Neither can stand. ‘Argos of the land’ (or, ‘of land’) is nonsense, and even if it were not, is absurd as an apostrophe of the River Inachus. ‘a plain’, indistinguishable from is similarly impossible: the audience would be baffled; in 6 has to be the first occurrence of the vox; ‘streams’ cannot be apposed to a ‘plain’, even if could have been understood as meaning this.

One of the most striking differences between ancient and modern writings on Homer is the prominence in the former, and the rarity in the latter, of discussions of pathos. The word barely appears in the most characteristic books of our time on the subject. Thus the inquirer will find in Wace and Stubbings's Companion to Homer (1962) an index hospitable enough to include ‘Babylonian cuneiform’, and ‘Kum-Tepe, neolithic-site at’, and ‘Pig-keeping, in Homer’; but for ‘pathos’ he will look in vain.

It seems surprising that this text—or others similar—(emending the manuscript reading found in both L and P) has been accepted without any serious search for a more meaningful alternative. Even if it be thought that Euripides was capable of adding , in an unusual sense producing an awkward tautology, to , surely this should only be accepted in the absence ofa more credible emendation which departs no further from the manuscripts? Is there such an alternative? In the corresponding last line of the strophe we have : the first syllable of is doubtful; there seems to be no convincing metrical objection to its being a long syllable here. This atonce suggests the maintenance of the manuscripts' to maintain the metrical balance.

The eagle has always been recognized as one of Pindar's most potent and characteristic images. Horace borrowed it to construct the first four stanzas of his Pindaric imitation in Carm. 4.4, and he presents both himself and Pindar as soaring birds: see Carm. 4.2.25 and 2.20, where the swan outflies Daedalus and Icarus in a way that the imitators of Pindar cannot hope to do. It is standard doctrine that Pindar often describes himself as an eagle, and that Bacchylides ‘imitates’ the notion in his fifth ode (e.g. CM. Bowra, Pindar (1964), p.l).

Bowra (Pindar, p. 270), referring to the image of the , and to the striking impression , states ‘Pindar seems to fuse two unusually disparate images into a single result… While the sheddingof leaves implies that he would have grown old without winning any wide renown, the cock means that such renown as he would have got would have beenof little account in the Greek world at large.’ Gildersleeve's comment ad loc, ‘The thus becomes a flower’, implies a similar assumption, that the secondimage is entirely unconnected with the first.

The Phoenissae of Euripides was throughout antiquity an exceptionally popular play, and is generally thought to be exceptionally heavily interpolated. In the Phoenissae, as in other annotated plays, a significant feature of variance between the medieval text and the text in antiquity is revealed by the scholia: verses present in the medieval manuscripts (to attempt a non-controversial formulation) were occasionally absent from ancient manuscripts. ‘Some (many, most) manuscripts are without this verse (these verses)’. Such scholia are well known: the ancient tradition, if one may speak of such a thing, was evidently in a more fluid state than the medieval.

In her masterly article on this passge, Dr. Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood goes most of the way towards solving two serious problems: the text of Lys. 645, where the vulgate makes the ‘bears’ more than ten years old, contrary to all other evidence; and the meaning of of A. Ag. 239 . She argues cogently that in Aeschylus means ‘shedding’ the saffron robe, as most editors including Fraenkel have thought, and not ‘letting her robes fall to the ground’ as Lloyd-Jones, followed by Page, has argued.

The essential purpose of the present article (which is quarried from my Cambridge doctoral dissertation, ‘A Study of the Seven against Thebes of Aeschylus’, 1975) is to put forward a new theory concerning the last scene of the Septem, 1005–78. The problem of the play's ending as a whole has been very thoroughly discussed by P. Nicolaus, Die Frage nach der Echtheit der Schlussszene von Aischylos' Sieben gegen Theben (Tübingen, 1967); since I have no wish to duplicate Nicolaus's work I shall deal only very briefly with those aspects of the problem on which I find myself in agreement with him and with other scholars.

As described by the ancient metricians, catalexis is a matter of arithmetic rather than rhythm. They develop the idea in their usual way, mechanically and mathematically, adding and subtracting elements, so as to produce ‘brachycatalexis’ and ‘hypercatalexis’. These are now mere metrical-glossary terms, but in catalexismodern metricians have seen a genuine relationship between cola and a rhythmic effect more or less comprehensible even to us. Wilamowitz, T.D. Goodell, and A.M. Dale explore the concept to some extent, but current hand books and general treatises give it only perfunctory and superficial treatment, while casual appearances of the term offer the reader glimpses of a theoretical substructure which hasnot been explicitly and coherently explained

In pages 101–3 of his article Pope lists the numbers of occurrences of interrogative and enclitic in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and mentions occurrences in other authors. He shows that, although there is a dead heat between the numbers of instances of the two words in Aeschylus, nevertheless enclitic is very rarely indeed, and perhaps never, found in sentences which do not have a main verb (or, failing that, at least subject and predicate). There are, however, occurrences of interrogative in sentences which lack a main verb and have no predicate either. It must surely be rare to find statement sentences which do not contain at least subject and predicate at the best of times, let alone when happens to occur in the sentence. There are strong reasons, then, for rejecting the version of F and Triclinius, quite apart from the occurrence of in the sentence. One can defend by saying that either is understood from the preceding sentence, or else is vaguely understood: The favour of the gods comes to men (comes about) perforce.’ But it is not very plausible. I am inclined to agree with Pope on this point, if not for quite the same reason.

