que les conventions dépendent du contexte social parce que le contexte structure les attentes des agents, fixe des points de référence en matière de gains et de pertes et permet à l’observateur d’inférer la présence et la gravité des torts.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 50 , Issue 2: Special Issue / Numéro spécial: Normativity: Epistemic, Mental and Moral Aspects / La Normativite : aspects epistemiques, mentaux et moraux , June 2011 , pp. 261 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Références bibliographiques

Baumard, Nicolas 2010 Comment nous sommes devenus moraux. Une histoire naturelle du bien et du mal, Paris, Odile Jacob.Google Scholar
Foot, Philippa 1972 «Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives», Philosophical Review, vol. 81, p. 305–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret 1989 On Social Facts, Londres, Routledge.Google Scholar
Gilbert, Margaret 2003 Marcher ensemble : essais sur les fondements des phénomènes collectifs, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Guala, Francesco 2009 «Esistono le convenzioni di Lewis?», Rivista di estetica, vol. 41, p. 141–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guala, Francesco et Mittone, Luigi 2010 «How History and Conventions Create Norms : An Experimental Study», Journal of Economic Psychology, vol. 31, p. 749–756.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haidt, Jonathan, Koller, Silvia et Dias, Maria G. 1993 «Affect, Culture and Morality : Or is it Wrong to Eat your Dog?», Journal of personality and social psychology, vol. 65, p. 613–628.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, Herbert L.A. 1961 The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Heath, Joseph 2008 Following the Rules. Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, Daniel et Tversky, Amos 1979 «Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk», Econometrica, vol. 47, p. 263–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Daniel et Stich, Stephen 2007 «Two Theories of the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality», dans Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. et Stich, S., dir., The Innate Mind Vol. 3. : Foundations and Future Horizons, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 348–366.Google Scholar
Kelly, Daniel, Stich, Stephen, Haley, Kevin J., Eng, Serena J. et Fessler, Daniel M.T. 2007 «Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction», Mind & Language, vol. 22, p. 117–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, David K. 1969 Convention : A Philosophical Study, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lillehammer, Hallvard 1997 «Smith on Moral Fetishism», Analysis, vol. 57, p. 187–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, Shaun 2002 «Norms with Feeling : Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment», Cognition, vol. 84, p. 221–236.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Nichols, Shaun 2004 Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford, Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nucci, Larry P. 2001 Education in the Moral Domain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ogien, Ruwen 2007 L’éthique aujourd’hui : maximalistes et minimalistes, Paris, Gallimard.Google Scholar
Prinz, Jesse J. 2007 The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Royzman, Edward B., Leeman, Robert F. et Baron, Jonathan 2009 «Unsentimental ethics : Towards a content-specific account of the moral–conventional distinction», Cognition, vol. 112, p. 159–174.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sadler, Brook J. 2003 «The Possibility of Amoralism : A Defence Against Internalism», Philosophy, vol. 78, p. 63–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smetana, Judith G. 1995 «Morality in context : Abstractions, ambiguities, and applications», Annals of Child Development, vol. 10, p. 83–130.Google Scholar
Smith, Michael 1995 The Moral Problem, Oxford, Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sripada, Chandra Sekhar et Stich, Stephen 2006 «A Framework for the Psychology of Norms», dans Carruthers, P., Laurence, S. et Stich, S., dir., The Innate Mind : Culture and Cognition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 280–301.Google Scholar
Turiel, Elliot 1983 The Development of Social Knowledge, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Turiel, Elliot 2002 The Culture of Morality : Social Development, Context, and Conflict, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar