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The British Decision to Upgrade Polaris, 1970–4

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2013

HELEN PARR
HELEN PARR*
Affiliation:
SPIRE, Keele University, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG; [email protected].
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Abstract

This article adopts a political approach to examine the reasons why Edward Heath's government wanted to upgrade Polaris and the reasons why they did so by way of a programme called Super Antelope, to improve the front-ends of the missiles against Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile defence, as opposed to the alternatives on offer. It argues that the political contexts within which Heath took the decision have been insufficiently understood, and shows that the acceptance of the ‘Moscow criterion’ – the understanding that Britain had to have the capability to destroy Moscow – by central government represented continuity in Britain's cold war stance.

Politique et modernisation des missiles nucléaires polaris, 1970–1974

C'est sous un éclairage politique que cet article examine ce qui a motivé le gouvernement britannique d'Edward Heath à investir dans des missiles nucléaires Polaris modernisés et ce qui l'a poussé à opter pour le programme Super Antelope pour améliorer la partie antérieure des missiles contre les défenses antimissiles balistiques soviétiques, de préférence aux autres options disponibles. Selon cet article, on n'a pas encore entièrement cerné le contexte politique dans lequel Edward Heath a pris cette décision. En acceptant le ‘critère de Moscou’, une conception selon laquelle la Grande-Bretagne devait disposer de la capacité de détruire la capitale soviétique, le gouvernement britannique ne faisait en effet que s'inscrire dans la continuité de sa politique de la guerre froide.

Die politischen überlegungen zur aufrüstung von polaris (1970–74)

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich unter einem politischen Blickwinkel mit der Frage auseinander, warum die britische Regierung unter Premierminister Edward Heath Polaris aufrüsten wollte und dabei ein Programm namens ‘Super Antelope’, bei dem verbesserte Sprengköpfe zur Überwindung des sowjetischen Raketenabwehrschilds zum Einsatz kommen sollten, gegenüber den übrigen gangbaren Alternativen bevorzugte. Er vertritt die These, dass die politischen Gegebenheiten, unter denen Heath die Entscheidung traf, nur unzureichend verstanden wurden, und zeigt, dass die Verständigung der Regierung auf das sogenannte ‘Moscow Criterion’ – Großbritannien sollte im Ernstfall in der Lage sein, Moskau zu zerstören – Ausdruck einer Kontinuität in der britischen Haltung zum Kalten Krieg war.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , May 2013 , pp. 253 - 274
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

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