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Plato, Carneades, and Cicero's Philus (Cicero, Rep. 3.8–31)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

David E. Hahm
David E. Hahm
Affiliation:
Ohio State University, [email protected]
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Extract

The centrepiece of Cicero's De re publica is a discussion of justice (Book 3). This discussion, which evokes the theme of the Platonic dialogue after which it was named, consists of a set of three speeches. It begins with a speech opposing justice, placed in the mouth of L. Furius Philus and alleged by him to be modelled on the second of a pair of speeches for and against justice delivered in Rome in 155 B.C. by the Greek Academic philosopher Carneades (Rep. 3.8–31 [8–29 B]). Philus' speech lays the dialectical foundation for the two subsequent speeches, a defence of justice as the prerequisite for government by C. Laelius (Rep. 3.32–41 [30–41 B]), and an explanation of its role in various forms of government by Scipio Aemilianus (Rep. 3.42–8).

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , May 1999 , pp. 167 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1999

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References

1 The latest text is Bréguet, E., Cicéron: La république (Paris, 1980),Google Scholar with English translations by Keyes, C. W., Cicero XVI: De re publica, De legibus, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1928),Google Scholar and Sabine, G. H. and Smith, S. B., Marcus Tullius Cicero: On the Commonwealth (Columbus, Ohio, 1929; repr. Indianapolis, 1960).Google Scholar Ziegler's, K. text (M. Tulli Ciceronis De re publica [Leipzig, 1960])Google Scholar is still useful for indirect testimony. Where Bréguet diverges from Ziegler's numbering, I have added Bréguet's number in parentheses. Texts found only in Ziegler are indicated with the letter Z. For all aspects of the work, including earlier bibliography, Büchner's, K. commentary (M. Tullius Cicero. De re publica: Kommentar [Heidelberg, 1984])is indispensable; cf. also Bréguet, pp. 1.56–71. For a brief survey of the dialogue and of Cicero's philosophical work in general, seeGoogle Scholar Mackendrick, P. L., The Philosophical Books of Cicero (London/New York, 1989).Google Scholar

2 Philus' claim has been convincingly challenged by Ferrary, J. -L., ‘Le discours de Philus (Cicéron, De re publica, III, 8–31) et la philosophie de Carnéade’, REL 55 (1977), 128–56Google Scholar and Philhéllenisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate, Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d' Athènes et de Rome 271 (Rome, 1988), pp. 351–63, who conjectures that Cicero derived the argument from a treatise by Carneades' student Clitomachus, not from any record of Carneades' Roman speeches. For the difficulty historians have had devising a plausible scenario consistent with the evidence, see e.g. Gruen, E. S., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley, 1984), 1, pp. 341–2Google Scholar; Wilkerson, K. E., ‘Carneades at Rome: a problem of sceptical rhetoric’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (1988), 131–44.Google Scholar

3 This is no more than 40%, and more likely less than 30%. On the reconstitution of the text see Ziegler (n. 1), pp. v–xv; Heck, E., Die Bezeugung von Ciceros Schrift De re publica, Spudasmata 4 (Hildesheim, 1966), pp. 1–10;Google Scholar Büchner (n. 1), pp. 62–6; Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 129–34.

4 Lactantius' rebuttal occurs both in his major apologetic work, The Divine Institutes, and in his later treatment known as The Épitomé of the Divine Institutes, a briefer, more focused reconsideration of the same subjects, with additional material, alternative paraphrases of sources, and sometimes new interpretations; cf. M., Perrin (ed. and trans.), Lactance: Epitomé des institutiones divines, Sources chrétiennes 335 (Paris, 1987), pp. 7–36Google Scholar; E., Heck and A., Wlosok (edd.), L. Caeli Firmiani Lactanti: Epitome divinarum institutionum (Stuttgart, 1994), pp. viii, xvii–xxiv.Google Scholar Most (but not all) of the relevant passages may be found in Ziegler (n. 1) and Bréguet (n. 1), interspersed among the pages of the palimpsest and numbered in sequence. For analysis of Lactantius' argument, see P., Monat, (ed.), Lactance: Institutiones Divines, Livre V, 2 vols, Sources chrétiennes 204–205 (Paris, 1973), 2, pp. 121–50.Google Scholar

5 The most useful analyses are Büchner (n. 1), Bréguet (n. 1), and Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), all with citations of earlier literature. The fundamental assessment of the indirect evidence is Heck (n. 3). The crux for reconstruction has been the role of Lactantius' summa and examples (Inst. 5.16.3–13), which some, e.g. Büchner (n. 1), pp. 283–9, go so far as to use as a comprehensive, objective summary of the argument or even an outline of the speech. Such use is rightly rejected by Ferrary (n. 2, 1977).

