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Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

Carter Vaughn Findley
Carter Vaughn Findley
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Extract

Central to late Ottoman history is a series of events that marks a milestone in the emergence of modern forms of political thought and revolutionary action in the Islamic world. The sequence opened with the rise of the Young Ottoman ideologues (1865) and the constitutional movement of the 1870s. It continued with the repression of these forces under Abdülhamid 11 (1876–1909). It culminated with the resurgence of opposition in the Young Turk movement of 1889 and later, and especially with the revolution of 1908. Studied so far mostly in political and intellectual terms, the sequence seems well understood. The emergence of the Young Ottomans—the pioneers of political ideology, in any modern sense, in the Middle East—appears to result from the introduction of Western ideas and from stresses created within the bureaucracy by the political hegemony of the Tanzimat elite (ca. 1839–71). The repression under Abdülhamid follows from the turmoil of the late 1870s, the weaknesses of the constitution of 1876, and the craft of the new sultan in creating a palace-dominated police state. The emergence of the Young Turks shows that terror ultimately fostered, rather than killed, the opposition. Too, their eventual revolutionary success shows how much more effective than the Young Ottomans they were as political mobilizers.

Type
The Analysis of Administrative Elites
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , January 1986 , pp. 81 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1986

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References

1 Ramsaur, Ernest E., Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton, 1957);Google ScholarLewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2d ed. (London, 1968), 150–74, 194–230;Google ScholarMardin, serif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, 1962);Google Scholaridem, Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri [Young Turk political ideas] (Ankara, 1964);Google Scholaridem, “Libertarian Movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1878–1895,” Middle East Journal, 16:2 (1962), 169–82;Google Scholaridem, “Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11:3 (1969), 258–81;CrossRefGoogle ScholarAhmad, Feroz, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914 (Oxford, 1969);Google ScholarShaw, Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel K., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), II, 263–67,CrossRefGoogle Scholar 273ff.; Findley, Carter Vaughn, “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East, Part II,” Studio Islamica, 56 (1982), 147–66;CrossRefGoogle ScholarQuataert, Donald, “The 1908 Young Turk Revolution: Old and New Approaches,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 13:1 (1979), 22–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Mardin, , Genesis, 121–32;Google Scholaridem, “Power, Civil Society, and Culture,” 277; idem, “Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century,” in Turkey: Geographic and Political Perspectives, Benedict, Peteret al., eds. (Leiden, 1974), 403–46.Google Scholar

3 Since I have treated problems of ideology and political mobilization in another study, discussion of these topics here will be schematic. Interested readers should see Findley, , “Advent of Ideology, Part II.”Google Scholar

4 Keddie, Nikki, “Religion and Ireligion in Early Iranian Nationalism,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4:3 (1962), 265;CrossRefGoogle ScholarStavrianos, L. S., Global Rift (New York, 1981), 388–90;Google ScholarKushner, David, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism (London, 1977), 10–14.Google Scholar

5 A similar argument for the years right around 1908 appears in Quataert, Donald, “The Economic Climate of the ‘Young Turk Revolution’ in 1908,” Journal of Modern History, 51:3 (1979),CrossRefGoogle Scholar D1147–D1161 (available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, order no. IJ–00049). See also idem, “Commercialization of Agriculture in Ottoman Turkey, 1800–1914,” International Journal of Turkish Studies, 1:2 (1980), 52–53.Google Scholar

6 Davies, James C., “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” in When Men Revolt—and Why, Davies, James C., ed. (New York, 1971), 134–47. Some scholars question whether the term revolution is appropriate for the Young Turk case of 1908. The view taken here is that it is meaningful to speak of revolutionary transformation of a political system—a fundamental, violent, restructuring of the political game—as distinct from more drastic revolutions that transform socioeconomic relations, and perhaps culture, as well. Revolutionary transformation of a polity is also distinguishable from the less drastic coup d'état, an irregular and usually violent change in the identity of those who wield power, without necessarily any restructuring of the political process. The view of political revolution taken here is congruent with the ideas of Davies, and other theorists of revolution. Considering what the Ottoman Empire was like before 1908, a strong case can be made that the Ottoman experience of 1908 was a political revolution as here defined.Google Scholar

