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IAMBLICHUS APVD SIMPL. COROLLARIVM DE TEMPORE 794.21–7 DIELS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2021
Abstract
In his commentary on the Timaeus, the Neoplatonist Iamblichus argues that time is logically antecedent to change inasmuch as time is no mere aspect of change. Naturally, scholars appraise this thesis in light of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, they neglect the philological framing of this thesis, and thence the philosophical implications thereof. Only J.M. Dillon acknowledges this framing, though even Dillon does not acknowledge the philosophical implications thereof. This article illustrates the logic of said thesis vis-à-vis the Iamblichean exegesis of Ti. 38b7–c1 (Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.21–7 Diels, Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon). Beginning from the intuition that time is no mere aspect of change, Iamblichus argues that time can persist apart from change, and thereupon, given the Platonic notion that time is the everlasting image of Eternity qua paradigm, Iamblichus intuits that time is no mere image but everlasting in its own right, being itself a paradigm. Yet this thesis rests upon the indeterminateness of the Platonic title τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως (‘the paradigm of a thoroughly everlasting nature’) at Ti. 38b8 and, still more so, upon the reflexiveness of the ambiguous ΑΥΤΩΙ (that is, αὐτῷ ‘to it [the paradigm]’, if not αὑτῷ ‘to itself [as paradigm]’) at Ti. 38c1. Inasmuch as the subject of the Platonic title is indeterminate between Eternity and Eternal Being qua intelligible everlastingness, Iamblichus construes ΑΥΤΩΙ not as a mere reflexive but as self-reflexive, with αὑτῷ referring to Time qua intelligible paradigm. In this light, the Platonic lemma grounds the Iamblichean thesis.
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Footnotes
I am grateful to the editors and the reader at CQ for their insights.
References
1 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.702.19–24 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 62 Dillon) (ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἐν τῷ †ὀγδόῳ [NB: ὀγδόῳ Simpl. MSS E F a, sed τρίτῳ emendauit Dillon] τῶν εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐπήγαγεν· εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἐν χρόνῳ, κινήσεις πολλαὶ ὁμοῦ συνίστανται. τὰ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου μόρια ἄλλα ἄλλοτε. ἡ κίνησις περί τι μένον φέρεται, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἠρεμίας δεῖ. κινήσει κίνησις ἢ ἠρεμία ἐναντιοῦται τῇ μὲν ἐν γένει ἡ ἐν γένει, τῇ δὲ ἐν εἴδει ἡ ἐν εἴδει, χρόνῳ δὲ οὐδέν). In so far as time is not commensurate with motion or rest, time is no mere aspect of change. On the logic of this fragment and its situation in the third—not eighth—volume of the Iamblichean τὰ εἰς Τίμαιον ὑπομνήματα, see J.M. Dillon (ed.), Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta (Leiden, 1973), 60–3, 343–5.
2 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 345–9.
3 Thus the situation in H. Meyer, Das Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios und die Aporien des Aristoteles zur Zeit (Meisenheim am Glan, 1969), 42–7; S. Sambursky and S. Pines (edd.), The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism: Texts with Translation, Introduction and Notes (Jerusalem, 1971), 12–17, 43, 108 nn. 6–7; B. Dalsgaard Larsen (ed.), Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et philosophe, tomes I–II (Aarhus, 1972), 1.416–18; Hoffmann, P., ‘Jamblique exégète du Pythagoricien Archytas: trois originalités d'une doctrine du temps’, EPh 3 (1980), 307–23Google Scholar; E. Sonderegger (ed.), Simplikios. Über die Zeit: Ein Kommentar zum Corollarium de Tempore (Göttingen, 1982), 125–6; R.R.K. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983), 33–45; D.P. Taormina, Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quatre études (Paris, 1999), 68–75, 86–92; Wear, S.K., ‘Syrianus the Platonist on eternity and time’, CQ 58 (2008), 648–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.21–7 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon); Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 351–3.
