In chapter 40 of the De malorum subsistentia, Proclus outlines three positions that advocate for a single (godly, psychic, or intelligible) principle as cause of evil. The first group juxtaposes an evil principle (a ‘fount’) to the good principle, the second position adduces a ‘maleficent soul’, and the third argues that ‘forms of evil’ exist in the demiurgic intellect similarly to other forms. The entire passage runs as follows (with the second position set in italics):
Some indeed say that there is a fount of evils, and from this fount is produced every evil of whatever kind; others posit a maleficent soul as the principle of the nature of evil and say that the evils are generated from there. Others again take a middle position and leave forms of evils in the intellective nature, from which, they claim, evils have their procession just like all other things.
Philosophers come to those conclusions from different suppositions; some of them even make Plato the father of their doctrines. Those, indeed, who place the ideas of all things in the intellective realm adduce what is said by Socrates in the Theaetetus as corroboration of their doctrine, namely that there are two kinds of ‘paradigms, the one divine and the other godless’. Others cite the Athenian Stranger, who introduces two kinds of soul, ‘the one beneficent, the other the opposite of beneficent’, and asserts that the universe is governed by the first of these alone, but the mortal realm by both. (transl. Opsomer/Steel)Footnote 1
As Opsomer and Steel point out in their edition, the last conception was presumably held by Amelius, while the first doctrine seems to allude to some sort of Manichaean dualism featuring an antagonistic evil god.Footnote 2 The second position is the subject of this paper and involves seven relevant notions in total (some of which, in turn, imply more subtle premisses):
(1) There is a unique cause of evil.
(2) Two (kinds of?) psychic principles exist, one good and the other evil (or ‘maleficent’).
(3) The latter causes ‘the nature of evil’ (τοῦ κακοῦ φύσεως).
(4) All evils are generated (γεννᾶσθαι) from it.
(5) The universe is solely governed by the beneficent (world-)soul.
(6) The mortal realm is governed by both (world-)souls, the beneficent and the maleficent together.
(7) Plato's Laws is cited to corroborate (some of?) the previous tenets.Footnote 3
Scholarship has considered Plutarch and Atticus as possible albeit problematic candidates.Footnote 4 They come to mind first because Proclus elsewhere associates the notion of a maleficent soul with those who side with Atticus and Plutarch.Footnote 5 Yet Plutarch is at best an unfit candidate. He does not posit a separate evil (world-)soul (2), all the less so one governing the lower realm (6).Footnote 6 Proclus himself recounts in his commentary on the Timaeus that Plutarch's pre-existing irrational soul does not survive the demiurgic activity as irrational.Footnote 7 A recently discovered Syriac text of Porphyry suggests that Atticus—who is anyway often inextricable from Plutarch in later doxographies—shared Plutarch's conception in this regard.Footnote 8 For Plutarch, at least, the evil or maleficent soul merely represents the irrational aspect of soul as an integral part thereof; that is to say, it is not a distinct entity opposed to a counter-principle in the way in which Proclus supposes it in the testimonium discussed here.Footnote 9 Beyond that, Plutarch considers (the irrational) soul as such to be the cause of evil, not the world-soul (as the latter already has received order and harmony from the demiurge) (3).Footnote 10 In short, it chiefly speaks for Plutarch that he indeed quotes Plato's Laws to corroborate the notion of an evil soul—a figure of thought he admittedly makes extensive use of.Footnote 11 None the less, this is at most thin evidence given the apparent contradictions to other aspects of Plutarch's cosmology.