Theseus, on entering, immediately demands of the Chorus an explanation of the in the house and of the lack of proper welcome for the returning master. His first thought (794) is that something may have happened to the aged Pittheus. No, say the Chorus, the (that which has happened) has nothing to do with the old: it is the young whose death causes pain (798). Naturally, Theseus now leaps to the conclusion that it is his children whose ‘life is pillaged’ (799): no, he is told, it is his wife.

The question contrasts two ways of expressing the role of the sense organ in perception. In one the expression referring to the sense organ is put into the dative case (let us call this the ‘with’ idiom); the other is a construction with the preposition δiá (‘through’) governing the genitive case of the word for the sense organ (let us call this the ‘through’ idiom).

The battle of Salamis can be dated with a high degree of certainty. Probably about the time of that battle, Cleombrotus was at the Isthmus, constructing the defences there (Hdt. 8. 71. 1). At some point while building the wall, he considered giving chase to the Persian army. When his sacrifice was answered by a solar eclipse, he took this as a bad omen and immediately returned to Lacedaemon (9. 10. 2–3). The eclipse visible to Cleombrotus could only have been that of 2 October 480. Now it is generally supposed that Cleombrotus would not have thought to abandon the construction of the wall and pursue Xerxes unless the latter had just begun his retreat from Athens. Thus, as Herodotus says that a few days () after the battle of Salamis Xerxes withdrew from Attica (8. 113. 1), the battle of Salamis probably occurred before 2 October 480.

In the creation myth of the Timaeus Plato describes God as wishing that all things should be good so far as is possible. Wherefore, finding the whole visible sphere of the world not at rest, but moving in an irregular fashion, out of disorder He brought order, thinking that this was in every way an improvement. To achieve His end He placed intelligence in soul and soul in body, reflecting that nothing unintelligent could ever be better than something intelligent (30 a—b). From this account of creation it would seem that God confronted a chaotic world whose disorderly motions existed in full independence of the principle of soul. Yet, in his doctrinal pronouncements in the Laws (892 a) and the Pbaedrus (245 e) on the origin of motion, Plato declares soul to be elder born than bodies and the prime source of all their changes and transformations.

In 404 Sparta stood supreme, militarily and politically master of Greece, in concord with Persia. By 362, the year at which Xenophon terminated his history on the sad note of ‘even greater confusion and uncertainty’, she was eclipsed militarily, never to win a great battle again; and so far from being master even of the Peloponnese that she would spend the rest of time struggling to recover her own ancestral domain of Messenia, no longer a world power, merely a local wrangler. The reasons for all this which are to seek are of absorbing interest and prime importance for the history of Greece, but it is hard to resist the temptation to connect the change with the policies of Agesilaus whose reign virtually coincided with the period in question. He was king for forty-one years and over thirty of them well before the battle of Leuctra (Plut. Ages. 40) and he had influence in the state unequalled as far as we can tell by any other king.

Dissatisfaction with Thucydides' account of the years of confusion and inconclusive action that followed the Peace of Nicias has perhaps been too strong a stimulus to modern scholars. In their eagerness to repair the historian's omissions and illuminate his obscurities they have sometimes offered answers to questions of policy and motive that seem needlessly elaborate, complex, and farfetched, often basing their views of the foreign policy of cities on assumptions about internal political dissensions as unnecessary as they are implausible.

In speaking of Demosthenes' conduct in the period between his return to Athens after the peace agreement with Macedon (late 338 B.C.) and Philip's death (July 336) Aeschines refers to only one specific incident, the attempt by Demosthenes to have himself elected What this position was has never been satisfactorily explained.

The achievement of Thrasybulus on his last voyage has been variously estimated. Busolt saw no more than a series of strong-arm acts that added up to very little. Beloch spoke of the Second Athenian Empire. For others there were mere renewals of friendship. This note has as its starting-point that Thrasybulus sought to restore the fifth-century empire.

If one looks merely at the list of places explicitly mentioned, the sum is not large. Thasos and its peraea, Samothrace and possibly its peraea, Byzantium, Chalcedon, Abydos possibly, Mytilene, Methymna, Eresus, Antissa, Chios, Halicarnassus, Aspendus. But Xenophon implies a great deal more.

(a) The Regress: Knowledge, we like to suppose, is essentially a rational thing: if I claim to know something, I must be prepared to back up my claim by statingmy reasons for making it;and if my claim is to be upheld, my reasons must begood reasons. Now suppose I know that Q; and let my reasons be conjunctively contained in the proposition that R. Clearly, I must believe that R (for R cannot give my reasons unless it has my assent);equally clearly, I must know that R (for mere opinion is not nutritious enough to sustain the demanding body of knowledge). Thus if I know that Q, I know that R. But if I know that R, then I must have my reasons, R' for holding R; and, by the same argument, I mustknow that R'. And if R', then R”; and so on, ad infinitum

Marriage is a subject of perennial interest, and we should like to be able to assess the exact degree of importance which the Greeks attached to this institution. One of the chief questions is how the formality of marriage, or the lack of it, affected the children of a union; above all, was illegitimate birth a bar to citizenship even in democratic Athens? Unfortunately there is still no general agreement about the answer to this question.