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Innumerable Worlds in Presocratic Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

F. M. Cornford
F. M. Cornford
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Cambridge.
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Extract

Zeller argued that the ‘innumerable worlds’ mentioned in accounts of Anaximander's system must be an endless succession of single worlds, not (as in the Atomists' doctrine) an unlimited number of coexistent worlds scattered through infinite space, some always coming into being while others are passing away. Zeller pointed out that a succession of single worlds is grounded in the principles of the system. ‘Things perish into that from which they had their birth… according to the order of Time,’ a cycle of birth, existence, and destruction. A world ends, and the living divine stuff begets a new world to take its place. On the other hand, there is much in the system to contradict the idea of coexistent worlds. Anaximander's successors, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes, show that this idea is not a necessary consequence of the unlimitedness of the original world-stuff. Nothing in the appearances of Nature suggests it. Anaximander is a monistic hylozoist, whereas Democritus is a pluralist with his innumerable independent atoms producing, by similar processes, independent world-systems in different parts of an infinite void.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , January 1934 , pp. 1 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1934

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References

page 1 note 1 DrGilbert, Nestle mentions, Met. Theor. 39Google Scholar ; Gomperz, , G. D. 3 i, 46Google Scholar , Überweg-Prächter § 13, p. 33. Others are Mieli, Aldo, I Prearistotelici (1916) i, 44Google Scholar ; Adam, J., Religious Teachers, 187Google Scholar ; Taylor, A. E., Commentary on Timaeus, p. 84Google Scholar .

page 1 note 2 Reinhardt, , Parmenides, 174Google Scholar , reviews the uses κόσμος in the Presocratics.

page 2 note 1 ἒνα ἢ μ⋯ ⋯εί in 1. 22 is difficult. As Simplicius says, the words really stand for ἒνα και ⋯ε⋯ τ⋯ν αὐτ⋯ν ἢ ἒνα μέν, ούκ ⋯ε⋯ δέ. We should probably read ἓνα <ἤ ⋯ε⋯> ἥ μ⋯ ⋯εί with (apparently) Themistius' Oxf. Trans. Note).

page 2 note 2 The Atomist, M. of Chios, is here confused with Anaxagoras' pupil, M. of Lampsacus (Zeller I7 11852).

page 3 note 1 Aet. II, I, 8. This distinction between Anaximander and Epicurus will be discussed below (p.12).

page 4 note 1 Cf. D. L. 1, 14 θαλο⋯ μ⋯ν γ⋯ρ Ἀναξίμανδρος, οὖ Ἀναξιμένης, οὖ Ἀναξαγόρας, οὖ Ἀρχέλαος, οὖ Σωκράτης, κτλ.

page 4 note 2 Diels' conclusion (Dox. 113) that Simplicius had never seen Theophrastus' Φυσικ⋯ν Δ⋯ξαι because he normally quotes extracts he found in Alexander is disputed by Reinhardt, Parmenides, 93, who points out that Simplicius in the same way regularly takes quotations of Eudemus from Alexander, but where he has occasion to disagree with Alexander copies out a long passage directly from Eudemus.

page 5 note 1 See below, p. 10.

page 6 note 1 συγκρινομένοις.. Anaxagoras, having reduced all so-called ‘becoming’ to σύγκρισις (Frag. 17), usesσυγκρινομένοις for γιγνομένοις It covers all the things ordinarily said to ‘come into being’ —the world, its parts, and living things.

page 6 note 2 ζῷα, including plants, which have consciousness, pleasure and pain (Vors. 46A 116, 117).

page 6 note 3 For ἣλιος and σελήνη without the article cf. Plato, Tim. 38c ἥλιος και σελήνη και πέντε ἃλλα ἂστρα, Laws 898D ἣλιον και σελήνην καί τ⋯ ἂλλα ἂστρα, where there is no question of more than one sun or moon.

page 7 note 1 Cf. e.g. Plato, Phuedo 64B Simmias speaks of the Thebans as οΙ παρʹ ἣμἳν ἂνθρωποι. Soph. 242D (the Eleatic Stranger), τ⋯ παρʹ ⋯μῖν Έλεατικόν ἒθνος.

page 7 note 2 Phys. 35, 9 δόξει ἲσως τισίν ον πρ⋯ς νοερ⋯ν διάκρισιν τ⋯ν γενέσει παραβάλλειν, ⋯λλ⋯ πρ⋯ς τάπους ἂλους τ⋯ς γ⋯ς τ⋯ν παρʹ ⋯μῖν συγκρίνειν οἴκησιν.

page 7 note 3 E.g. Ar. ie caelo 302a 28, and Simplic. ad loc.

page 7 note 4 See Cornford, F. M., Anaxagoras’ Theory of Matter, C.Q. xxiv (1930), p. 18Google Scholar .

page 7 note 5 R.P. § 160.

page 8 note 1 Cf. Alex, , in Meteor, p. 671Google Scholar (Hayduck)= Vors. 51A 17, οί ϕυσικο⋯ regard the sea as a portion of the moisture round the earth remaining ⋯ν τοῖς κοίλοις π⋯ς τ⋯ποις. For the relation of these hollows on the earth's surface to hollows inside the earth see Gilbert, , Met. Theor. 285 ffGoogle Scholar .

page 8 note 2 Statius, , silv. III, 1, 183Google Scholar .

page 8 note 3 Luc. IX, 872. Eurofam alias soles Asiamque viientem.

page 9 note 1 Theophr. (Dox. 477).

page 9 note 2 Cf. Plato, Tim. 22A, the Deucalion and Phaethon myths. Fossils would not survive a destruction by fire.

page 9 ntoe 3 Aet. II, 4, 11. Ξενοϕ⋯νης Παρμέίδης Μέλισσος ⋯γένητον κα⋯ ⋯ϕθαρτον κόσμον.

