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Euboea in the Time of Philip II1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

P. A. Brunt
P. A. Brunt
Affiliation:
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
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Extract

To the modern student of fourth-century Greece nothing at first sight seems so surprising as the almost kaleidoscopic changes in relations between Greek cities, especially in the fourth century. Mortal enemies become allies suddenly, and alliances, though made for all time, are rapidly dissolved. In his old age Sophocles had summed up the harsh experience of a lifetime in words that might serve as an epigraph for the mutability of Greek ‘international’ politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , December 1969 , pp. 245 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1969

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References

2 Oed. Col. 610-15; cf., for individuals, Ajax 677-83.

3 D. 23. 122; cf. Arist. EN 1156a6 ff. on friendships contracted .

4 Thuc. 3. 82.

5 Tod 127; 144; 147 (cf. 156).

6 Isocr. 6. 64-8; cf. Diod. 15. 40 (various Peloponnesian cities); 58 with Plut. 814 B (Argos); Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 41-3 (cf. Diod. 15. 77); 7. 4. 17 and 28-30; 7. 5. 1 and 18 (Achaea); 7. 1. 44-6 (cf. Diod. 15. 70); 7. 2. 11-15; 7. 3. 1 ff. (Sicyon); Plut. Timol. 4-7; Nepos, Timol. 1; Diod. 16. 65; Arist. Pol. 1306a24 (Corinth); Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 5-10; 7. 4. 33 ff. (Arcadia); for Elis p. 259, n. 3, and p. 262 n. 8.

1 Aeneas Tacticus 1. 6-7; 3. 3; 10. 5-6; 10. 15; 10. 20; 10. 25; 11. 14; 17; 22. 6-7; 22. 15-17; 23. 6-11.

1 Pol. 5. 9; 6. 3; 6. 4.

3 Diod. 18. 8. 5. Such refugees probably provided many of the mercenaries, whose number was for Isocrates one of the great evils of his day, e.g. 8. 24 and 44-8; ep. 9. 8-10; note apolides in 8. 44. By 323 the total may have been swollen by banishment of anti-Macedonians.

4 Diod. 16. 54. Cf. Cawkwell, , C.Q. xiii (1963), 204 with prudent reserves. Philip's diplomacy (Polyaenus 4. 2. 9) was perhaps more important, playing on the divisions between cities.Google Scholar

5 Polyb. 18. 14; compare, on Thessaly, 9. 33. against 9. 28.

6 Aristotle, EN 1157a25ff., classes all friendships between cities as made for self- interest.

7 Brunt, , Phoenix xix (1965), 256–7.Google Scholar

1 C.Q. xii (1962), 127–30Google Scholar ═ Cawkwell i; ibid, xiii (1963), 120 ff.; 200 ff. ═ Cawkwell ii.

2 As members of the Athenian league, they had surrendered part of their sover eignty, for they were bound by the decisions taken jointly by Athens and a majority of the synedrion. It also appears from A. 3. 94 ff. (below) that each of the four large Euboean cities, Carystus, Chalcis, Eretria, and Oreus had to pay a syntaxis of 5 talents to the league. Syntaxeis were still collected after 371, when the war with Sparta ended, for which the league had been formed. Per haps the Euboeans did not secede im mediately after Leuctra, but only when they found that the peace had not freed them from their obligations. Moreover, the little towns of Athenai Diades and Dium were inscribed among the members of the Athenian league (Tod 123, w. 88 and go); they later disappear, and Oreus may have seized the occasion to swallow them up, once the Euboeans were no longer in the league. (On the putative membership of Arethusa near Chalcis see Accame, S., La Lega Ateniese (Rome, 1940), p. 72.)Google Scholar

3 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 23; 7. 5. 4. IG xii. 7. 7, recording loans to Carystus from The-bans and Oreans, seems to belong to this time.

4 Diod. 15. 76. 1; A. 3. 85. Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 1 is silent on Themison's role.

5 Diod. 16. 7. 2. On the chronology of the Sacred war see Hammond, N. G. L, JHS lvii (1957), 58 ff.;Google ScholarPouilloux, J., BCH lxxiii (1949), 177 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

1 Tod 153-4 show that treaties were made with all four cities; 154 that the Carystians had rendered special services to Eretria. I find this document mysterious. It imposes penalties Kara [] on those who had invaded Eretrian territory, apparently from Attica itself and from allied cities, and likewise on Athenians and allies who in future attack allied cities. It is hard to imagine how or why Athenians and allies should have acted in this way. It seems to be implied that Eretria, despite her secession in or soon after 371, was regarded as legally still a member of the league at the time of the operations in 357. This conception may underlie Aeschines' suggestions that in 341 the Euboeans after their second secession in 348 still owed syntaxeis to Athens (infra).

