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Moral Judgments and Emotional Displays: A Comment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1966

Henry Jack
Henry Jack
Affiliation:
University of Saskatchewan
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Extract

Professor Braybrooke has presented some interesting and novel points in support of the emotive theory in his recent paper. I imagine that his points are designed to worry objectivists or antiemotivists. In this note I will try to show that they need not worry very much.

1. In addition to moral sentences and factual sentences (M-locutions and F-locutions) we should pick out for comparison a class of expressive sentences (E-locutions) whose function is to express or evince emotions. I much prefer “express” to Braybrooke's “display” here. Examples of expressive sentences are: “I am angry,” “I am afraid,” “I am furious,” “I am very pleased,” etc.

Type
Discussions/Notes
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , March 1966 , pp. 536 - 539
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1966

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References

1 Dialogue, Vol. IV, No. 2, September 1965. pp. 206–233. All page references in parentheses refer to this paper.