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Western Communists, Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1989 Revolutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

SILVIO PONS
SILVIO PONS*
Affiliation:
Università di Roma ‘Tor Vergata’, Dipartimento di Storia, via Columbia 1, 00133 RomeItaly; [email protected].
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Abstract

Western communists reflected two opposing responses to the final crisis of communism that had matured over time. The French communists represented a conservative response increasingly hostile to Gorbachev's perestroika, while the Italians were supporters of a reformist response in tune with his call for change. Thus Gorbachev was the chief reference, positive or negative, against which Western communists measured their own politics and identity. In 1989 the French aligned with the conservative communist leaderships of eastern Europe, and ended up opposing Gorbachev after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Accordingly, the PCF became a residual entity of traditional communism. On the other hand, the Italian communists agreed with all Gorbachev's choices, and to some extent they even inspired his radical evolution. But they also shared Gorbachev's illusions, including the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall would produce a renewal of socialism in Europe. Unlike the PCF, the PCI was able to undertake change in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, thus standing as a significant ‘post-communist’ force. However, if conservative communism was destined to become marginal, reform communism also failed in its objective of renewing the Soviet system and the communist political culture

Les communistes occidentaux, gorbatchev et les révolutions de 1989

Les communistes occidentaux étaient le reflet de deux réponses contradictoires à la crise finale du communisme qui avait mûrit à travers le temps. Les communistes français représentaient une réponse conservatrice de plus en plus hostile à la Perestroïka de Gorbatchev, tandis que les Italiens soutenaient la réponse réformatrice en accord avec son appel au changement. Gorbatchev était ainsi le point de référence, négatif ou positif, par rapport auquel les communistes occidentaux mesuraient leur propre politique et leur identité. En 1989, les Français se sont alignés sur les dirigeants communistes conservateurs de l'Europe de l'est et se sont opposés à Gorbatchev après la chute du mur de Berlin. Ainsi, le PCF est devenu une réserve du communisme traditionnel. Les communistes italiens par contre étaient en accord avec tous les choix de Gorbatchev et jusqu'à un certain degré ils ont inspiré son évolution radicale. Cependant, ils ont aussi partagé les illusions de Gorbatchev, comme l'idée que la chute du mur de Berlin produirait un renouvellement du socialisme en Europe. Contrairement au PCF, le PCI fut capable de changer au lendemain des révolutions de 1989 et devenir ainsi une force ‘postcommuniste’ importante. Néanmoins, si le communisme conservateur était destiné à devenir marginalisé, le communisme réformé échoua lui aussi dans son objectif de renouveler le système soviétique et la culture politique communiste.

Westkommunismus, gorbatschow und die revolutionen von 1989

Die Krise des Kommunismus im Westen spiegelte zwei gegensätzliche Antworten auf die sich entwickelnde Krise des Kommunismus im Osten wider. Die französischen Kommunisten vertraten eine konservative Antwort, die Gorbatschows Perestroika gegenüber zunehmend feindlich eingestellt war, während die Italiener die reformistische Reaktion und seinen Aufruf zum Wechsel unterstützten. Folglich war Gorbatschow die Hauptreferenz, positiv oder negativ, an der die Westkommunisten ihre Politik und Identität maßen. 1989 richteten sich die Franzosen nach dem konservativen Kommunismus der Führungen Osteuropas aus und wandten sich nach dem Mauerfall gegen Gorbatschow. Demzufolge wurde die PCF ein Überbleibsel des traditionellen Kommunismus. Die italienischen Kommunisten waren im Gegensatz mit allen Entscheidungen Gorbatschows einverstanden und zu einem gewissen Grad inspirierten sie seine radikale Wandlung. Sie teilten jedoch auch Gorbatschows Illusionen, darunter auch die Idee, dass der Fall der Berliner Mauer zu einer Erneuerung des Sozialismus in Europa führen würde. Im Gegensatz zur PCF, war die PCI fähig einen Wechsel nach den Revolutionen von 1989 vorzunehmen und wurde dadurch zu einer wichtigen ‘postkommunistischen’ Kraft. Doch auch wenn der konservative Kommunismus einem marginalisierten Schicksal entgegensah, verfehlte der reformierte Kommunismus sein Ziel der Erneuerung des Sowjetsystems und der kommunistischen politischen Kultur.

Type
Articles
Information
Contemporary European History , Volume 18 , Issue 3: Revisiting 1989: Causes, Course and Consequences , August 2009 , pp. 349 - 362
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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19 FIG APC, record of the meeting between a delegation of the CPSU and a delegation of the PCI, Moscow 29 March 1988.

20 FG, f. 2, op. 1, k. 1110.

21 V Politburo TsK KPSS, 312 (31 March 1988).

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24 FG, f. 2, op. 1, k. 1166.

25 FG, f. 2, op. 1, k. 1163.

26 FIG APC, Sezione Esteri, 19 July 1988.

27 FIG APC, Sezione Esteri, 23 December 1988.

28 Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du Parti communiste français, 408.

29 FIG APC, Sezione Esteri, 11 January 1989.

30 As Rubbi noted, he was referring to Marchais.

31 FIG APC, Sezione Esteri, 11 January 1989.

32 FIG APC, Sezione Esteri, record of the meeting between Occhetto and Gorbachev, Moscow, 28 February 1989.

33 Ibid.

34 Lévesque, Enigma of 1989, 84.

35 Chernyayev, Sest’ let s Gorbachevym, 282.

36 Quoted by Rey, ‘La gauche française’.

37 FIG APC, Direzione, Allegati, 1989, mf 8908, 138.

38 FIG APC, Direzione, Verbali, mf 8908, 2–4; ibid., Sezione Esteri, 7 July 1989.

39 Napolitano, Dal PCI al socialismo europeo, 238–9.

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46 L'Unità, 10 December 1989.

47 Note by Rubbi on his visit to Prague, 11–13 December 1989, FIG APC, Direzione, Allegati, mf 9001, 110–14.

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51 See the essays by Jonathan Haslam, ‘1989: History Is Rewritten’, and Mark Kramer, ‘Gorbachev and the Demise of East European Communism’, in Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, eds., Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodisations (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

52 Lévesque, Enigma of 1989, 210–11.

53 Boffa, Memorie dal comunismo, 233.

54 FIG APC, note by Giuseppe Boffa on a meeting with Gorbachev, 15 November 1990.

55 Ibid.

56 Chernyayev, Sest’ let s Gorbachevym, 379.

57 These occurred in the aftermath of the so-called ‘tangentopoli’ corruption scandal.

58 Francesco Benvenuti and Silvio Pons, ‘The End of Soviet Communism: A Review’, in Pons and Romero, Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War.