6 Identified by Lactantius, Inst. 5.14.5 = Rep. 3.9 [cf. 5.17.4]; Epit. 50.5 = Rep. 3.10.

7 Una is usually taken either as ‘unique’, presumably in its altruistic spirit (e.g. Sabine and Smith [n. 1], p. 203), or as intensifying maxime, i.e. superlatively altruistic (Keyes [n. 1], p. 193, Büchner [n. 1], p. 290; Bréguet [n. 1], 2, p. 57); but the fact that Philus sets out to refute the defenders of justice by attacking the uniformity of right practices suggests that Philus himself assumed that the defence of justice included a claim of uniformity.

8 In presenting the actual position of Plato and Aristotle in the lost lines of the introduction Pbilus had presumably described justice as the virtue ‘that assigns to each his own and that preserves equity for all’ and ‘which is oriented not only toward itself (sibi… conciliata), but reaches completely out of doors and is inclined (pronus) to do good so as to benefit as many as possible’ (Lact. Epit. 50.5 = Rep. 3.10). The quotations of Non. 373.30; 299.30 (= Rep. 3.11 [2.69 B]) derive from Book 2 (cf. Heck [n. 3], p. 185; Bréguet [n. 1], 2, p. 154, n. 2 to p. 47); but Philus may have described justice in similar language in Book 3.

9 See e.g. D.L. 9.61, 78–9, 83–4, 101 (cf. 88); Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.79–90, 145–63; 3.179–82, 198–235. Cf. J. Annas and J. Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge, 1985), esp. pp. 54–65, 151–71.

10 About 35 more lines are quoted verbatim by Lactantius. Even so, we have no more than 40% of the remainder of the speech, and less if a whole quaternion is lost. Since Book 3 consisted of at least 16 quaternions for the three major speeches and leaves of only three quaternions of Philus' speech have survived, it is not unreasonable to speculate that at least one additional quaternion of his speech has been lost. See Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 129–30, 133–4, who postulates a quaternion lost between Rep. 3.19 and 23 and another between 3.24 and 26. See below, n. 15.

11 On the philosophical nuances and historical reference see Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 137–8; Sorabji, R., Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 54 (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 142–3.Google Scholar

12 On rejection of animal sacrifice and eating meat, see Sorabji (n. 11), pp. 172–5; for potential consequences see Büchner (n. 1), p. 298; Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 139–40.

13 E.g. Arist. Eth. Nic. 8.11.1161b1–3; Pol. 1.8.1256b7–26; Chrysippus apud Cic. Fin. 3.67; cf. Leg 1.25. See also Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 138–9.

14 Cf. Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 138–42, who takes this as the second major argument, a rebuttal of a second alleged criterion of justice, namely rendering to each as he deserves. His reconstruction, however, developed by analogy with other sceptical arguments and later discussions of the treatment of animals, differs significantly from my own. He is followed by Sorabji (n. 11), pp. 127–8.

15 The gap between 3.19 and 3.23 (20 B) must be at least 16 lines, but more likely 144, if an entire quaternion has been lost, as Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 138–9 has conjectured. Sixteen lines are hardly enough to accommodate the requisite argument.

16 It might be objected that free will was not mentioned in the targeted conception of justice (Rep. 3.12); but neither was nature, the source refuted in Argument I. The wording of J2 (Rep. 3.12; cf. Lact. Epit. 50.5 = Rep. 3.10) supports free choice as a source or at least presupposes it as a necessary condition.

17 The close connection between intrinsic justice and voluntary compliance is made also in 3.26 (24 B) and later by Laelius (3.41). Cf. also Rep. 1.1,1.3; Büchner (n. 1), p. 304.

18 The lost subject of the sentence in Rep. 3.18 is presumably ‘nature’ (cf. Büchner [n. 1], p. 296; Bréguet [n. 1], 2, p. 159, n. 6); it certainly cannot be ‘human beings’.

19 The summa (A and B) of Inst. 5.16.3 differs primarily in prefixing a sentence that apparently sums up the positive conclusion to be drawn from Philus' first two arguments. It may reflect a bit of the context in which Lactantius found a convenient formulation of the theses of Arguments I and II to serve in his summa.

20 He cites a soldier retreating from defeat in battle who steals a horse from a wounded man and a shipwrecked sailor who pushes a weaker man off a plank to save his own life (5.17.10–20; quoted in full at 5.16.10–11 = Rep. 3.30 [26 B]).

