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Some Aspects of Oligarchical, Dictatorial and Popular Signorie in Florence, 1282–1382*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Marvin B. Becker
Marvin B. Becker
Affiliation:
Western Reserve University
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Extract

This paper attempts to differentiate the forms of political regime that held sway in the city of Florence over the century following the formation of the Florentine constitution in 1282. It aims to establish certain pragmatic criteria for distinguishing between these Signorie, and to incorporate these into a framework that may be of some value in subsequent comparative study of the politics of the Italian city state in the later Middle Ages. The method employed is inductive. The more conventional deductive approach is rejected because the setting up of definitions at the outset is likely to create the illusion that political forms existed in a pure state. Dictatorship, oligarchy and popular government did not exist in the form of “ideal types” but rather were characterized by frequent changes of form and function. During periods of challenge and struggle their true nature became more clearly discernible than in eras of relative quiescence and this fact in part explains the conflicting interpretations that have arisen.

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Research Article
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 2 , Issue 4 , July 1960 , pp. 421 - 439
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1960

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References

1 This is particularly true of the period between the overthrow of the dictatorship of Walter of Brienne (1343) and the fall of the regime established after the Ciompi Revolution (1382). For contrasting judgments concerning this era of Florentine history, see Rodolico, N., I Ciompi (Florence, 1946)Google Scholar; Scaramella, G., Firenze all scoppio del tumulto dei Ciompi (Pisa, 1914)Google Scholar; Perrens, F., Historie de Florence (Paris, 1877–1883), vol. IV, pp. 343ff.Google Scholar; Doren, A., Die Florentiner Wollentuch-industrie von vierzehnten bis zum sechszehnten Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1901), pp. 239ff.Google Scholar; Schevill, F., History of Florence from the Founding of the City through the Renaissance (New York, 1936), pp. 260ffGoogle Scholar.

2 The principal critic of this type of interpretation is Nicola Ottokar. In his two major works, Studi Comunali e Fiorentini (Florence, 1948)Google Scholar, and Il Comune di Firenze alia fine del dugento (Florence, 1926)Google Scholar, he observes that the historical studies of both R. Davidsohn and G. Salvemini are infused with an economic determinism that tends to distort their presentation of the history of the Commune at the end of the thirteenth century. For further comments see Fiumi, E., “Sui rapporti tra citta e coutado,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXIV (1956), pp. 18–68Google Scholar. For the implications of this problem for the general history of Europe and for additional bibliography see Lestocquoy, J., Les villes de Flandre et d'ltalie sous le gouvernement des patriciens (Xle-XVe siècles), (Paris, 1952), pp. 45ffGoogle Scholar. and Sapori, A., Le marchand italien au moyen âge (Paris, 1952), pp. 3–115Google Scholar.

3 The records of the Strozzi and Medici families reveal that these popolani owned extensive real estate in the contado, while their magnati counterparts, the Bardi, Frescobaldi and Mozzi were actively engaged in trade. On the economic origins of these Florentine noble families, see Villani, G., Cronica, ed. Dragomanni, F. G. (Florence, 1845), IV, 39Google Scholar. For the Medici landed patrimony, see Brucker, G., “The Medici in the Fourteenth Century,” Speculum, XXXII (1957), pp. 7–8Google Scholar. For Strozzi real estate transactions in the early Trecento, see Archivio Notarile, R. 159, M. 293.

4 See preceding footnotes and Jones, P., “Florentine Families and Florentine Diaries in the Fourteenth Century,” Papers of the British School at Rome, XXIV (1956), pp. 183–205Google Scholar; Fiumi, E., “Fioritura e decadenze dell’ economia fiorentina,” Archivio Storico Haliano, CXV (1957), pp. 385–439Google Scholar; Plesner, J., L'emigration de la campagne a la ville libre de Florence au XIIIe siècle (Copenhagen, 1934)Google Scholar; Brucker, G. and Becker, M., “The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342–1378,” Mediaeval Studies, XVIII (1956), pp. 93–104Google Scholar. For a critique of the classical view of Florence as a tripartite society composed of magnati, popolani grassi and minuti, see Sapori, A., La crisi delle compagnie mercantile dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi (Florence, 1926), pp. 118–120Google Scholar. For additional bibliography, see Sapori, A., Studi di storia economica secoli XIII–XIV–XV (3rd ed., Florence, 1955), vol. II, pp. 1115–1186)Google Scholar.