7 For assistance in this research, I am indebted to the late Wilford L'Esperance, and to Charles Issawi, Mehmet Genç, Andreas Tietze, Russell Major, David Landes, Metin Heper, Yilmaz Esmer, Lars Sandberg, Donald Quataert, sevket Pamuk, Feroz Ahmad, Justin McCarthy, Tom Whitney, and Jim Wagner.

8 Phrases liked bureaucratic intelligentsia are justified in speaking of the Ottoman elites in the sense that, historically, government service was the predominant, almost the exclusive, way for intellectuals to earn their livelihoods. One of the best-charted themes of nineteenth-century Ottoman history is the link between reform and the creation of a Western-oriented “modernist” segment within the bureaucratic intelligentsia. In the civil bureaucracy, the Foreign Ministry played the key role in shaping the modernist leadership that dominated the government during the Tanzimat. The rise of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s represents the emergence from the “modernist intelligentsia” of a movement opposing the leading Tanzimat statesmen. About the same time, bureaucratic and literary careers were also beginning to differentiate, a process linked especially to the rise of journalism (Mardin, , Genesis, 124–27;Google Scholaridem, Jön Türklerin, 94 et passim; Lewis, , Emergence, 88–89, 147–50;Google ScholarFindley, Carter Vaughn, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1980), 126–40, 209–17;Google Scholaridem, “Ideology, Part II,” 151–52).

9 Okçun, Korkut Boratav A. G., and Pamuk, S., “Ottoman Wages and the World Economy, 1839–1913,” Review (published by the Fernand Braudel Center, State University of New York, Binghamton), forthcoming.Google Scholar

10 Salaries mentioned for 1838–76 (and data sources) are: 75,000 kurus per month (Haus-, Hof-, and Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Türkei VI/67, 18 April 1838); 65,000 (Basbakanlik Archives, Istanbul (cited as BBA), Maliyeden Müdevver (cited as MM) 11738, p. 11, entry of 17 Safer 1256/20 April 1840); 75,000 (BBA, Dahiliye sicill-i ahval defterleri (cited as DSA) II, 218, entry of 1273/1856–57); 61,455 (BBA, MM 10531, p. 20, entry of 27 Mart 1277/8 April 1861); 75,000 (BBA, MM 10529, pp. II, 22, entries of 26–27 Mart and 10 Nisan 1279/7–8 and 22 April 1863); 50,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 2 Cemaziyülahir 1289/7 August 1872); 75,000 (BBA, DSA XXII, 37, entry of 1 Rebiyülahir 1291/18 May 1874); 75,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 8 Zilhicce 1291/16 January 1875, incumbent in office until May 1876).

11 To compute this wage estimate, I have multiplied the highest daily wage estimates in the appendix of Boratav et al., “Ottoman Wages,” by twenty-six, the average number of workdays per month assuming a six-day workweek and full employment. See also Issawi, Charles, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914 (Chicago, 1980), 37–43.Google Scholar

12 Salaries for 1876–79 (and data sources): 39,000 kurus (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 25 Cemaziyülevvel 1293/18 June 1876); 40,000 (ibid., entry of 16 Safer 1295/19 February 1878); 39,000 (ibid., entry of 9 Saban 1296/29 July 1879). In all notes mentioning ministerial salaries of 1876 and later, consistency with the procedure outlined in the appendix would require multiplying the salaries by 0.975 to convert them into gold kurus. Since the highest salaries may have been paid in gold (Findley, , Bureaucratic Reform, 237)–one more inequity of the salary system–I have not done this here.Google Scholar

13 BBA, DSA IV, 114, entries of Sevval 1297/September 1880, 14 Muharrem 1300/25 November 1882, 19 Cemaziyülahir 1301/16 April 1884; BBA, DSA I, 576–77, entry of 20 Cemaziyülahir 1299/9 May 1882.

