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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 April 2010
Understanding Wittgenstein consists of twenty-seven short, self-contained chapters, each concentrating narrowly on a small segment of text, mostly from The Philosophical Investigations. Hunter's own words are apt. “The volume is therefore not comprehensive; but on the topics of which it treats I hope it will be found to have the merit of getting down to the fine detail of Wittgenstein's work, and of often showing, rather than merely saying, what can be made of it” (xii).
1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (3rd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). Hereafter cited as PI.Google Scholar
The point is primarily about imagining, not about pain…. Wittgenstein does not mean to imply that there can be either an image or a picture of pain. He is only saying that we can imagine someone in pain without picturing anything.
…I have him denying that there can be either an image or a picture of pain (the troublesome distinction between images and pictures disappears), but not denying that pain can be imagined…(117).
2 The gist of this interpretation comes indirectly from Wittgenstein himself. Malcolm discussed these passages with Wittgenstein in the Summer of 1949 and later recounted the conversation in a seminar at Cornell.