5 Cf. Paoli, C., Delia Signoria di Gualtieri Duca D’ Atene in Firenze (Firenze, 1862)Google Scholar. For a contrasting analysis of the economic motives of those classes other than magnati who supported the despotism of Brienne, see Sapori, A., La crisi delle compagnie mercantile dei Bardi e dei Peruzzi, op. cit., pp. 140–148Google Scholar. Among the popolani grassi who supported the dictator were the Antella, del Bene, Altoviti, Ricci, Iacobi, Guicciardini and others. Cf. Provvisioni Duplicati, 3. fols. 18–22; Libri Fabarum, 21, fols. 104r–108; ibid., 22, f. 20. (The latter source will henceforth be abbreviated as L. F.). All documents cited in this article are to be found in the Archivio di Stato in Florence.

6 Almost one half of the noble families cited by the thirteenth century chronicler, Malespini, were engaged in mercantile pursuits. Cf. P. Jones, op. cit., pp. 203–205. Within the confines of the territory of Florence, the vast majority of the nobility were honorific, i.e., they were magnati without fiefs. Frequently, their titles were conferred upon them by the Parte Guelfa, the Angevin Monarchy or il popolo. Cf. E. Fiumi, loc. cit., pp. 394 ff.

7 The Bardi and della Tosa families, for example, supported the Priorate in its efforts to punish those nobles who had attacked the consuls of the arti. Cf. Compagni, D., Cronica, ed. del Lungo, I. (Florence, 1889), I, 21Google Scholar. Magnati families were among the chief advisors to the Signoria throughout this era. Cf. Consulte et Pratiche, vols. 1–20. (Henceforth this source will be abbrevisted as C. P.)

8 The judicial records suggest that the lawlessness of the magnati was one of the principal sources of contention. Cf. Stefani, Marchionne di Coppo, Cronica fiorentina, ed. Rodolico, N., Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new ed., XXX (Città di Castello, 1903–1955), rub. 595Google Scholar; G. Villani, XII, 23. For condemnations against those nobles who attacked popolani, see Appelli, vols. 123–125.

9 The magnati were accorded extensive representation in the most important offices of the Republic. Cf. Camera del Comune, vols. 1 ff. (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as C. C.)

10 For a discussion of this type of interpretation, see G. Brucker and M. Becker, op. cit., PP. 93 ff.

11 Cf. G. Scaramella, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.

12 Except for the brief tenure of the Signoria of the Ciompi, communal offices were filled by men whose tax returnṣ, on the average, placed them in the upper ten per cent of the rate paying citizenry.

13 With very few exceptions, the composition of the urban patriciate did not alter materially between 1300 and 1400. Based upon the surviving lists of officeholders, it would appear that the preceding century was the era of greater social mobility.

14 The Bardi, Peruzzi, and even the Mozzi, all victims of bankrupty during the first half of the fourteenth century, were ubiquitous in Florentine politics during the latter part of this century. Cf. C. P., 1–10; Estimo, 386, fols. 4 ff.; ibid., 391, fols. 12 ff.

15 The chief proponent of this interpretation is Niccolo Rodolico. Cf. La democrazia fiorentina nel suo tramonto (Bologna, 1905), pp. 141ff.Google Scholar; “II ritorno alia terra nella storia degli italiani,” Atti dei Georgofili, CXI (1933), pp. 323ffGoogle Scholar.

16 Cf. P. Jones, op. cit., pp. 196 ff.

17 Cf. Rodolico, N., Il popolo minuto (1343–1378), (Bologna, 1899), pp. 32ffGoogle Scholar. The discovery of judicial records for the early Trecento reveals that there was disaffection among the minuti throughout the interval under consideration. This resulted in acts of political subversion that were directed against the hegemony of the masters of the arti. Cf. C. C., 1 bis, fols. 46r-47; Appelli, 122, III, f. 25.