If Proclus really had Plutarch in mind, he gave a heavily flawed rendering of his position, perhaps for didactic purposes. It is also possible—and some would uphold: the most likely case—that Proclus had limited access to Plutarch's writings or that he adduced his position from doxographic accounts (in all likelihood, from Porphyry). This would, however, not explain why Proclus transmits two contradicting accounts of Plutarch. Either his knowledge of Plutarch in the in Timaeum differs heavily from that in this work or Proclus must have given, for the sake of the argument or illustration, a sketchy abbreviation of a position he actually knew better. Be that as it may, any attempt to save the attribution to Plutarch (or Atticus) is rather unrewarding in the face of a much more probable candidate: Numenius of Apamea (whom later Platonists sometimes mention alongside Plutarch and Atticus).Footnote 12
NUMENIUS
Caution is in order: Numenius’ psychology is attested fragmentarily—which would have been less obstructive if the Christian and Neoplatonic lines of transmission were not so difficult to reconcile. Nevertheless, the textual evidence suffices to plausibly relate the testimonium to him.
Calcidius reports in his commentary on the Timaeus that Numenius praised Plato for having postulated the existence of two world-souls, one benevolent and the other malicious.Footnote 13 Numenius analogously extended such a dichotomy to human psychology: every human receives a rational, good soul from the demiurge and an irrational, malicious soul from the material cosmos. Porphyry firmly assures that Numenius indeed had two numerically distinct souls in mind (and not merely ‘parts of a single soul’, μέρη ψυχῆς μιᾶς).Footnote 14 Iamblichus, too, seems to affirm this reading.Footnote 15 Maleficent soul subsists in the body owing to its material nature, whereas the beneficent soul, being of supramundane origin, joins the body as an addition (or descends to the body through the planets; cf. Numenius, fr. 12.14–16). Calcidius further recounts in the same passage that Numenius’ malicious world-soul is to be identified with matter and that matter, in turn, is the origin of evil. Calcidius’ testimonium gives the impression that Numenius stressed the latter part repeatedly, attributing it to both Pythagoras and Plato. This is resemblance enough to relate the testimonium to Numenius above all.
Aside from this glaring doctrinal affinity, it moreover matches Numenius’ modus operandi of adducing Platonic passages to ‘seal’ (σημηνάμενον) his own, previously laid out doctrines with Plato's words.Footnote 16 Calcidius confirms that Numenius indeed worked out his psychology in reference to Plato. Philoponus likewise suggests that Numenius appealed to Plato's exact wording to establish another (equally controversial) aspect of his psychology, namely the immortality of the irrational soul.Footnote 17
NUMENIUS IN IAMBLICHUS’ DE ANIMA
A weak yet noteworthy parallel to these aspects of Numenius’ psychology is found in Iamblichus’ report that according to Numenius evil enters the soul externally through matter.Footnote 18 Consistent with Calcidius, Iamblichus further remarks at another instance that according to ‘the former’ (ἐκεῖνοι, referring to Numenius and some other Platonist[s]) the soul ‘dissolves’ (ἀναλύσει) into a ‘union without individuation’ (ἀδιορίστῳ συναφῇ)—two valuable bits of information that all existing editions of Numenius fail to include.Footnote 19
Moreover, it seems reasonable to link this notion with what Iamblichus recounts as the position of ‘many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans’ at another instance, namely the notion that soul (confers) a harmonia ‘which is interwoven with the cosmos and inseparable from the heaven’.Footnote 20 This ‘immanentist’ stance seems to sit well with the other depictions discussed so far. It also sheds light on the much-debated question as to why Proclus prefers to (somewhat polemically) label Numenius’ third god ‘creation’ (ποίημα).Footnote 21
FINAL REMARKS
One ought to keep in mind that testimonies of the kind discussed here inevitably entail an element of uncertainty. Any possible attribution, no matter to whom, is not without doubts; it is not even clear whether it can be attributed to anyone as a faithful testimonium in the first place. If, however, one wishes to count it as a testimonium proper that can be attributed to someone, this is the most justified conjecture given the textual evidence at hand. Since testimonies for Numenius—arguably the most significant single precursor to Plotinus—are scarce, every possible finding is worthwhile. Hopefully, this humble addition along with the further remarks will enrich scholarly debates on Numenius and make their way to future editions, at least among the dubia.Footnote 22