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Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America: The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Michael Geyer
Michael Geyer
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Extract

The histories of Germany and the United States became deeply entangled in the century of total war. After (re)unification on the battlefield in the midnineteenth century, both countries underwent rapid transformations through national programs of industrialization based on new products and technologies and emerged as great powers with global pretensions at the beginning of the twentieth century. An initial, and somewhat hesitant, confrontation in World War I was followed by a period of oscillation and confusion during the 1920s and 1930s, as leading elements in the two economies sought grounds for collaboration even as the political development of the two nations diverged, one moving toward fascism, the other toward a liberal democratic renewal. This produced the deeply ideological collision of the Second World War, which resulted in an equally dramatic turnabout, as the Germans endured what Americans then most feared, a grim (albeit partial) communist takeover, and the United States became the staunch ally of the German west in its faceoff with the east. Recently this close partnership has turned into a more perplexed and occasionally suspicious friendship, as the familiar terrain of the cold war is ploughed up. This is a history of extreme reversals is tied inextricably to war and preparations for war.

Type
Worlds of War
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 38 , Issue 4 , October 1996 , pp. 619 - 657
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1996

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References

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72 Da Costa, The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories, ch. 7.

73 Bright, Charles, “The State in the United States during the Nineteenth Century,” in Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory, Bright, Charles and Harding, Susan, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 121CrossRefGoogle Scholar–58.

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77 The debate on Westward expansion need not be rehearsed here; however, the other Latin and Caribbean dimension is worth recalling: Brown, Charles H., Agents of Manifest Destiny: The Lives and Times of the Filibusters (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980Google Scholar); May, Robert E., The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854–1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1973Google Scholar).

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79 On the “Baldwin thesis” and the so-called “staple approaches” to development, see Adelman, Frontier Development, 7–8.

80 The triumph of the interior was politically registered in the fact that every Republican president from Grant to Hoover, with the lone exception of Theodore Roosevelt, came from Indiana, Illinois, or Ohio.

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88 This should be distinguished from the logistics debate of early-modern military history. See Creveld, Martin van, Supplying War: Logistics from Walierstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977Google Scholar).

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