18 If population statistics are utilized as an index of the relative prosperity of Florence, then it should be noted that the rate of increase was constant until the advent of the Black Death. After the onslaught of the plague there was a marked upsurge that continued until the end of the century when there was a definite leveling off. It would appear, therefore, that any effort to correlate this demographical phenomenon with a sharp economic decline must be confined to the era after 1382. For recent studies on this subject, see Fiumi, E., “La demografia fiorentina nelle pagine di Giovanni Villani,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CVIII (1950), pp. 78–158Google Scholar; Battara, P., La popolazione di Firenze alia metà dei ‘500 (Florence, 1935)Google Scholar.

The thesis that there was a sharp decline in the manufacture of wool during the second half of the Trecento, does not prove that the industrial character of the Republic was transformed since, even if there had been a slack in wool manufacturing, it is possible that the rise of the silk industry may have compensated for this decline. Davidsohn, R., “Blute und Niedergang der Florentiner Tuchindustrie,” Zeitschrijt fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, LXXXV (1928), pp. 225–255Google Scholar; Pieri, P., Intorno alia storia dell’ arte delta seta in Firenze (Bologna, 1927), pp. 117ffGoogle Scholar.

19 The tax assessments of the novi cives stood in a ratio of five to six and one half in comparison to those imposed upon the members of the patriciate. This figure is based upon a study of the estimi and prestanze that survive for the Trecento. The holdings of the novi cives in the Monte of 1345 averaged the considerable sum of 57 florins. Cf. G. Brucker and M. Becker, op. cit., p. 101. Petitions of foreigners who sought citizenship and the right to hold office, reveal that members of the urban patriciate were required to offer security for their good behavior. Cf. L. F., 34 fols. 76r-82 (21 June–8 July 1356).

20 The tendency of magnati and popolani to intermarry is chronicled throughout the notarial records and the diplomatico. Gente nuova and minori usually contracted marriages within their own class. There are, of course, notable exceptions; the most famous of these being Dino Pecora, the villainous butcher of Compagni’s chronicle, who married into the aristocratic Papini family. Cf. N. Ottokar, op. cit., p. 107; Archivio Notarile, M. 293, II.

21 Many of the wealthy minor guildsmen who were to be active in communal politics after 1343 had been brought into the Signoria during the despotism of Walter of Brienne. Among these were: Iunta Ciati (Cf. Monte of 1345, S. S., f. 496), Zambane Zeggio (Cf. L. F., 21, lr), Bellaccio Puccio (Cf. Monte of 1345, S. C, f. 98r) and Cini Bettone (Cf. L. F., 15, I, f. 13r; Provvisioni, 216, f. 139 (Henceforth this source will be abbreviated as P.).

Donato Velluti observed that the leading factions in communal politics each contended for the support of the gente nuova and minori. Cf. La cronica domestica, ed. del Lungo, I. (Florence, 1914), p. 242Google Scholar.

22 Private petitions presented by members of the urban patriciate were rejected by the councils with monotonous regularity. Cf. P., vols. 32–36; L. F., vols. 22–27 (1343–48).

23 Cf. Stefani, rub. 555; Barbadoro, B., Le finanze delta Repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1929), pp. 159ffGoogle Scholar.

24 Cf. G. Villani, XII, 24; Pieri, Paolino, Chronica delle cose d’ltalia, ed. Adami, A. (Rome, 1755), p. 56Google Scholar.

25 Stefani, rub. 204; Dorini, U., Notizie storiche sull’ Università di Parte Guelfa in Firenze (Florence, 1902), p. 14. For the election of communal officials authorized to review the accounts of the Parte, see P., 38, f. 226Google Scholar; Ibid., 39, f. 15r.

26 G. Brucker and M. Becker, op. cit., pp. 101–102. This relationship was especially true when it pertained to nobles matriculated in the arti.

27 Among these was the loss of immunity from prosecution for monopolistic practices. Atti Esecutore, 6, fols. 5 ff.; Ibid., 17, fols 25 ff.; Ibid, 79, fols. 11r. ff.

28 Bishops and other members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy were selected, almost exclusively, from the upper reaches of Florentine and Tuscan society. Cf. Cerrachini, Luca Guiseppe, Cronologia Sacra de’ Vescovi e Archivescovi (Florence, 1716), pp. 102ffGoogle Scholar.

29 For a discussion of these measures, see Panell, A., “Politica ecclesiastica del commune fiorentino,” Archivio Storico Italiano, II, part IV (1913), pp. 271–370Google Scholar.

