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In Search of a Greater Economic Entity: Norway and the Sterling Area Episode of the Early 1950s Reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2008

LARS FREDRIK ØKSENDAL
LARS FREDRIK ØKSENDAL*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Helleveien 30 N 5045 Bergen, Norway; [email protected].
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Abstract

In the early 1950s, Norway attempted to join the sterling area. This article argues that this futile attempt can be used as a point of departure for understanding the country's ambivalence towards multilateralism in the early post-war period. The attempt was triggered by the prospects of an early move to convertibility under conditions Norway believed to be premature. Norway saw closer association with Britain through the sterling area as a buffer against the negative effects of multilateralism and at the same time as a window of opportunity for becoming part of a larger market. Moreover, I argue that both the perception of the costs of multilateralism and the positive view of Britain as a natural ally was deeply embedded in the prevailing economic thinking of Norwegian social democracy.

A la recherche d'un plus grand espace économique. nouvelles perspectives sur le rapprochement de la norvège et de la zone sterling au début des années 1950

Au début des années 1950, la Norvège a essayé de joindre la zone sterling. Cet article suggère que cette tentative futile peut être utilisée comme point de départ pour mieux comprendre la position norvégienne ambigüe face au multilatéralisme dans l'immédiat après-guerre. Cette tentative était motivée par la crainte d'un passage immédiat à un régime de change convertible que la Norvège jugeait prématuré. Elle voyait dans une association plus étroite avec la Grande-Bretagne qu'amenait l'inscription dans la zone sterling une garantie contre les effets négatifs du multilatéralisme et, en même temps, une opportunité de s'intégrer à un marché plus large. De manière plus générale, l'auteur estime que tant la perception des coûts du multilatéralisme que l'image positive de la Grande-Bretagne comme alliée naturelle étaient profondément enracinées dans le courant dominant de la pensée économique de la social-démocratie norvégienne.

Auf der suche nach einer größeren wirtschaftseinheit. norwegen und die annäherung an den sterling-raum zu beginn der fünfziger jahre in neuer sicht

Zu Beginn der Fünfzigerjahre versuchte Norwegen, dem Sterling-Raum beizutreten. Dieser vergebliche Versuch soll hier als Ausgangspunkt genommen werden, um die norwegische Zweideutigkeit bezüglich Multilateralismus in der frühen Nachkriegszeit zu verstehen. Auslöser dafür war die Aussicht auf einen für Norwegen verfrühten Schritt in Richtung Konvertibilität. Aus Norwegens Sicht war eine engere Verbindung mit Grossbritannien durch den Beitritt zum Sterling-Raum nicht nur hilfreich, um sich gegen die negativen Folgen des Multilateralismus zu schützen, sondern bot gleichzeitig auch eine Möglichkeit Teil eines größeren Markts zu werden. Ferner argumentiert der Autor, dass die Wahrnehmung der Kosten des Multilateralismus und das positive Bild Großbritanniens als natürlichen Verbündeten im dominierenden Denken der norwegischen Sozialdemokratie tief verankert waren.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , November 2008 , pp. 523 - 544
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

1 In the 1960s Sweden – hampered by security policy considerations – only applied for association with the EEC.

2 Eriksen, Knut Einar and Pharo, Helge Øystein, Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949–1965 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), 144Google Scholar. All translations of quotations from untranslated sources are by the author

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15 Lars Fredrik Øksendal, ‘Norsk betalingspolitikk 1945–1958’, master's thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2001, 188–92.

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19 Brofoss to the cabinet: Memo on the proposals for a new payments system in Europe.

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33 Sir Henry Brittain to C. Brinch, 21 January 1950, FED 202.

34 Brofoss: Report on talks in London 20–23 May 1953 with a) President of the Board of Trade Mr. Thorneycroft (20 May), b) British civil servants in the Board of Trade (May 21), c) British Chancellor Mr. Butler and treasury civil servants (May 21), Box 61 (C-2–3), Økonomiavdelingen (Economic Policy Unit – EcPU), Finansdepartements arkiv (Norwegian Treasury Records – TR), NAA.

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42 Ibid.

43 Øksendal, ‘Betalingspolitikk’, 208–12.

44 Norway's, Sweden's and Denmark's association with the Sterling Area. Recommendation from group led by Arne Skaug, 9 September 1953, BP 174.

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47 Ibid.

48 Skaug et al. to Prime Minister Torp: Report on developing the UNISCAN arrangement in order to establish a closer association with the Sterling Area, 8 Feb. 1954 FED 302.

49 Ibid.

50 C. Brinch: Report on talks with MR. Eggers, UK treasury, 23 June 1953, FED 302.

51 C. R. P. Hamilton to Miss Oppe (treasury), 17 Aug 1953, BofeE OV 26/19.

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53 Brofoss: Report on talks with Cobbold 19 July 1954, 22 July 1954, FED 302.