5 Plotinus, Enn. 3.7; Porph. Sent. 44; Porph. apud Cyril. Adv. Iul. 1.45.9–26 Riedweg (Porph. 223F Smith); Porph. apud Procl. Plat. theol. 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon). On Plotinus and Porphyry, see P. Hadot, ‘La métaphysique de Porphyre’, in H. Dörrie (ed.), Porphyre. Huit exposés suivis de discussions (Geneva, 1966), 125–63; W. Beierwaltes (ed.), Plotin. Über Ewigkeit und Zeit (Enneade III 7) (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Aubenque, P., ‘Plotin philosophe de la temporalité’, Diotima 4 (1976), 78–86Google Scholar; Graeser, A., ‘Zeitlichkeit und Zeitlosigkeit: Bemerkungen zu Plotins Unterscheidung zweier “immer” (III, 7)’, PhJ 94 (1987), 142–8Google Scholar; A. Smith, ‘Soul and time in Plotinus’, in J. Holzhausen (ed.), Psychê—Seele—Anima. Festschrift für Karin Alt (Stuttgart, 1998), 335–44; L. Brisson (ed.), Porphyre. Sentences, tomes I–II (Paris, 2005), 2.756–86; S.K. Strange, ‘Porphyry and Plotinus’ metaphysics’, in G.E. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard (edd.), Studies on Porphyry (London, 2007), 17–34.
6 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.14.16–19, 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 61, 64 Dillon). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.6.1–12 on Ti. 37d6.
7 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen); Procl. in Ti. 3.21.6–24.30 Diehl.
8 On this terminology, see Dillon (n. 1), 39–40, 335–6, 345, 353 on Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 2.240.2–28 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 54 Dillon) (πάσης γὰρ τάξεως ἡ ἀμέθεκτος ἡγεῖται μονὰς πρὸ τῶν μετεχομένων). Cf. also Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.21–3 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen) (λέγει οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἀμεθέκτου χρόνου ἐν τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματι τὴν Ἀρχύτου λέξιν ἐξηγούμενος); Procl. in Ti. 3.26.30–27.3 Diehl (ἔστιν οὖν αἰώνιος μὲν καὶ μονὰς καὶ κέντρον κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὁ χρόνος καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ μείνασαν ἐνέργειαν, συνεχὴς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ κύκλος κατὰ τὸ προϊὸν καὶ τὸ μετεχόμενον); Procl. Inst. theol. prop. 21–4, 53.
9 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.792.20–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen, in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon). Cf. Procl. in Ti. 3.17.17–19.32, 3.24.30–32.6 Diehl; Procl. Plat. theol. 5.99.15–100.17 Saffrey–Westerink.
10 On the manuscript tradition, see L. Tarán, ‘The text of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle's Physics’, in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie (Berlin, 1987), 246–66. As Tarán warns that Diels is liable to report mistaken readings, I have myself inspected Marcianus graecus 229 (MS E, fol. 422r), Marcianus graecus 227 (MS F, fol. 290v) and the Aldina (MS a, fols. 188r–v), noting no errors. As for the text of the Timaeus, I have likewise inspected the two earliest primary witnesses, Parisinus graecus 1807 (MS A, ninth century, the ‘codex praestantissimus’) and Tubingensis Mb 14 (MS C, eleventh century). On these manuscripts and on all other primary witnesses to the Timaeus, see further G. Jonkers, The Textual Tradition of Plato's Timaeus and Critias (Leiden, 2017), 45–201, especially 74 on MS C vis-à-vis the other primary witnesses: ‘C is an independent source for the Timaeus. In age, C is only surpassed by A and perhaps by P, which has only excerpts from the text. C goes back to a MS which also served indirectly as a source for g (namely, the common ancestor of YΘΨ). Cg share many readings with F which are supported by ancient testimonia against the readings of AV.’
11 Inasmuch as Iamblichus distinguishes between Time imparticipable, Time participable and Time in its participants, I distinguish the three in parentheses. On the framing of this lemma, see Ti. 38b6–c3 (χρόνος δ᾽ οὖν μετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεν[ν]ηθέντες ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γίγνηται, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς [δι]αιωνίας φύσεως [sc. γέγονεν], ἵν᾽ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν, ὁ δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον [sc. ἐστιν] γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος). Observe that the implicit subject of ᾖ (if not that of the implicit γέγονεν), and thence that of ὁ (and the implicit ἐστιν), is perhaps χρόνος or οὐρανός, if not οὐρανός qua αἰώνιος εἰκών (Ti. 37d5–7), where οὐρανός could refer to the cosmos, viz. ‘the All’ τὸ πᾶν (cf. Ti. 27c4–d1, 28b2–7, 37d1–4), just as well as to celestial phenomena (cf. Ti. 37e1–3, 38c3–6, 39d7–e2). On these semantic distinctions, see further F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato (London, 1937), 99 n. 1; Festugière, A.-J., ‘Le sens philosophique du mot αἰών. À propos d'Aristote, De Caelo I, 9’, PP 4 (1949), 172–89Google Scholar, at 186 n. 1; Cherniss, H.F., ‘Timaeus 38a8–b5’, JHS 77 (1957), 18–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 23; R. Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote. Quatre études (Paris, 1982), 43–55.