30 A member of the guild of judges and notaries and Pepo Frescobaldi, a scion of the famous banking family, were the two spokesmen for the law in question. Cf. Provvisioni Duplicati, 5, f. 54.

31 Marzi, D., La cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. Casciano, 1910), pp.650–652Google Scholar.

32 B. Barbadoro, op. cit., pp. 649 ff. For condemnations of former office-holders, see C. C., vols. 6–9 (June-December, 1344). For fines against important families such as the Bondelmonte, Pazzi and Bardi on charges of appropriating the Republic’s property for their own use, see C. C., 6. f. 72r; L. F., 32, f. 68.

33 P., 4, fols. 1297–130.

34 These men were among the fourteen who were elected to institute reforms in the court system “maxime pauperibus et impotentibus.” Cf. Ibid.

35 IL popolo minuto made no gains except during periods of dictatorship. For bibliography and a discussion of this question, see G. Brucker and M. Becker, loc. cit., pp. 98–99.

36 In practice, those minuti who desired to ply a trade over which one of the minor guilds held jurisdiction were required to pay matriculation fees and other assessments that were levied by the consuls. Cf. Atti Esecutore, 29, fols. 196r–197; Ibid., 40, 112.

37 Atti Capitano, 17, f. 72. All concessions that were made to the wool workers by Walter of Brienne in 1342–43 were annulled by the popular government in 1344.

38 This tendency is reflected in the Popular government's policy of using syndics extensively to review the actions of communal officials. This had the effect of placing definite limits upon the authority of the Republic's office-holders. Cf. Masi, G., “Il sindacato delle magistrature comunali nei secoli XIV–XVI,” Rivista Italiana per le Scienze Giuridiche (1930), V, pp. 20ff.;Google ScholarStatutum Bladi Reipublicae Fiorentinae (1348), ed. Masi, G. (Milan, 1934), pp. 34ffGoogle Scholar. For the strict controls that were initiated over the magnati who held office at this time, see P., 32, f. 73 (14 November 1343); L. F., 24, fols. 5–6, 7r–8, 10.

39 The greater the political influence of the novi cives, the more elaborate were the laws that aimed at effecting a wide distribution of public offices. Cf. P., f. 4r (21 July 1378).

40 The first two regimes of this type followed the failure of the despotisms of Charles of Calabria in 1328 and Walter of Brienne in 1343. The last popular Signoria was inaugurated in 1378, immediately after the disastrous war with the papacy.

41 Paolino Pieri, op. cit., p. 58.

42 For example, during eras of oligarchical hegemony, the authority of the consuls of minor guilds over small artisans and tradespeople was severely limited. Cf. P., 6, f. 24; Ibid., 10, f. 181r.

43 The records of the minutes of the advisory councils suggest that these men were among that segment of the population which gave the patricians unqualified support. The twenty-five minori who most frequently held the office of Prior between the years 1348 and 1378 did not often voice opinions antithetical to those expressed by the oligarchs. Cf. C. P., 1, 4, 8, 12.

44 Cf. especially the documents pertaining to the career of the butcher, Andreas Benis, in L. F., 13, I, fols. 51, 58r; Ibid., II, fols. 5, 86; P., 23, 89r; P., 24, Ms. 60, 76.

45 For example, at the height of patrician power (1328–42), 71 per cent of the individuals who sat in the Signoria were matriculated in only three of the 21 arti; the Lana, Cambio and Calimala. Their holdings in the funded communal debt averaged 636 florins. Cf. Monte, vols. 1–4.

46 This statement is based upon analysis of the Camera del Comune for the Trecento. This source reveals that during periods of patrician domination the law was not enforced with the vigor that characterized popular governments. Cf. especially vols. 28–29; Appelli, 121.

47 The history of virtually every Florentine family is replete with instances in which judicial dispensation played a decisive role in salvaging the patrimony or the person of one of its members. Note the cases involving members of the Strozzi, Bardi, Medici, della Tosa, Gherardini, Nerli Adimari, Infangati, etc. Cf. Ibid., 122–123.

48 Cf. M. Villani, III, 58; Stefani, rub. 660, 739. See also petitions presented requesting absolution by the Pazzi (P., 37, f. 76), Ricasoli (P., 39, f. 170r), Tornaquinci (P., 39, 185), Castiglionchi (P., 42, f. 133r) and Medici (C. C., 57, f. 128).