21 The anecdote itself, though well known to Cicero (cf. Off. 3.45, Tusc. 5.63), was apparently not quoted in Philus' speech or Lactantius would have pointed out the contradiction between it and his own unmitigated utilitarianism. See Monat (n. 4), 2, pp. 141–2 for later occurrences of this popular topos.

22 It is the only argument from this chapter that he thought worth including in his Epitome (52.1–5).

23 Cic. Off. 1.63 expresses a similar view, citing Plato, Menex. 246E–47A.

24 Confirmed by the similar phraseology used in his description of animals (5.17.30) and in his version of J2 (Epit. 50.5 = Rep. 3.10).

25 Cf. Heck (n. 3), pp. 90–1. Heck's relegation of the passage to the status of an echo rather than a report led Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), 130 and n. 3, and Bréguet to disregard it completely, though Heck acknowledged that it sheds light on Inst. 5.16.4. Heck, however, underestimated its value, thinking it added nothing to what we hear in 5.16.4. In fact, it adds a detail on the declaration of war by the Fetiales; and it is rhetorically distinct enough to suggest that each was derived from different words of Cicero's text.

26 The placement of this example after Summa B and Lactantius' tendency to conflate Philus' Arguments II and III have led interpreters to assume that it was presented as an example of the foolishness of justice, the thesis of Summa B. Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 144–5 and Bréguet (n. 1), 2, p. 160, n. 1 (to p. 62) place it after 3.24 (22 B). However, it says nothing of wisdom or foolishness and presupposes only the incompatibility of justice and self-interest, just as Example A1 does. In Epit. 51.3 Lactantius paraphrases it differently, perhaps closer to Cicero's original (cf. Heck and Wlosok [n. 4], 2, p. 133). There he links it to the second argument of rendering to each what is appropriate (cf. suum cuique restituere). We may conjecture that Inst. 5.16 was intended, not as a condensation of the speech, but as a set of excerpts, arranged to segregate philosophical theses from examples.

27 This is confirmed by the fact that in Epit. 51.3, formally the concise version of Inst. 5.16.4 (Example A2), Lactantius incorporates a detail found only in Inst. 6.9.4 (Example A1), seizing the property of others by armed force.

28 Non. 498.18 = Rep. 3.35b (3.37, fr. 3 B), which closely parallels Example A1 may belong in this context. Though usually attributed to Laelius as an altruistic justification for imperialism (e.g. Heck [n. 3], pp. 205–6), Büchner (n. 1), pp. 282, 285–6, 307, has suggested it may be ironic and thus from Philus' speech.

29 Another example that might have been cited here is the story of Alexander the Great (Non. 125.12, 318.18,534.15 = Rep. 3.24 [21 B]; August. De civ. D. 4.4.8–14). Although usually taken as an example of the foolishness of justice (e.g. Ziegler [n. 1], p. 92; Heck [n. 3], p. 126; Bréguet [n. 1], 2, p. 61), it lacks the comparative element of the other such examples and illustrates the same self-interested imperialist exploitation. The observation of the next surviving page (Rep. 3.23 [20 B]) suggests that examples of other forms of oppressive rule may also have been cited.

30 A similar view is often attributed to Panaetius, but the evidence is weak; cf. Ferrary (n. 2, 1988), pp. 370–8, 395–424.

31 The parallel has often been noted, e.g. Sabine and Smith (n. 1), p. 210, n. 53; Büchner (n. 1), pp. 304–5; Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 143–4.

32 Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 144–5, following Buchner (n. 1), p. 271, assumes Philus discussed Roman imperialism in only one place in the speech, which leads him (p. 134) to postulate a whole quaternion lost between 3.24 and 28. This is unnecessary if imperialism entered into other arguments (cf. 3.16 in Argument I and 3.28 in Argument IIIC).

33 The Epicurean objection is introduced with the word primum and breaks off in mid-sentence. Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), pp. 146–7 conjectures that a Stoic objection followed. The lacuna of about 56 lines (between Rep. 3.26 [24 B] and 3.27 [28 B]) is nearly half filled by the examples preserved by Lact. Inst. 5.16.5–11 = Rep. 3.29–30 (25–6 B). Cf. Heck (n. 3), pp. 83–4; Ferrary (n. 2,1977), pp. 132–3; Breguet (n. 1), 2, pp. 63–5.

34 The hypothetical examples deal with the behaviour of a good man(bonus vir), when no one else is aware of his injustice (quae … solus sciat, 5.16.5) or a just man (iustus) when there is no witness (cum sit nullus… testis, 5.16.10).

35 Cf. Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), p.147.

36 Noted by Sabine and Smith (n. 1), p. 212, n. 59; Büchner (n. 1), p. 300; Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), p. 147.

