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Abortion and Potential
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
In a recent article “Abortion and Simple Consciousness' (Journal of Philosophy, V. LXXIV, N. 3, pp. 159–172), Werner S. Pluhar puts forward the following view:
A few words of explanation are in order. The reasoning can, I think, be summed up as follows: If one thinks that being conscious is what gives beings rights (and this seems to be a fairly common idea), then what justifies preferential treatment for humans as opposed to sentient members of other species? The fact, or so the answer goes, that humans have a higher degree of consciousness than do members of other species. But human fetuses do not have a higher degree of consciousness than, say, adult dogs. What justifies preferential treatment of human fetuses as opposed to adult dogs? The fact that human fetuses have a higher potential for reaching a higher degree of consciousness than do adult dogs. The liberal who holds that future generations have rights, e.g., to a healthy environment, thereby holds that merely potentially conscious beings have rights. If we have a right to life, then future generations also have that right. But fetuses are no less potentially conscious beings than unconceived future generations. So even a liberal must concede that if we have a right to life, fetuses have a right to life, and that it is at least prima facie wrong to destroy them by abortion.
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- Discussion/Note
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 1979 , pp. 220 - 223
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1979
References
Note
1 I do not wish in this brief paper to enter into a discussion of the consciousness criterion for rights eligibility. Personally I think more than mere sentience is needed and am resigned to the consequence, if it turns out to be one, that infanticide is morally permitted. I would add, however, that even if infanticide were morally permitted, it would not thereby follow that anyone has a right to kill infants.
Each contestant in a boxing match is permitted under the rules to remain on his feet during the entire period of a round, yet neither contestant has a right to do so – if each did have such a right, then trying to flatten one's opponent would be interfering with his rights. But each contestant in a boxing match does have the right to throw in the towel anytime during the match. Mere permission to do a thing does not imply a right to do it.
Perhaps it is morally permissible to kill the members of rare animal and plant species. Perhaps they don't have a right to life, and yet no one has a right to kill them either. If so, it would be quite reasonable for an environmentalist to bend all his energies to preventing people from doing what they are morally permitted, but do not have a moral right to do, namely to kill members of these species.