49 Cf. C. C., 33–34 (June–July, 1349). For other aspects of oligarchical policy at this time, see Doren, A., Entwicklung und Organisation der Florentiner Zünfte im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (Leīpzig, 1897), p. 31Google Scholar.

50 P., 51, f. 171r. One of the Donatis was pardoned for the crime of treason. Ibid., 54, f. 48r. A member of the Antella family was pardoned after having been convicted on a charge of peculation of communal funds. See a similar case involving a member of the Bardi clan. P., 53, f. 65.

51 Cf. L. F., 14, f. 51; ibid., 17, 15; Stefani, rub. 738.

52 Cf. C. C, 1 bis; Ottokar, N., Il Comune di Firenze alla fine del dugento (Florence, 1926), pp. 278ffGoogle Scholar.

53 Sapori, A., La crisi delle compagnie mercantili dei Bardi a dei Peruzzi (Florence, 1926), pp. 107ff.Google Scholar; L. F. 17, f. 52; Capitoli Protocoli, 12, fols. 219, 227.

54 L. F., 17, f. 154; ibid., 19, fols. 29–36; P., 36, f. 132r. For opposition to these practices, see B. Barbadoro, op cit., p. 600; Balie, 17, f. 75r; P., 67, fols., 1–13; L. F., 40, f. 301.

55 P., 25, f. 70r. They lost this immunity during the despotism of Charles of Calabria (1325–28).

56 Cf. L. F., vols. 17–21.

57 P., 6, f. 24; ibid., 9, f. 74r; ibid., fols. 100, 181r. For a further consideration of this question at the end of the Trecento, see Doren, A., Le arti fiorentine, trans. Klein, G. B. (Florence, 1940), vol. 2, p. 280Google Scholar.

58 Seta, I, f. 66r; Lana, 5, bk., rub. 16. For a general consideration of the political implications of this problem, see Scaramella, G., Firenze allo scoppio del Tumulto dei Ciompi (Pisa, 1914), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

59 One of the first steps that the woolcarders took when they were admitted to the Signoria in the year 1378 was to abolish this office. Cf. P., 67, fols. 2 ff.; L. F., 40, f. 302.

60 The statuti of the fourteen lesser guilds were subject to the authority of this Balia. Cf. for example, Vinattieri, 1, fols. 39–39r (10 03 1344)Google Scholar.

61 In 1350 the fee required for the admission of those whose fathers had not been members of the Parte was raised from 50 to 100 florins. This represented approximately 25 years' rent on the average shop and it can be assumed that this sum was an effective deterrent against the democratization of the Parte Guelfa. Cf. U. Dorini, op. cit., p. 24; Guelfa, Parte, numeri rossi, 1, f. 31Google Scholar.

62 Cf. Barbadoro, B., “Parte Guelfa,” Marzocco, XXVIII (1923), n. 14Google Scholar; Salvemini, G., Magnati e popolani in Firenze del 1280 al 1295 (Florence, 1899), pp. 64ff.Google Scholar; P., 19, f. lr; P., 21, f. 70r; P., 22, f. 4; C. C., 22, f. 57.

63 Tratte, 138. They were accorded representation at the sessions of the advisory councils. Cf. especially C. P., 3, fols. 5r–15r; ibid., 13, fols. 48r–49, 64r. In May of 1359, the Capitani were granted permission by the Signoria to hold communal office while serving as Guelph functionaries. Cf. P., 46, f. 144. They were also granted immunity from prosecution for debts contracted during the tenure of their office. Cf. Statuti, 15, bk. 2, rub. 100 (1355).

64 Between 1323 and 1358 the nobles held half of the major offices of the Parte. Cf. Stefani, rub. 748; C. P., 14, f. 54, ibid., 15, fols. 66–66r.

65 Cf. footnote 40; G. Villani, IX, 214; XI, 130; A. Sapori, op. cit., pp. 141 ff.

66 Cf. Atti Capitano, 42, f. 11. This source contains the records of a case that involved the planning of a riot to be launched against the bankrupts. Cf. also Tratte, 1105; A. Sapori, op. cit., pp. 163–164.

67 In the vanguard of those who led the proletariat were the butchers and dyers. These men were among the most affluent segment of the artisan-shopkeeper class. Cf. Monte, vols. 1–4.

