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On the Meaning of ΛΟΓΟΣ in Certain Passages in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2009

J. Cook Wilson
J. Cook Wilson
Affiliation:
Oxford.
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Type
Original Contributions
Information
The Classical Review , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , June 1913 , pp. 113 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1913

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References

page 114 note 1 In this place, however, and some others (see the conclusion of this article) λ⋯γος may rather mean reasoning. But, as opposed to ‘definition,’ the translation is still ‘Reason.’ ‘Reason,’ like λ⋯γος, often stands for reasoning. In the familiar expression ‘to listen to reason,’ this is often the case. Cf. ‘When I am resolved, I always listen to reason, for then it can do no harm’ (Goldsmith's Good-natured Man). It is, of course, sometimes impossible to say which exactly is intended.

page 115 note 1 It must be observed that λ⋯γος sometimes—as, e.g., in VI. viii. 9, 1142a 26; xi. 4, 1143b 1, but by no means always—is restricted to discursive reason.

page 117 note 1 I find that Peters has ‘rational ordinance.’