14 BBA, DSA 1, 576–77, entry of 15 Zilhicce 1302/25 September 1885, incumbent in office through 1895.

15 Mentions of salaries for 1896–1908 begin with 45,000 kurus (BBA, DSA I, 576–77, entry of 15 Receb 1313/ l January 1896). The following are from Hariciye Archives, Istanbul (cited as Har.), Sicill-i Ahval collection (cited as SA) 429: 40,000 (entry of 18 Cemaziyülevvel 1313/6 November 1895); 36,000 (9 Sevval 1314/24 March 1896); 46,000 (4 Receb 1318/28 October, 1900); 25,000 (17 Saban 1326/14 September 1908).

16 Boratav, et al., “Ottoman Wages,” appendix.Google Scholar

17 Emin, Ahmed [Yalman], Turkey in the World War (New Haven, 1930), 151–53;Google ScholarToprak, Zafer, Türkiye'de “Millî Iktisat,” 1908–1918 [Economic nationalism in Turkey] (Ankara, 1982), 334–35.Google Scholar

18 Velay, A. Du, Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie (Paris, 1903), 316–461;Google ScholarBlaisdell, Donald, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1929), 74–107;Google ScholarShaw, and Shaw, History, II, 221–27;Google ScholarIssawi, , An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1982), 64–65.Google Scholar

19 E.g., Levant Herald, 4 August 1875, p. 276, circular from grand vezir to provincial governors, implying a figure of 3,000 kurus.Google Scholar

20 İbrahim, Asçidede Haul, Hat, ralar [Memoirs]. Koçu, R. E., ed. (Istanbul, 1960), 114–15.Google Scholar

21 BBA, Bab-l Âli Evrak Odasi 6641, Hasan Tahsin to Grand Vezir, 20 Kanun-i Sani 1312/1897.

22 Har., SA 531, entry of Cemaziyülahir 1314/1896: unable to manage on 920 kurus per month because of size of family and alcoholism; Har., SA 270, entry of 17 Nisan 1327/1911: 2,000 kurus per month inadequate for large family at Aleppo.

23 Har., Tercüme Kalemi Evraki 1406, no. 226, petition of Enise Hanim, 20 Agustos 1308/1892.

24 Usakligil, Halid Ziya, Kirk Yil [Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1969), 358.Google Scholar

25 Har., Müteievvi 249, both reports enclosed in dossier on reorganization of Foreign Ministry, ca. 1912.

26 Toprak, , Türkiye'de “Mili Iktisat,” 332–33.Google Scholar

27 Elder, Vedat, Osmanli Imparatorlugunun İktisadi Sartlara Hakkinda bir Tetkik [Economic conditions in the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara, 1970), 214–15.Google Scholar

28 Landen, Robert G., The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (New York, 1970), 173.Google Scholar

29 Emin, Ahmed [Yalman], Turkey, 151.Google Scholar

30 The point of recomputing time series as percentage relatives is to convert values expressed in other terms into percentages, with the value for an arbitrarily selected base period set equal to 100. This technique not only facilitates analysis of change over time in a single statistical series, but also—if the base period used for all series is the same—permits the comparison of different series. For computation of percentage relatives on a common base period turns disparate values and measures (salary per month, price per unit) into comparable values expressed on a common scale. To convert the salaries stated in kurus in Table 1 into percentage relatives, we use 1880–82 as the base period. For the means, the divisor used to compute the relatives is the arithmetic mean of the three annual means falling in the base period. Since medians are not mathematically manipulable, I have taken as the divisor the middle value of the three salary medians for the base period. To compute the relatives, the values in kurus for each year are divided by the appropriate divisor, and the result is expressed as a percentage. By this procedure, as Table 2 shows, the average of the means for the base period (1880–82) equals 100. In the case of the medians, it is the middle value—here appearing (because of rounding in calculation) as a paired value—for the same years that equals 100.