68 D. Velluti, p. 242.

69 Stefani, rub. 734.

70 M. Villani, X, 24–25; Stefani, rub. 685. The Ricci, who had formerly been supported of the Parte, championed a measure to give representation to the minori in the office of the Capitani. Cf. P., 54, f. 67; L. F., 38, fols 54–54r; Parte Guelfa, numeri rossi, 5, f. 21 (3 November 1366).

71 Cf. Stefani, rub. 720, 726.

72 Members of the Medici, Strozzi, Covoni, Ricci, Guadagni families, and others, not only served in the popular government (1378–1382), but also resisted the attempts of the Albizzi faction to exercise complete domination over Florentine politics. Cf. C. C., 184–204; Manoscritti varii, 222, f. 182. See a discussion of the advisory council in which measures were taken to check factionalism and to conserve the city “in sua libertate.” C.P., 12, f. 14 (31 March 1372).

73 For a reiteration of the opinions of the chroniclers, see C. Paoli, op. cit., pp. 7 ff.

74 Hopf, K., “Walter VI von Brienne, Herzog von Athens, und Graf von Lecce,” in Raumer's Historisches Taschenbuch (Leipzig, 1854), pp. 301–401Google Scholar. Sassenay, F., Les Brienne de Lece et d’Athenes (Paris, 1869)Google Scholar.

75 Bernardino Barbadoro has noted that contradictions in policy stemmed from the despot's attempt to gain popular support while, at the same time, seeking to placate the “discredited oligarchy.” Cf. Le finanze Repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1929), p. 620Google Scholar.

76 Balie, 2, 143–152; C. Paoli, op. cit., pp. 103–104.

77 C. C., 1 bis, fols 19r, 32, 80r; G. Villani, XII, 2.

78 On November 30, 1342, Brienne appointed special officials for the purpose of recovering communal property. They were authorized to keep “unum registrum” in which they were to inscribe all the property and rights (“bona et iura”) of the commune. Cf. Balie, 2, fols, 110–112. For condemnations by these officials of individuals who had usurped the property of the state, see ibid., 2, f. 165 (30 March 1343). For fines levied against the powerful Adimari and Rossi families by these officials on the same charge, see C. C., 1 bis, fols. 249, 276 (18 April, 14 May 1343).

79 Ibid., fols, 130, 209–221.

80 Balie, 2, fols. 58–63; C. Paoli, op. cit., pp. 25–30.

81 P., 25, f. 45 (3 December 1326); C. C., 1 bis, f. 357. See also B. Barbadoro, op. cit., pp. 161–189, 207–211. When the priorate invited Brienne to become Signore of the city, the Bardi Company reduced their capital by half in order to escape direct taxation which they knew he would establish on the model of his predecessor, Charles of Calabria. Cf. Sapori, A., Compagnie e mercanti di Firenze antica (Florence, 1955), p. XXIIIGoogle Scholar.

82 Complaints to the despot were frequently concerned with the regressive nature of Florentine taxation. Cf. C. Paoli, op. cit., p. 114, doc. 260; Balie, 2, f. 66. Revision of the tax system was a commonplace under the rule of the despots. Cf. Silva, P., Il governo di Pietro Gambacorta in Pisa (Pisa, 1912;, pp. 116–117Google Scholar.

83 The Signoria, with the permission of the Duke of Calabria, was granted the authority to suspend immunities and privileges that formerly had been conferred upon certain inhabitants of the contado. Cf. P., 23, f. 67 (9 February 1327). Brienne also appointed a special official to perform this same function. Cf. C. Paoli, op. cit., p. 75. Severe fines, ranging from 500 florins to 3,932 florins, were exacted from members of the Ricci and Ricciardi families who did not comply with this ^dict. Cf. C. C., 1, fols. 9r, 27 (October–November, 1342).

84 Cf. footnote 55; P., 25, f. 70r. For a further analysis of the effects of the policies of a despot upon the arti, see Rodolico, N., Del Comune alla Signoria. Saggio sul governo di Taddeo Pepoli in Bologna (Bologna, 1898), pp. 84ffGoogle Scholar. In 1373, attempts were made to reintroduce this form of taxation. The advisors to the Signoria, however, were successful in thwarting the passage of this measure. Cf. C. P., 12, f. 56r.

