In 1943 one of the authors of this paper set out a case for the view that the sixth book of Polybius' Histories contained two layers, written at different times, and indicating a change in the historian's assessment of the achievements and merits of the Roman hegemony. The arguments there put forward met with some acceptance; but the recent burst of interest in the problems of the sixth book has shown that unanimity is still remote. Among scholars writing since 1943, one, G. B. Cardona, is a ‘separatist’ who accepts the views of De Sanctis; another, W. Theiler, believes that three ‘layers’ of composition can be detected and isolated; three, E. Mioni, H. Erbse, and H. Ryffel, are ‘Unitarians’, but vary in the date they assign to the composition of the Histories; and K. Ziegler in his R.E. article on Polybius argues for composition in the sixties followed by a revision and publication before 146.

No pre-Socratic philosopher, perhaps, has caused more disagreement, or been more variously interpreted, than Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Among recent attempts to reconstruct his system some of the more notable are those of Tannery, Bailey, Cornford, Peck, and Vlastos. Each of these reconstructions, and especially that of Tannery, has its adherents; and since none of them (with the possible exceptions of the first and last) has much in common with any other, a universally acceptable solution to the fundamental problems involved may well by now seem unattainable. It is my belief, however, and it is the object of this paper to try to prove, that all these modern reconstructions have at least one quality in common, namely an undue complication. The actual system of Anaxagoras was, I believe, considerably simpler than any reconstruction yet forthcoming. Unfortunately what I take to be the basis of the whole system, Anaxagoras' reaction to his Eleatic predecessors, is by.no means easy to convey in brief and simple terms. But if I should succeed in conveying it, then it will, I hope, be seen in itself to possess such a simplicity and neatness that my contention will carry with it a fair warrant of its own truth. I shall, for convenience, divide my argument into ten sections, to which I shall append a brief summary of my conclusions.

No recent scholar has ever seriously maintained the genuineness of [Andokides] Oration IV, Against Alkibiades. Against it, one need cite no more than Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit (1868), pp. 325–31; Jebb, Attic Orators (1876), vol. i, pp. 133–9; an(i now more recently Raubitschek's learned and interesting article in T.A.P.A., vol. lxxix (1948), pp. 191–210. The speech is quite ‘out of character’ for Andokides, who was certainly far too young ever to have been in danger of ostrakism as an alternative victim to Nikias or Alkibiades; and there is no reasonable doubt that its ‘dramatic date’ is early in 415, and its ostensible speaker Phaiax, the clever young orator of Aristophanes' Knights (1377 ff.), ambassador to Sicily in 422 (Thk. 5. 4–5; cf. our speech § 42, which adds Macedonia and Epeiros) and butt of Eupolis on divers occasions (Plut. Alk. 13, Athenaios 3. 106b). These conclusions, however, leave open certain other material questions, especially that of the real date of the composition, on which in turn depends the question how far it can be legitimately used as an historical or biographical source.

In later antiquity few monuments at Athens had such a great reputation as what the Athenians called with pride the Altar of Eleos or Pity, the suppliants' altar. Philostratos links it in fame with Olympia and Delphi. The Athenians pay homage to Eleos along with Athena Polias, says Sopatros. ‘You have an Altar of Eleos’, says Apsines to the Athenians; ‘…for this you have a great reputation amongst all other men.’

This article is a survey of familiar ground—those passages of the Poetics of Aristotle which throw light on the treatment of legend by the tragic poets. Although sweeping generalizations are often made on the use of the traditional stories in drama, our evidence on the subject is slight and inconclusive. We have little knowledge of the form in which most of the legends were known to the Attic playwrights, for the few we find in the Iliad and Odyssey appear there in very different versions from those they take on in the plays, and the fragmentary remains of epic and lyric poetry between Homer and the fifth century B.C. present us with a wide field for speculation, but few certain facts; while vase paintings and other works of art supplement only here and there the scanty information gained from literature.The comments of ancient writers on this aspect of tragedy are surprisingly few, and carry us little farther. The Poetics stands out as the one source from which we can draw any substantial account of the matter. Even Aristotle, of course, is not directly concerned with the history of drama, and deals with it only incidentally in isolated passages; and in considering these it must constantly be borne in mind that he is discussing tragedy as he knew it in the late fourth century, for the benefit of fourth-century readers. But even so, his statements are the main foundation on which our view of the dramatists' use of legend must be built.

A Study of the related words munia, munus, munis, and their derivatives will throw light on the original linguistic and juridical meaning of the ius municipi. It is agreed that these words all derive from a root *mei ‘to exchange' (Meillet—Ernout, p. 749; Walde-Hofmann, i, p. 255). Meillet-Ernout rightly point out that words derived from that root with the suffix -n- ‘ont servi a désigner des échanges régiés par l'usage, et plusieurs ont une valeur juridique'.

Down to the present century the Niobe of Aeschylus was represented by eight significant manuscript fragments containing some twenty-three lines. Even in this condition it deservedly attracted the interest and attention of scholars; and in 1933 this interest was intensified by the publication in Florence by Vitelli and Norsa of a mutilated papyrus of twenty-one lines embodying two of the earlier fragments.

In this paper I wish to examine the meaning of the doctrine of anamnesis, with particular regard to the role assigned in it to sense-experience. I shall argue (a) that an empirical interpretation of the doctrine as it is presented in the Meno is false, and that Plato is not concerned at all in the Meno with the question of the role of sense-experience in recollection; (b) that the doctrine of the Phaedo (73 c ff.) shows an inadequate appreciation of the problems involved in assigning a role to sense-experience, and is seriously inconsistent with what Plato says elsewhere, in the Phaedo and in other dialogues, about the senses and sensible images; (c) that the revised and more responsible presentation of this doctrine in the Phaedrus is self-contradictory; (d) that misinterpretations of the theory of anamnesis are due principally to (i) either misinterpretation or neglect of what is said about it in the Meno, (ii) the custom of taking Phaedo 73 c ff. as specially representative of Plato's doctrine.

The metics of Gortyna came under the jurisdiction of the special courts for foreigners, κσενεία δίκα, and of the κσένιος κόσμος, an official who is often named in Gortynian inscriptions. From one of these we can infer that freedmen were classed with metics, because of the artisan status of both.