IntroductionCotard’s syndrome is a nihilistic delusion where the individual believes they are dead, partly dead, or replaced by an animal. The delusion that their body has been replaced by a purely inanimate azooic (but physical entity), such as a robot or a droid, has not hitherto been described.
MethodsCase study: This 60-year-old, right-handed, female, with a past history of schizophrenia presented with complaints of depression, irritability, and anger. When confronted with commitment papers signed by her father, she denied their truthfulness, insisting that he had been replaced by an imposter. This belief persisted unabated, despite treatment with 20 mg of haloperidol per day. Over time, she expressed the belief that she had been replaced by another person, whom she refused to identify. The following day she refused all food and water proclaiming that she had died and been replaced by a machine revealing, “I am not her. I am a robot.” Soon thereafter she developed tremulousness, stiffness, and rigidity. After haloperidol was decreased and benztropine started, these parkinsonism symptoms subsided, but her delusions persisted.
ResultsAbnormalities in physical examination: General: decreased blink frequency. Neurologic examination: Mental status examination: bradyphrenia, hypoverbal, blunted affect. Oriented ×2. Motor examination: bradykinetic, cogwheel rigidity in both upper extremities. Gait examination: slow shuffling gait, reduced bilateral arm swing. Cerebellar examination: resting tremor in both upper extremities at 3 cycles per second. Other: EEG: focal sharp transients in the left temporal region. MRI with and without contrast: normal. Toxicological, metabolic, endocrine screening: normal.
ConclusionThis illustrated sequential presentations of three delusions of misidentification. Upon presentation, she exhibited Capgras syndrome, the delusional belief that a familiar person has been replaced by a double. The nidus for this may have been the discovery that her father had signed her commitment papers. This was followed by the belief she was a double of herself, which is the syndrome of Reverse Subjective Doubles. Finally, she manifested Cotard’s syndrome in a previously undescribed manner, believing she had died and become a robot. Cotard’s and Capgras syndromes are known to present sequentially rather than concurrently, whereas the patient presented concurrently with all three syndromes. Drug-induced parkinsonism may have made the patient subjectively feel stiff, which she interpreted as being rigid like a robot. She was bradykinetic, did not eat or drink, and had rigidity, suggesting that these were somatic manifestations of her underlying delusion of being a robot or alternatively, may have been the somatic nidus for the delusion. Those who present with Cotard’s syndrome warrant evaluation for underlying medical conditions, serving as a substrate for this delusion.