85 Cf. Rodolico, N., Il popolo minuto (Bologna, 1899), p. 141Google Scholar; C. Paoli, op. cit., pp. 82–83; Balie, 2, fols. 92–93.

86 For the first time since the end of the preceding century, large numbers of novi cives were admitted to office. Cf. P., 32, f. 145.

87 See especially the document that records the pardon of Jacabo, a wool-beater, who had been condemned to death in 1318 by the “official foreigner of the Lana” for conspiring with other workers against the masters of the guild. C. C., 1 bis, fols. 46–47 (19 december 1342). A certain Cione was also granted dispensation by Brienne from the sentence of death. He had been condemned by the Executor for instigating a conspiracy against the rule of the guilds. Ibid., f. 187r (16 February 1343). Two years earlier, the Councils of the Comune had refused to take this action on his behalf. Appelli, 122, III, f. 25 (26 05 1341)Google Scholar.

88 Stefani, rub. 566.

89 Upon payment of lines to the ducal treasury, certain members of the Falconery Pulci, Amadori and Corbizzi families were pardoned. They had formerly been convicted for having fought against their native city on the side of the Emperor Henry VII in the year 1312. C. C., Ibis, fols. 70–92.

90 A scion of the house of the Bardi was fined 500 florins for attacking a popolano. C. C., 1 bis, f. 5r (19 October 1342). Two other members of the same family were condemned to pay a fine of 5,813 florins, along with a member of the Rucellai clan, for peculation of communal funds. Ibid., f. 132r (18 January 1343). See also ibid., fols. 204r–205, 209–211. Members of the Adimari, Bordoni, Tornaquinci and Spini families who had posted bonds for fellow members of the patriciate, were required to make payment into the communal treasury when those for whom they were responsible, defaulted. Ibid., fols. 175r, 211r.

91 Becker, M., “Gualtieri di Brienne e l’uso delle dispense giudiziarie,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXIII (1955), pp. 245–251Google Scholar. These arbitrary and capricious actions of the despot also served to intensify opposition to his rule.

92 Shortly after the overthrow of Brienne, the Republic obligated itself to pay five per cent interest a year to those who had loaned money to the despot. The total of these loans was 41,480 florins. Cf. Provvisioni Duplicati, 7, 52r. During the last month of the Duke's tenure, loans from the Bardi family alone accounted for approximately one-fourth of the monies paid into the treasury. C. C., 1 bis, f. 336 (22 July 1343). Less than a week before the outbreak of the revolution against Brienne, a new estimo was imposed upon the citizenry and a new prestanza was levied. Ibid., fols. 335–357 (20 July 1343).

93 Many of the leaders of the conspiracy against the despot were members of the same families who had been compelled to pay heavy fines and to make forced loans to the ducal treasury. Cf. G. Villani, XII, 16 and footnote 90.

94 Cf. Brucker, G. and Becker, M., “Una lettera in difesa della dittatura nella Firenze del Trecento,” Archivio Storico ltaliano, CXIII (1955), p. 255Google Scholar.

95 In 1343, according to Giovanni Villani, both minori and minuti deserted their self-appointed benefactor and joined the patriciate in a concerted and successful effort to overthrow Brienne. Cf. bk. XII, ch. 17. The presence of differences in the socioeconomic composition of the lower orders tended to make it difficult for its membership to achieve a strong sense of political unanimity and social solidarity. The fact that the more affluent minori and minuti tended to identify with the lower strata of the patriciate demonstrates a lack of cohesion. For a further consideration of this problem, see Brucker, G. and Becker, M., “The Arti Minori in Florentine Politics, 1342–1378,” op. cit., p. 101Google Scholar.

96 In 1323, and also in 1372, electoral and administrative reforms were initiated to prevent certain of the great patrician families from exercising absolute hegemony over communal affairs. Cf. G. Villani, IX, 271; Stefani, rub. 731; C. P., 12, fols. 55–56r.

On the complex problem of the definition of the term “state,” see Hexter, J. H., “Il Principe and Lo Stato,” Studies in the Renaissance, IV (1957), p. 118Google Scholar.

97 Rodolico, N., I Ciompi, pp. 228ffGoogle Scholar.