Plato's Noble Art Of Sophistry

G. B. Kerferd

doi:10.1017/S000983880000793X

Plato's Noble Art Of Sophistry

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009

G. B. Kerferd

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G. B. Kerferd: Affiliation:
University of Manchester

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Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, or more probably different aspects of the sophistic art. The sixth division (226 a–231 b) is very different. To quote Cornford's words, ‘satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent’.

Type: Research Article
Information: The Classical Quarterly , Volume 4 , Issue 1-2 , May 1954 , pp. 84 - 90

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S000983880000793X [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © The Classical Association 1954

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^{page 84 note 1} Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 173.

^{page 84 note 2} Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work ⁴, 379. There is nothing to support Jackson's view (J. Phil, xiv (1885), 176–82) that Plato is describing successive stages in the history of the sophistic movement. Soph. 232 a shows that Plato held there was a single common element underlying the name ‘sophist’ and it is for this that he is searching.

^{page 84 note 3} Op. cit. 177.

^{page 84 note 4} Op. cit. 182.

^{page 84 note 5} Op. cit. 381. Similarly Burnet, Greek Philosophy, Thales to Plato, 276.

^{page 84 note 6} Cf. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 12–13; V. Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon, 29–31; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, 241–2.

^{page 84 note 7}

^{page 84 note 8} Keeping Alternatively, with Burnet's the meaning will be ‘let it be so’.

^{page 85 note 1} Op. cit. 381 n. 1.

^{page 85 note 2} Op. cit. 180 n. 2.

^{page 85 note 3} Op. cit. 175 n. 1.

^{page 85 note 4} e.g. Stallbaum ad loc.; Campbell ad loc.; Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. i ⁶. 1338. They were fol lowed on this point by Burnet, op. cit. 275, and Diés in the Budé translation. Taylor, loc. cit., saw a grammatical difficulty in the way of this view. But the difficulty arises in English rather than Greek— can easily refer to the only plural expressed in the earlier sentence, namely

^{page 85 note 5} Cf. Cornford, op. cit. 182, and the list of passages in Louis, P., Les Métaphores de Platon, Paris, 1945, p. 186.Google Scholar

^{page 85 note 6} Rep. 2. 375 a–376 c.

^{page 85 note 7} It may have been consciousness of this which led Grote, Plato, ii ³. 408, note b, and similarly Jowett, to misrepresent the Greek of the first half of the comparison by writing, ‘the sophist is indeed very like this grand educator’, and which led Cornford to write for the second part of the comparison, ‘so has the dog (some resemblance) to the wolf’.

^{page 86 note 1} Cf. Speusippus, frags. 5–23 Lang.

^{page 86 note 2} For the evidence and discussion see Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, i. 48–58.

^{page 86 note 3} Cf. Politicus 287 c, Phaedrus 265 e.

^{page 86 note 4} It is true that Plato uses ‘wild’ and ‘tame’ as a basis for classification himself, e.g. Soph. 222 b–c, Politicus 263 e–264 d, Laws 823 b. But in none of those cases is Plato dividing animals according to their own natural kinds—he is concerned with the use made of animals by human beings.

^{page 86 note 5} e.g. . Heindorf.

^{page 86 note 6} As Diès, op.cit., p. 326 n.

^{page 86 note 7} As Campbell ad loc.

^{page 86 note 8} So Ast and Stallbaum.

^{page 87 note 1} Cf. Grube, Plato's Thought, 226–7; Hackforth, ‘Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics’, in C.Q. xl (1946), 118–20, with C.R. lix (1945), 1–4; Dodds, ‘Plato and the Irrational’, in J.H.S. Ixv (1945), 18–19.

^{page 87 note 2} Especially 229 a 3 and in 228 e 3.

^{page 88 note 1} For other interpretations of the phrase see Campbell, ad loc.

^{page 88 note 2} Not ‘refute’, as it precedes the demonstration of the contradictory nature of the opinions.

^{page 88 note 3} The meaning of appears to be ‘not easily changed’, cf. Crat. 407 d . The other possibility is that it refers to the overbearing character of the man's conceit, giving a different meaning to ——‘thoughts about himself’, cf. R. Robinson, op. cit. 12

^{page 89 note 1} Op. cit. 276.

^{page 89 note 2} Plato, Prot. 335 b.

^{page 89 note 3} Plato, Phaedrus 267 a–b.

^{page 89 note 4} VS ⁶ 90. 8. 1 and 8. 13. Only the affirmative arguments survive—the original probably included arguments against as well.

^{page 89 note 5} Loc. cit.

^{page 89 note 6} VS ⁶ 22B 17.

^{page 89 note 7} That it is etymologizing in general and not simply about the names of the gods which is in question is shown by V. Goldschmidt, Essai sur le Cratyle, 106–7.

^{page 89 note 8} Cf. .

^{page 89 note 9} As Campbell (ad loc.) saw, the insertion of introduces an unjustified change in the meaning. It is not one feature that is to be selected but that

^{page 90 note 1} Untersteiner, ‘Le “antilogie” di Prota-gora’, Antiquitas, ii-iii (1947–8), 34–44 and I Sofisti, 17–25, maintains that Plato is summarizing the of Protagoras and that the list of writings of Protagoras in D. L. 9. 55 is likewise listing the contents of the . But Diogenes' list makes it clear that the of Protagoras contained only two books.

^{page 90 note 2} Cf. Phaedrus 261 c ff.

^{page 90 note 3} Cf. Diels ad VS ⁶ 80 A 1 ‘vermittelst welcher’. For discussion and a different view see Untersteiner, ^{I Sofisti}, 53 n. 93. Untersteiner is right in refusing to restrict with Diels to ‘syllogistic dialogue’. There is no justification with Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, iii. 25 n. 11, for deriving this description solely from Plato's Protagoras.

^{page 90 note 4} Cf. L. 's edition of Plato's Meno, London, 1901.

^{page 90 note 6} Cf. R. Robinson, op. cit. 88–92 (84–88 in the second edition).

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