Plato, Republic 606ab, which deals with the soul bipartition and the behaviour of the two soul components during a theatrical performance, has been the object of scholarly dispute concerning both its grammar and its meaning. In this passage, Socrates says that theatrical performance boosts precisely that soul component which ‘decent men’ otherwise struggle to keep under control by force. So far so good. But what happens to the rational component during a theatrical performance? Here is Socrates’ answer (Resp. 606a7–606b4):
[a7] τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς [8] πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν του̑ [b1] θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωρου̑ν καὶ ἑαυτῳ̑ [2] οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὂν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως [3] πενθει̑, του̑τον ἐπαινει̑ν καὶ ἐλεει̑ν, ἀλλ’ ἐκει̑νο κερδαίνειν [4] ἡγει̑ται, τὴν ἡδονήν κτλ.
The general meaning is that even the best spectators consider the theatrical performance rather innocuous because they believe that the feelings displayed on the stage, since they belong to a different person, can be experienced and enjoyed without risk or shame. Socrates’ point is that the pleasure experienced in someone else eventually becomes one's own pleasure.
Let us take a closer look. At the theatre the rational component of the soul, if it has not been educated enough, loosens up the guard over the non-rational component. Now the participle θεωρου̑ν (b1) which seems to be grammatically connected with the subject τὸ βέλτιστον ἡμῶν (a7) suggests that it is the rational component which beholds the onstage performance and praises and pities the mourning dramatic hero without feeling embarrassed or ashamed. This, however, is not the meaning we expect since throughout the critique of poetry and even a few lines before this passage Socrates has repeatedly and consistently pointed out that it is the lower half of the soul which is affected by poetic imitation and is able to feel pity. This is why Halliwell wrote:Footnote 1
The grammar of the sentence, if taken strictly, makes it seem that it is the best part of the soul which is lulled into enjoying the emotional experience of poetry, even though that is clearly not the required sense … The incongruity is caused by the analytical separation of psychological faculties within the coherent experience of an individual.
Criticizing this discrepancy between grammar and meaning, Mastrangelo and Harris suggested detaching the passage from the context and admitting that in these lines Plato maintains that the rational component of the soul is susceptible to emotions when exposed to theatrical performance.Footnote 2 This suggestion was later adopted without further comment by Halliwell.Footnote 3
The issue has been recently reopened by Storey, who rightly emphasizes the significance of the philosophical context for the interpretation of this passage and the need to find a solution which fits Plato's views on the bi- and tripartition of the soul.Footnote 4 Storey points out that the ἅτε-clause at b1–3 does not make much sense if ἑαυτῷ (b1) refers (like θεωρου̑ν) to the rational component (τὸ βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, a7), as the syntax seems to require, since the main clause has just stated that the rational component loosens up its guard over the lamenting component (ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν του̑ θρηνώδους, a8–b1).Footnote 5 Indeed, why should the rational component loosen its guard over the non-rational component at the theatre if it is the rational component which enjoys the dramatic performance?
Storey proposes to read the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτῷ as referring to the whole person, a reading facilitated by the presence of ἄλλος ἀνήρ in the next line and the change of subject brought by the masculine καταφρονήσας (b5). This reading has the obvious advantage of interpreting the puzzling sentence in accordance with the context. In particular, it demonstrates that it is not necessary, as Mastrangelo and Harris suggested, to accept the idea that Plato exceptionally attributes here to the upper half of the soul feelings and emotions such as pity, which he otherwise consistently associates with its lower half. The reason is that Plato easily moves between the perspective of the person as a whole and the perspective of the soul's parts endowed with their own agency.Footnote 6
Although Storey's reading is preferable to that of Mastrangelo and Harris, it is not exempt from difficulties. Storey argues that the ἅτε-clause at b1–3 must refer to the whole person because, if it refers to the upper half of the soul alone, it is a non sequitur.Footnote 7 However, since the participle θεωρου̑ν (b1) is neuter, the entire ἅτε-clause cannot refer to the whole (masculine) person. Rather, according to Storey's explanation, the change of subject must take place within this clause, namely between θεωρου̑ν (neuter) and ἑαυτῷ (masculine), which would be more than just a ‘minor difficulty’.Footnote 8 Moreover, it is not clear whether in Plato's Greek a reflexive pronoun such as ἑαυτῷ at b1 can be used without an explicit subject.Footnote 9
In view of these difficulties, I suggest a different approach. In his discussion Storey assumes that the ἅτε-clause at b1–3 must have one of two possible subjects, namely either the upper half of the soulFootnote 10 or the whole person. He prefers the whole person because the alternative seems worse (which is true). However, there is a third possibility. As Storey points out, the subject of ἐλεει̑ν (and ἐπαινει̑ν)Footnote 11 at b3 must be the lower half of the soul (του̑ θρηνώδους, b1).Footnote 12 In this case, why not assume that the entire ἅτε-clause refers to τὸ θρηνῶδες? This meaning can be obtained by connecting θεωρου̑ν not with the (grammatical) subject of the main clause (= the upper half of the soul) but, by way of an anacoluthon, with τὸ θρηνῶδες which, though a genitive, is its logical subject.Footnote 13 That in the sentence 606a7–606b4 the focus is still on the lower half of the soul (following the previous sentence) is shown by the emphatic use of the demonstrative τούτου at b1, which directs the reader from the grammatical to the logical subject of the sentence and could justify an anacoluthon.
Plato does not shy away from giving such sense constructions to a participle.Footnote 14 Take Tht. 168c8–d4 ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι του̑ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ἡμι̑ν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ του̑ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτου̑, καὶ χαριεντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμα̑ς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὑτου̑ λόγον; Here, the subject changes from the second person of ἐνενόησας to the third (= Protagoras) of διεκελεύσατο. Consequently, the first participle ὀνειδίζοντος has the same case as Πρωταγόρου, while the following participles ἀποκαλῶν and ἀποσεμνύνων are nominatives, as if Protagoras had been the subject of the sentence all the time. This shift is possible because Protagoras is obviously the logical subject of the sentence, which also explains the use of the reflexive pronouns ἑαυτου̑ and αὑτου̑. Similarly, at Phdr. 241d4–6 the text reads: καίτοι ᾤμην γε (v.l. σε) μεσου̑ν αὐτόν (v.l. αὐτου̑), καὶ ἐρει̑ν τὰ ἴσα περὶ του̑ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὡς δει̑ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μα̑λλον, λέγων ὅσα αὖ ἔχει ἀγαθά. Here, the participle λέγων is nominative instead of accusative for the same reason, namely that the logical subject is more important than the grammatical subject.Footnote 15
As mentioned above, the context requires that the subject of ἐλεει̑ν (and ἐπαινει̑ν) at Resp. 606b3 be the lower half of the soul. For this reason, we may regard του̑ θρηνώδους τούτου as the logical subject of the ἅτε-clause at b1–3. Therefore, the use of the nominative participle θεωρου̑ν to refer to του̑ θρηνώδους τούτου is similar to the anacolutha in the Theaetetus and Phaedrus passages. Assuming an anacoluthon here, ἑαυτῷ at b1 may refer to τὸ θρηνῶδες as well.