31 Boratav, et al., “Ottoman Wages,” second section;Google Scholarcf. Issawi, , Economic History of Turkey, 44–50, 332–36;Google ScholarYorulmaz, Safi, “İstanbulda Toptan Esya Fiyatlari (1884–1911 Yillannda)” [Wholesale commodity prices], Konjonktür (1946), 45–55;Google Scholar and Quataert, Donald, “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1973), 21–23, 366–70, which uses the same sources analyzed here.Google Scholar

32 Boratav, et al., “Ottoman Wages,” second section.Google Scholar

33 Toprak, , Turkiye'de “Millî ⋖ktisat,” 333;Google ScholarElder, , Osmanli ⋖mparatorluğunun ⋖ktisadî Sartlar, 214–15.Google Scholar In computing the percentage for the estimate in Toprak, I added 100 kurus for rent (cf. 150 in the larger Elder estimate). On integration into the world economy, see Pamuk, Sevket, Osmanli Ekonomisi ye Dünya Kapitalizmi (1820–1913) [Ottoman economy and world capitalism] (Ankara, 1984), chs. 2, 7.Google Scholar

34 On provenance of grains traded in Istanbul, see note 36. With the extension of the railroad into Anatolia, Ottoman-grown grains began to assume an important—in some years, preponderant—place in the Istanbul market, but starting only in the 1890s (Quataert, , “Economic Climate,” DI 157;Google Scholaridem, “Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890–1908,” Business History Review, 51:2 (1977), 151, 154–58).Google ScholarBoratav, et al., “Ottoman Wages,” emphasize the exceptional decline in grain prices after 1873.Google Scholar

35 I collected quotations from newspapers published on, or soon after, 1 March, 1 June, 1 September, and 1 December of each year. The publications (followed by abbreviations), with quarters and years for which they served, are: Journal de Constantinople, 1851–2d qtr. of 1865 (I found no quotations for 1850);Google ScholarLevant Herald (LH), 3d 1865–2d 1875;Google ScholarLa Turquie, 3d 1875–3d 1880;Google ScholarConstantinople Messenger (CM), 4th 1880–2d 1881;Google ScholarLH, 3d 1881–1st 1882;Google ScholarEastern Express (EE), 2d 1882–1884;Google ScholarJournal de la Chambre de Commerce de Constantinople (JCCC), 1st-3d 1885;Google ScholarEE, 4th 1885;Google ScholarLevant Herald and Eastern Express (LHEE), I st-2d 1886;Google ScholarJCCC, 3d 1886–1887;Google ScholarLHEE, 1888–1891;Google ScholarJCCC, 1892–2d 1914;Google ScholarMoniteur oriental, 1 August 1914. Constantinople Messenger, Eastern Express, and Levant Herald and Eastern Express are altemate names, inspired by the censor, for Levant Herald.Google Scholar

36 I converted newspaper quotations into gold kums per okka by relying, wherever possible, on notations, published with the prices, on the value of the monetary units and measures in which the quotations were given. In other cases, the best guidance came from “Poids et mesures en Turquie,” JCCC, no. 456, 23 September 1893, pp. 446–67; no. 460, 21 October 1893, pp. 495–96; no. 466, 2 November 1893, pp. 567–68. Since, for every commodity, several varieties or provenances were quoted, I computed commodity averages as averages of varietal subseries. The procedure was to select for each variety all years in which there were quotations for at least three quarters. From each subseries, all other years were excluded as offering insufficient control for seasonal fluctuations. Averaging the quotations for the selected years produced varietal price series, which were then averaged to produce the commodity averages in Table 3. To minimize the impact of price differences among commodities on the composite grain price average, I computed it as an average of percentage relatives (Table 4). The computation of percentage relatives is explained in note 30. Again 1880–82—art interval intermediate, in terms of both time and price levels, between the highest and lowest prices recorded—served as the base period. For want of indications of consumption volumes, the composite grain average is necessarily an unweighted one. This limits its value from an economic point of view, and could be taken to indicate use of a single commodity series for comparison with salaries. Here, the unweighted average is preferred as having fewer gaps.Google Scholar