12 Dillon (n. 1), 180–1, 352.
13 Dillon (n. 1), 352.
14 Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–8 Diels (ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν τοιαύτην).
15 Procl. in Ti. 3.49.20–6, 3.50.21–31 Diehl.
16 Dillon (n. 1), 352 (‘We may observe … a difference in the MSS readings available to Proclus and Iamblichus’, which implies that they abide by the readings of their exemplars, not that these are their readings).
17 Simpl. in Cael. 105.6–25 Heiberg. Simplicius construes οὐρανός as the subject of ᾖ at Ti. 38c1, as shown at lines 9 and 23–5 vis-à-vis κόσμος, viz. τὸ πᾶν ‘the All’. In similar fashion, Proclus construes οὐρανός as the subject of this same ᾖ in his gloss at in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl.
18 Plut. De an. proc. in Ti. 1013D–E, noting Whittaker, J., ‘Textual comments on Timaeus 27c–d’, Phoenix 27 (1973), 387–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On emendation as a matter of finesse, if not that of ‘finessing’ a given text, see Dillon, J.M., ‘Tampering with the Timaeus: ideological emendations in Plato, with special reference to the Timaeus’, AJPh 110 (1989), 50–72Google Scholar; Gioè, A., ‘Aspetti dell'esegesi medioplatonica: la manipolazione e l'adattamento delle citazioni’, RAL 7 (1996), 287–309Google Scholar; Ferrari, F., ‘Struttura e funzione dell'esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del Timeo’, Athenaeum 89 (2001), 525–74Google Scholar. That Plutarch himself finesses Platonic texts in light of his own exegesis has been shown by H.F. Cherniss (ed.), Plutarch, Moralia. Volume XIII, Part I. Platonic Essays (Cambridge, MA, 1976), 137–49.
19 Taur. and Alex. Aphr. apud Philop. De aetern. mund. c. Procl. 191.15–193.9, 214.10–20 Rabe (Taur. 30–1 T Gioè, 28–9 T Petrucci; Alex. Aphr. in Cael. fr. 97a Rescigno), noting Whittaker (n. 18), 388–9. On the methodology of Taurus and its reception, see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten, Teile I–II. Proklos (Leiden, 1976–8), 1.105–21; Verrycken, K., ‘Philoponus’ interpretation of Plato's cosmogony’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 8 (1997), 269–318Google Scholar; A. Gioè (ed.), Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d. C.: testimonianze e frammenti. Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicostrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrazione (Naples, 2002), 346–75; A. Rescigno (ed.), Alessandro di Aphrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele. Frammenti del primo libro (Amsterdam, 2004), 563–8; F. Ferrari, ‘Lucio Calveno Tauro e l'interpretazione didascalica della cosmogenesi del Timeo’, in R.L. Cardullo and D. Iozzia (edd.), Κάλλος καὶ ἀρετή. Bellezza e virtù. Studi in onore di Maria Barbanti (Rome, 2014), 321–33; F.M. Petrucci, Taurus of Beirut: The Other Side of Middle Platonism (London, 2018), especially 26–197.
20 Aen. Gaz. Theophr. 8.11–17 Colonna, noting Whittaker (n. 18), 389. On this critique, see M.W. Champion, Explaining the Cosmos: Creation and Cultural Interaction in Late-Antique Gaza (Oxford, 2014), especially 52–3.
21 Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.5; Porph. apud Procl. Plat. theol. 1.51.4–11 Saffrey–Westerink (Porph. 232F Smith); Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.10.2–16.11 Diehl (Syrian. in Ti. fr. 17 Wear); Procl. in Prm. 3.1118.6–1121.16 Steel–Van Campe (Syrian. in Prm. fr. 5 Wear); Procl. Inst. theol. prop. 52–4, 84–94, 104; Procl. Plat. theol. 3.54.22–62.10 Saffrey–Westerink.
22 Cf. Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl; Procl. apud Philop. De aetern. mund. c. Procl. 103.25–104.3 Rabe; Simpl. in Phys. 2.1155.8–14 Diels on Pl. Ti. 37c6–40d5.