37 The same example is cited at Off. 3.109.

38 The summary at the end of Lactantius' report (Inst. 5.16.12 = Rep. 3.31 [27 B]), often taken as reference to a peroration, is his own assessment of the speech as a whole, and not a quotation from Philus. Lactantius' Summa B (5.16.3b) would make a better ending, but there is no way to tell from where in the final portion he derived it.

39 For assessments of Cicero's debt to Plato, see Zoll, G., Cicero Platonis Aemulus: Untersuchungen iiber die Form von Cicero's Dialogen besonders De Oratore (Zurich, 1962), esp. pp. 60–8, 125–56Google Scholar (for dialogues in general); Pohlenz, M., ‘Cicero De re publica als Kunstwerk’, in Festschrift für R. Reitzenstein (Leipzig/Berlin, 1931), 70–105Google Scholar, repr. in H., Dörrie (ed.), Kleine Schriften (Hildesheim, 1965), 2, pp. 374–409Google Scholar and Pöschl, V., Römischer Stoat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero: Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De re publica, Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Abteilung Klassische Philologie 5 (Berlin, 1936; repr., Darmstadt, 1983), 108–78Google Scholar (for De re publica); and Ferrary (n. 2, 1977), esp. pp. 143–52 (cf. Ferrary, J. L., ‘Le discours de Laelius dans le troisiéme livre du De re publica de Cicéron’, MEFRA 86 [1974], 745–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 769 and n. 2) and Zetzel, J. E. G. (ed.), Cicero: De re publica, Selections (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 4–6, 13–5Google Scholar (for Philus' speech).

40 Since Argument II was introduced similarly (Rep. 3.18), we may suspect that the entire speech was constructed as an extended debate in which Philus took on all comers. For the wide range of opponents, see Ferrary (n. 2, 1977). Cf. also Striker, G., ‘Following nature: a study in Stoic ethics’, OSAP 9 (1991), 1–73 at 50–8Google Scholar

41 In the extant part of the palimpsest (3.8) these views are described only generically as ‘against justice’, but August. De civ. D. 2.21 (= Rep. 3.Pref. [3.7 B]; 19.21 = Rep. 3.36 Z), describes them more specifically as the claim of those ‘who believe that the state cannot be governed without injustice’, i.e. precisely as proposed the day before (Rep. 2.70). Cf. also Lact. Inst. 5.14.5 = Rep. 3.9.

42 This is the first mention of Carneades' name, which Philus juxtaposes with his own, expressed in the third person in its full Roman form; cf. Buchner (n. 1), pp. 278,281.

43 Ibid., pp. 277–8.

44 The parallel between Philus and Glaucon has often been noted, e.g. Pohlenz (n. 39), p. 94; Pöschl (n. 39), pp. 127–8; Ferrary (n. 39,1974), p. 769, n. 2 and (n. 2,1977), p. 150; Bréguet (n. 1), 1, p. 61, n. 2. Pöschl observes that Philus’ parallel to Glaucon extends to the personal disavowal of the position being expressed.

45 The literature or philosophical affiliation of the detractors is not explicitly mentioned in any text, but can be inferred from the positions of the advocates. Thrasymachus and Glaucon articulate views voiced by fifth-century sophists. Carneades expresses the views of the sceptical Academy, most likely known to Cicero and the Romans through the writings of Clitomachus (see above, n. 2).

46 The presence of Galba and Cato in Carneades' audience is reported only by Lactantius, but it is a small detail that Lactantius would have known and included only if he found it in Cicero's dialogue.

47 The subject of ideal ruler, the counterpart of Plato's philosopher-king, is discussed in Cic. Rep. 2 and 5–6; cf. Pöschl (n. 39), pp. 119,162–6. Pohlenz (n. 39), pp. 92–6 notes that the Platonic tripartition is reflected formally in the work as a whole, which introduces a new subject at 2.64, only to interrupt it for a discussion of its foundational topic, the role of justice.

48 Cf. Ferrary (n. 39, 1974).

49 The metaphor of spilling across from Greece is Ciceronian. Of the practice of attacking prominent public figures Cicero says: ‘born and multiplying’ in Greece, it ‘overflowed’ (redundasse) to Rome (Rep. 1.5).

50 This may be why Cicero called himself ‘Plato's travelling companion’ (Platonis comes, Pliny, N.H. pref. 22 = Rep. 1, fr. 3 B). He identified himself neither as a follower, nor a rival, but one who pursued a similar course of life and achievement (cf. Büchner [n. 1], p. 50).