Varietal subseries for each commodity, with the dates for which each is quoted, follow. Hard Wheat: Azov-Taganrog, , 1850–1890; Ismail-Bessarabia, 1850–90; Galatz-Danube-Constantza, 1851–90; Rumelian (Balçik, Burgaz), 1850–96; Edirne, Rodosto, 1862–1903; Anatolia-Bandirma, 1896–1906; Anatolian First, 1905–14; Anatolian Second, 1907–14. Soft Wheat: Rumanian (Galati, Galati-Braila, Danube, Braila), 1850–88, 1893–96, 1906–13; Rumelian (BurgazVarna-Balçik, Varna-Balçik), 1850–96; Burgaz-Plovdiv, Plovdiv-Zagora, Zagora, 1880–96; Konya First, 1904–15; Konya Second, 1904–14; Ankara First, 1904–12: Ankara Second, 1904–12. Barley1: Braila, Danubian, 1851–1913; Rumelian, 1858–1908; Black Sea, Odessa, 1888–1900; Mersin, 1899–1914; Anatolian First, 1903–14; Anatolian Second, 1903–14. Flour: Odessa 2d, 000, 1, and successor grades, 1869–1914; Odessa 3d, 00, and successor grades, 1868–1914; Danube 2d, Braila 3d, and successor middling grades, 1870–80, 1882–85, 1888, 1890–1908, 1911–14; Danube 3d, Braila 00, 4th, and successor lower grades, 1868–76, 1878–79, 1890–97, 1899–1902, 1907–08, 1911–14; Local, local Braila, local kirma, 1868–1914.Google Scholar

37 Quataert, , “Economic Climate,” D1154.Google Scholar

38 Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople, no. 256 (31 July 1908), 156.Google Scholar

39 Quataert, , “Economic Climate,” D1155, events of 1908.Google Scholar

40 Gaps in the price series have two possible explanations. Some signify insufficient numbers of quarterly quotations. Others, especially longer gaps like that of 1896–1903 for soft wheat, or short gaps across all series, signify that no quotations were being published. The reason is never stated, but sometimes (i.e., 1855, 1915–18) it was obviously war.

41 Stratil-Sauer, G., “Cereal Production in Turkey,” Economic Geography, 9:4 (1933), 324, 327–39;CrossRefGoogle ScholarQuataert, , “Limited Revolution,” 149.Google Scholar

42 Mitchell, Brian K., with collaboration of Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 488–89;Google Scholar United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Yearbook 1921 (Washington, 1922), 146;Google ScholarQuataert, , “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 188, 389–90;Google ScholarIssawi, , Economic History of Middle East, 10;Google ScholarPamuk, , Osmanli Ekonomisi, 131–36.Google Scholar

43 Mitchell, , Abstract, 488–89;Google ScholarUSDA, Yearbook 1921, 146.Google Scholar

44 Shaw, and Shaw, , History, II, 151–52.Google Scholar

45 Karal, Enver Ziya, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1977), VII, 37;Google ScholarVelay, Du, Essai, 279.Google Scholar

46 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Bonn), Abt. A (856/3), 868, I.A.B.q 95, Brassier von Saint-Simon to Bismarck, 13 February 1868; Uebel to Bismarck, 9 July 1868 (T139, mf. roll 354, in the microfilm holdings of the U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C., where I consulted the German diplomatic correspondence).