23 Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.32.32–34.7 Diehl; Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.23–794.21 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 63–4 Dillon). NB: Iamblichus distinguishes Eternity as ‘everlastingness’ no less than ‘oneness’ (Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.2 Diehl τὸ ἓν καὶ ἄπειρον τοῦ αἰῶνος). Its everlastingness follows from its infinite potency (ἄπειρος δύναμις), its oneness from the sameness of its perfect ‘Now’, which obtains simultaneously and always (ἅμα καὶ ἀεί). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.7.2–6; Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 1.230.5–8, 2.72.20–3 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. frr. 29, 49 Dillon); Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.793.11–22 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. fr. 108 Dalsgaard Larsen).
24 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.24–6 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 67 Dillon) (καὶ προσέοικε τῷ αἰῶνι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιότατός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διὰ τὴν ἀμερῆ φύσιν), pace Dillon (n. 1), 353. Instead of ἀμερῆ in MS E, Dillon reads ὁμοιομερῆ in MSS F and a, noting e.g. the presence of ὁμοιομερῆς at Procl. in Ti. 2.225.31–226.3 Diehl. Yet Iamblichus attests to the partlessness of Time imparticipable apud Simpl. in Cat. 353.19–354.9 Kalbfleisch, in Phys. 1.792.20–793.23 Diels (Iambl. in Cat. frr. 108, 110 Dalsgaard Larsen). Cf. also Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.1–2 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 63 Dillon); Procl. in Ti. 3.23.11–22 Diehl.
25 Procl. in Ti. 3.50.21–31 Diehl, with τὸ πᾶν (‘the All’) as subject of ὁμοιότατον at line 23. Cf. Pl. Ti. 39d7–e2 (κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα ἐγεννήθη τῶν ἄστρων ὅσα δι᾽ οὐρανοῦ πορευόμενα ἔσχεν τροπάς, ἵνα τόδε [sc. τὸ πᾶν] ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως); Cornford (n. 11), 99 n. 1.
26 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.27–795.3 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Instead of the γεγονώς τε of our Plato manuscripts, Iamblichus has γέγονεν, ὥστε, whilst the implicit ἐστιν is made explicit in the gloss thereafter, viz. ὃ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὡς παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών ἐστιν ἐν τῷ γενητῷ.
27 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.28–32 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.7–14 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon).
28 Iambl. apud Simpl. in Phys. 1.794.35–795.1 Diels (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 68 Dillon). Cf. Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 3.33.14–30 Diehl (Iambl. in Ti. fr. 64 Dillon).
29 On Plato as fount of truth, see Boys-Stones, G.R., Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar; Karamanolis, G.E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
30 On ‘misquotation’ as a means of Platonist exegesis, see J. Whittaker, ‘The value of indirect tradition in the establishment of Greek philosophical texts, or the art of misquotation’, in J.N. Grant (ed.), Editing Greek and Latin Texts (New York, 1989), 63–95. According to Whittaker, ‘misquotation’ may or may not entail a faithful gloss, faithfulness being relative (71).
31 Cf. Procl. in Ti. 3.55.2–7 Diehl on Ti. 38c3–6. Inasmuch as Iamblichus ‘misquotes’ Ti. 38b7–c1, one could construe his reading of Ti. 38c1–3 as another ‘misquotation’.
32 Cf. Porph. and Iambl. apud Procl. in Ti. 1.219.20–7, 1.275.20–276.3 Diehl (Porph. in Ti. frr. 30, 33 Sodano; Iambl. in Ti. frr. 28, 31 Dillon) on the accentuation of η … η … at Ti. 27c5 and the scope of παντός at Ti. 28b2–7. At Ti. 27c5, exegetes thought to read ἦτα as ἢ or ᾗ, if not εἰ, viz. η (ἢ, ᾗ, εἰ) γέγονεν η (ἢ, ᾗ, εἰ) καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. Porphyry and Iamblichus construe η … η … as ἢ … ἢ … , if not as εἰ … ἢ … , ‘whether/if … or …’. Thereupon, at Ti. 28b2–7, Porphyry and Iamblichus argue that the παντός at 28b5 is referring to ‘everything of the All’, not just ‘everything’, as one should distinguish, first of all, whether the All is ungenerate or generate, viz. πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. Thence Ti. 27c5 is a programmatic disjunction—ἢ (if not εἰ) γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. On Porphyry and Iamblichus vis-à-vis Ti. 27c5, see Whittaker (n. 18), 388–91, with Ferroni, L. and Van Riel, G., ‘Editing lemmas in the second book of Proclus’ in Timaeum’, in Boodts, S., Leemans, P. De and Schorn, S. (edd.), Sicut dicit. Editing Ancient and Medieval Commentaries on Authoritative Texts (Leuven, 2020), 185–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 200–4 (contra Whittaker).