page 10 note 1 Cic, . Nat. D. i, 25Google Scholar . Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervaliis orientis occidentisque, eosque innumerabilis esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intel-legere non possumus.

page 10 note 2 It is natural to suppose that Cicero found διαστήμασιν in his Epicurean source, and that is a technical term for the intermundia' (Burnet's note).

page 10 note 3 Plutarch is corrected by Diels (Dox. II and 302) to conform with Stobaeus, on the strength of Ps.-Galen ⋯πείρους νο⋯ς (i.e. οὐνους) and a re-mark of Cyril's, who after the mention of Demo-critus says, Ἀναξίμανδρος δ⋯ οῖμον ὢσπερ ⋯τ⋯ραν όλοτρόπως ίὡν θε⋯ν διορίζεται τοὺς ⋯πείρους κόσμονς οὐκ οιδʹ δτι λέγων. Here κόσμους has been sub-stituted for οὐρανούς ‘inferioris aetatis usu’ (Diels, p. 11). Cyril, taking it to mean innumerable (coexistent) worlds, is naturally puzzled as to what Anaximander could have meant by calling such things ‘god.’ The Stob. extract may be taken as the correct text of Aetius.

page 11 note 1 Cf. Serv, . on Am. i, 331Google Scholar quo sub caelo: aut sub qaa parte caeli, aut secundum Epicureos, qui plures esse volunt caelos, ut Cicero in Hor-tensio. Cic, . ad fam. ix, 26Google Scholar ille baro te putabat quaesiturum, unum caelum esset an innuraera-bilia.

page 11 note 2 These words are part of the quotation, Theophrastus, a very terse and economical writer, would not write ⋯ γένεσίς ⋯στι τοἲς ούσι for γίγνεται τ⋯ όνγα or τ⋯ν ϕθορ⋯ν γίγνεσθαι for ϕθειρεσθαι.

page 12 note 1 Cf. Cyril's οὐκ οἶδ δτι λέγων, above p. 10, note3.

page 12 note 2 Cf. Cic, . it fin. I, 6Google Scholar , 21 innumerabiles mundi, qui et oriantur et intereant cotidie. Simplic. Phys. 1121, 5 ᾰλλων μ⋯ν ⋯ε⋯ γινομένων ᾰλλων δ⋯ ϕθειρομένων.

page 12 note 3 Cf. Hippol, .(Dox. 565, 11)Google Scholar .

page 12 note 4 See Diels', Über Anaximanders Kosmos, Phil, Arch.G. X (1897), 228 ffGoogle Scholar .

page 13 note 1 The last assertion is hardly consistent with Burnet's statement (p. 108), following Aristotle: ‘The Pythagoreans held that there was a “boundless breath” outside the heavens, and that it was inhaled by the world. In substance, that is the doctrine of Anaximenes, and it becomes practically certain that it was taught by Pytha-goras, when we find that Xenophanes denies it.’

page 13 note 2 τ⋯ν ὂγκον, cf. Diog. IX, 44 (Democritus). ὂγκωγ = atoms.

page 13 note 3 Cf. Simplic, . Phys. 178Google Scholar , 23 ὂσοι μ⋯ν κ⋯σμους ⋯πείρους ὑπέθεντο ὣστερ Δημόκριτος, ⋯ναγκαίως κα⋯ τ⋯ στοιχεῖα ⋯πειρ⋯ ϕασιν ε⋯ναι τῷ ⋯ριθμιρ.

page 14 note 1 The μνστικ⋯ς λόγος defaming Pythagoras attributed by Heracleides Lembos (second century)to some Hippasos (D.L. VIII, 7) was recog-nized as spurious by the Alexandrine critics (Delatte, , Vie dt Pyth. p. 165)Google Scholar . Delatte would identify this Hippasos with the Crotoniate adversary of the Pythagorean Society mentioned by Iambi. V.P. 257.

page 15 note 1 If Petron had read the Phaedrus, there is no reason against ascribing to him the rest of the doctrine associated with his 183 worlds (Plut. Plut. l.c. 422B). The worlds revolve as in a dance; the area of the triangle is the κοιν⋯ ⋯στία (μένει γ⋯ρ Έστία ⋯ν θε⋯ν οἲχψ μόνη Phaidr. 247A) and called π⋯δίον Ἀληθείας (ibid. 248B); it contains the λόγοι, είδη, παραδείγμαγα of things, surrounded by Eternity, from which οῖον ⋯πορρο⋯ν ⋯π⋯ τοὺς κόσμους ϕέρεσθαι τ⋯ν χρόνον. (This last trait is rather Pythagorean than Platonic: cf. Ar. π. τ⋯ν Πυθαγ. frag. 201 τ⋯ν μ⋯ν οὐραν⋯ν εῖναι ἒνα, ⋯πεισάγεσθαι δ⋯ ⋯κ τ⋯⋯ ⋯πείρον χρόνον.) Human souls are initiated into this spectacle once in 10,000 years (Phaedr. 248E). Philosophy is ⋯ναμνήσεως ἓνεκα τ⋯ν ⋯κεῖ (ibid. 240c). It seems hardly likely that Plutarch would take the triangle of 183 worlds from Petron and the rest of the description from other sources.

page 15 note 2 Burnet follows Heidel in calling the ‘sphere of flame’ an inaccuracy: ‘The comparison to the bark of a tree distinctly suggests something annular.’ That is because tree-trunks happen to be cylindrical; there is nothing in the nature of bark to demand any particular shape. The first animals, which were ‘enclosed in prickly bark’ (Aet. V, 19, 4), can hardly have been ‘annular.’ They were like sea-urchins.