47 Shaw, and Shaw, , History, II, 156;Google ScholarVelay, Du, Essai, 316–461;Google ScholarDavison, Roderic H., Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876 (Princeton, 1963), 301–10;Google Scholar Archives des Affaires étrangères (Paris), Turquie 390, 24 October 1871, Vogüé to Rémusat; Turquie 391, 9 January 1872, idem to idem; Turquie 391, 27 March 1872, idem to idem; Turquie 404, 17 May 1876, from Bourgoing.

48 Shaw, and Shaw, , History,Google Scholar II, 182ff., 221ff.; Velay, Du, Essai, 354–57;Google ScholarIssawi, , Economic History of Turkey, 326–29, 361–65.Google Scholar

49 Quataert, , “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 21–23, 211–12;Google Scholarcf. Mitchell, , Abstract, 489;Google ScholarUSDA, Yearbook 1921, 146.Google Scholar

50 Melson, Robert, “A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894–1896,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 24:3 (07 1982), 481–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Qualified observers noted at the time how the turmoil in eastern Anatolia affected the grain trade. See “Handelsbericht fur das Jahr 1897,” Deutsches Handelsarchiv (1898), 511–16 (unfortunately, I have to cite this source from memory, as I can no longer find my photocopy; I have verified the citation from other records).Google Scholar

51 Quataert, , “Economic Climate,” D1157, D1161;Google ScholarPamuk, , Osmanli Ekonomisi, 135–36.Google Scholar

52 Ruiz, Ramón, The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905–24 (New York, 1980), 120–35.Google Scholar On the crisis of 1907 in the United States, see Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, 1963), 156–68.Google Scholar I have not found a good discussion of the worldwide economic effects of the crisis; see comments in Schluter, William C., The Pre-War Business Cycle, 1907 to 1914 (New York, 1923), 13–34.Google Scholar

53 Keddie, , “Religion and Irreligion,” 265;Google ScholarStavrianos, , Global Rift, 367–427. Detailed research into the economic history of other countries that experienced revolution just before World War I—for example, Iran (1905–11) and China (1911)—might well disclose common factors in addition to financial crisis, such as the drought or crop failure that appears in both the Ottoman and Mexican cases.Google Scholar

54 Emin, Ahmed [Yalman], Turkey, 151;Google ScholarToprak, , Türkiye'de “Milli Iktisat,” 331.Google Scholar

55 Toprak, , Türkiye'de “Millî Iktisat,” 334, cost-of-living adjustment of 1916.Google Scholar

56 Quataert, , “Ottoman Reform and Agriculture,” 15–17, 189–91, 352–54;Google Scholaridem, “Limited Revolution,” 143, 159–60;Google Scholaridem, “Agricultural Trends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800–1914,”Google ScholarAsian and African Studies, 15:1 (1981), 83;Google Scholarlssawi, , Economic History of Turkey, 353–55;Google Scholaridem, Economic History of Middle East, 105.Google Scholar

