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Conceiving of Pain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

Brendan O'Sullivan  and
Peter Hanks
Brendan O'Sullivan
Affiliation:
Rhodes College
Peter Hanks
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
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Abstract

In this article we aim to see how far one can get in defending the identity thesis without challenging the inference from conceivability to possibility. Our defence consists of a dilemma for the modal argument. Either “pain” is rigid or it is not. If it is not rigid, then a key premise of the modal argument can be rejected. If it is rigid, the most plausible semantic account treats “pain” as a natural-kind term that refers to its causal or historical origin, namely, C-fibre stimulation. It follows that any phenomenon that is not C-fibre stimulation is not pain, even if it is qualitatively similar to pain. This means there could be phenomena that feel like pain but are not pain since they are not C-fibre stimulation. These possible phenomena can be used to explain away the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fibre stimulation. On either horn of the dilemma, the identity theorist has ample resources to respond to Kripke's argument, even without wandering into the contentious territory of conceivability and possibility.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , Spring 2008 , pp. 351 - 376
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2008

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