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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In 1979, A. D. Woozley proposed an interpretation of Apology 29c–d which was intended to alleviate the well-known tension between the Apology and Crito on the citizen's obligation to obey the law. According to his interpretation, the court's hypothetical offer – to release Socrates on the condition that he will be put to death if he does not give up philosophy – is not an order, but a warning as to what would happen should he accept their acquittal and yet continue to philosophize. Obviously, if this is the spirit of the words he puts into the court's mouth, Socrates would not be guilty of disobedience should he refuse the offer, or even if he should accept it and then disregard the warning. To support this interpretation, Woozley suggested a novel construal of the words in which Socrates makes his refusal – πε⋯σομαι δ⋯ μ⋯γγον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν (29d3–4):
1 Woozley, A. D., Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito (Chapel Hill, 1979)Google Scholar.
2 An exception is Panagiotou, S., ‘Socrates' “Defiance” in the Apology’, Apeiron 20 (1987), 39–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Kraut, R., ‘Plato's Apology and Crito: Two Recent Studies’, Ethics 91 (1981), 651–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Young, C. M., Review of Woozley, op. cit., Philosophical Review 91 (1982), 109–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar, offered independently what amounts to Kraut's point (ii). Kostman, J., ‘Socrates' Self-Betrayal and the “Contradiction” between the Apology and the Crito’, in New Essays on Socrates, ed. Kelly, E. (Lanham, MD, 1984), 107–30Google Scholar, emphasizes that ⋯πειθεῖν at 29a3 and b6 means ‘disobey’ and not ‘fail to be persuaded by’.
5 Kraut, , op. cit., p. 658Google Scholar; Young, , op. cit., p. 111Google Scholar; Kostman, , op. cit., p. 108Google Scholar; Taylor, C. C. W., Review of Woozley, , op. cit., Mind 90 (1981), p. 609Google Scholar says Woozley's reading is ‘hard’, but does not explain why.
6 There is a class of verbs in Attic Greek whose future middle functions as a passive, but πε⋯θω is not among them. See the copious examples in Kühner, R. and Gerth, B., Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache 3 ii.1 (Hannover, 1898), pp. 114–16Google Scholar, and the two lists of verbs in Smyth, H. W., Greek Grammar (Cambridge, 1956), p. 220Google Scholar. Woozley may have been misled by the presentation of material in LSJ, s.v. πε⋯θω B.1, which gathers middle and passive forms together under the meaning ‘be persuaded’. Only two of the twelve examples listed there clearly mean ‘be persuaded’ as opposed to ‘obey’ or ‘heed’, though, and both are passives (Sophocles, , Philoctetes 524–5Google Scholar; Aristophanes, , Thesmophoriazusae 1170Google Scholar). LSJ gives us no reason to believe that πε⋯θω in the middle ever has a simple passive meaning.
7 Kühner-Gerth, , op. cit., pp. 422–3Google Scholar; Smyth, , op. cit., pp. 343–4Google Scholar.
8 Smyth, , op. cit., p. 344Google Scholar.
9 This is clearly the operative sense at 25e5 and 29c6–7, though the grammar of these two passages does not differ from that of 29d3–4. S. Panagiotou, op. cit., claims that ‘πε⋯σομαι at 29d3–4 is used in its very broad sense of “to comply with”, “to yield to”, “to listen to”’ (56). As I admit, this interpretation of πε⋯σομαι is possible, but it cannot be supported by Woozley's revisionary construal of the grammar.
10 I am very grateful to Chuck Young and The Editors, whose comments on the original draft of this note helped me to sharpen its argument significantly.