57 Boratav, et al., “Ottoman Wages.”Google Scholar

58 One way to appreciate the strength of the causal argument in this case is to obey the dictates of a strict concern for method and consider the null hypothesis that there was no connection between economic distress and political behavior. Aside from some contrary evidence already presented, one of the best ways to assess this hypothesis is to examine how von Wangenheim, then German chargé at Istanbul—he was ambassador there in 1914—dealt with the same idea in a dispatch of 1901 (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Bonn), Türkei 134, Bd. 18, to von Bülow, 26 August 1901, corresponding to T 139, roll 392, in the microfilm collection of the United States National Archives). Commenting on press reports that Ottoman officials in Istanbul and Salonica had petitioned the sultan to have their back salaries paid, on the ground that they and their families would starve otherwise, Wangenheim argued that it would be wrong to conclude from this that there was any danger of revolution. One of his arguments was that officials and military officers blamed their problems, not on the sultan, but on their superiors, with the result that complaints like these served the sultan's efforts to maintain his own political dominance. Another argument concerned the likelihood of starvation. The ability of poor Turks to get by on very little excelled even what he had seen in Spain, wrote Wangenheim. To back up the point, he described how elderly Turks would fish on the landing in front of the embassy summer residence at Tarabya on the Bosphorus. Too, poor Turks earned the sharing of goods “to the social-democratic ideal,” and shopkeepers also would take mercy on the poor, so that the shocking indigence observable in other European capitals was unseen. Turks in office had the added advantage of enjoying influence, which enabled them to extract bribes from the public. Knowing that they did so enabled the sultan to accustom his officials to irregular salary payments. Salary payments had thus reached the point of being “a special act of grace by the ruler, announced in the newspapers, and celebrated almost like a national holiday,” not only by the officials, but also by the tradesmen who supplied them on credit between paydays. Only Christians and foreigners in Ottoman service suffered, Wangenheim argued, as they lacked access to the Muslims' business arrangements and love for their fellows. Wangenheim's comments on the sultan's manipulation of salary payments are probably worth taking seriously. Yet it is quite unclear why a Christian Ottoman official could find no support among his coreligionists, at any rate. Even more perplexing is the ingenious way Wangenheim's argument channeled the grievances of Ottoman officials into a limbo where they had neither severe human costs for the officials nor political costs for the regime. Perhaps in gratification at this conclusion, a pencil note below Wangenheim's signature, probably by von Billow, states: “very well written and correctly observed.” In fact, the argument is a piece of orientalism in the sense of Edward Said. Why should the behavior of poor old Turks, fishing on a landing, have provided any better guide to the political behavior of Ottoman officials and military officers than that of peasants digging potatoes in Prussia would have provided to the behavior of German diplomats like Wangenheim? Apart from having discussed these old men with his Montenegrin doorman, as he says, how well did Wangenheim understand them? It is not worthwhile to belabor such questions, since the kind of argument Wangenheim sought to make could be updated and strengthened. Yet the fact remains that revolution came only seven years after he wrote this dispatch and that Salonica and Istanbul, the sources of the news reports on which he commented, were its most important centers.

59 With particular reference to agrarian difficulties of 1873–75 and 1907–8, Quataert, “Commercialization of Agriculture,” 52–53, makes much the same point by speaking of social and political “dislocations” that arose out of crises in agriculture.Google Scholar

60 Mardin, , Genesis, 166–68, 321–23, 354, 388. As noted in the preceding section, there is evidence that the Young Ottomans did seize upon the economic problems that surrounded the Cretan crisis (1866–69), at least.Google Scholar

61 Among the many sources that could be cited on this point, Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 263–66Google Scholar; Mardin, , Jön Türklerin, 11, 22–27, 32–33, 39–41, 225–26, et passim.Google Scholar

62 Quataert, Donald, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908 (New York, 1983),Google Scholar chs. 4, 5; idem, “Ottoman Luddites and the Changing Carpet Industry in Usak Anatolia, 1860–1914” (Paper presented at the Third International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24–26 August 1983);Google Scholaridem, personal communications, November-December 1983. Further on the working class and on the beginning of socialist influence, especially among non-Muslims, see Dumont, Paul, “Une organisation socialiste ottomane: La Fédération ouvrière de Salonique,” Etudes balkaniques, 11:1 (1975), 78; idem,Google Scholar“Sources inédites pour l'histoire du mouvement ouvrier et des courants socialistes dans l'empire ottoman au début du XXe siècle, ” in Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071–1920), Okyar, Osman and Inalcik, Halil, eds. (Ankara, 1980), 383Google Scholar; idem, “A propos de la ‘classe ouvrière’ ottomane à la veille de la révolution jeune-turque,” Turcica, 9:1 (1977), 229–52Google Scholar; Haupt, Georges and Dumont, Paul, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Sosyallst Hareketler [Socialist movements in the Ottoman empire] (Istanbul, 1977; not seen).Google Scholar

63 Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” 136.Google Scholar