2 A. 3. 85.

3 D. 8. 74.

4 D. 18. 99 (naming Theodorus with Themison); A. loc. cit.

5 Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 12.

6 He had replaced Menestratus mentioned by D. 23. 124 as a friend of Athens.

7 D. 9. 57. Mr. Griffith remarks that Euphron at Sicyon also had mercenaries, though he was or became popular.

8 D. 21. 110; 200.

9 Schol. on D. 5. 5.

10 On the chronology Cawkwell i is decisive. See Plut, . Phoc. 12–14. 1 (what follows in 14. 2 ff. belongs to 341, but Plutarch is unaware of the interval); A. 3. 85-8.Google Scholar

1 [D] 59. 3 ff-

2 IG ii2. 207.

3 Kahrstedt, 54 ff., argues that the cap ture of Molossus preceded the victory at Tamynae, which forced the Euboeans to sue for peace. This is in direct conflict with Plutarch, and is not warranted by A. 3. 88, which refers to a peace, but by no means to a peace on Athens' terms. The peace was negotiated in or just before the Olympic truce of 348 (A. 2. 12), i.e. in July or August; the Euboean envoys said that they had been ordered by Philip to say that he too wished to be reconciled with Athens. (ibid.); from this, as well as from A. 2. 119 f.; D. 19. 22; 220; 326 (on the hopes aroused at Athens in 346 that Philip would [hand over] Euboea), it is clear that in 348 Euboea passed out of Athens' league into Philip's sphere of influence. Kahrstedt's view is false.

4 Earlier too the presence of Spartan harmosts in Euboea may have led the Euboeans to join the Athenian league; see Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56; Diod. 15. 30, 3 (but cf. Plut. 773 F); Polyaen. 2. 7.

5 D. 4. 37.

6 A. 3. 87, cf. Cawkwell i. 129.

1 He refers to tyrants installed by Philip; but in 349 the only known tyrant was the pro-Athenian Plutarchus.

2 D. 5. 5. Probably he thought it dis honourable to aid a tyrant; cf. 15. 18. As to cost, after the expedition there was not even money to pay the dicasts, 39. 17.

3 Tamynae was fought at about the time when the second expedition to Olynthus set out: Cawkwell i. 127-31. Olynthus was not yet cut off from the sea: ibid. 132. More effective aid could have prolonged her re sistance. One may agree with Cawkwell that Athens had not the resources for a lengthy war in the north; that was no reason for not doing all she could; no one could foretell that Philip would not be killed and Macedon relapse into anarchy, or that he might not be diverted himself by serious attacks from Illyria. Perhaps Athens should have made peace with Philip before 346: she should not have indulged in adventures . Another such adventure was the petty squabble with Megara in 350/49 (Androtion F. 30; Philoch. F. 155; cf. D. 13. 32; SIG3 204), also disapproved by D. 3. 20.

1 D. 19. 290 with scholiast; 21. no; 200. Hegesileos was cousin of Eubulus, and Midias his friend (21. 206), but Eubulus' own implication is not attested. On Eubulus see especially Cawkwell, JHS lxxxiii (1963), 47 ffGoogle Scholar

2 D. 9. 57 f.; cf. 27, 33 and 66; 10. 8; 18. 71. In 18. 295 Demosthenes names Sosistratus along with Hipparchus and Clitarchus as Euboean traitors. Plut. Mor. 178 D attests Hipparchus' early death. Clitarchus is often named alone as tyrant, e.g. A. 3. 103; D. 18. 71; Diod. 16. 74. 1. For an embassy of Clitarchus and Philistides at Athens, in unknown circumstances, see D. 18. 82.

1 D. 9. 59-62; cf. 12. 27 and 33; 8. 18, 36 and 59; 10. 9; Carystius ap. Athen. xi 506 E; 508 D ═ FHG iv F 1-2; [Plato] ep. 5; Suda s.v. Euphraeus.

2 D. 10. 9; cf. Schäfer, ii. 430 n. 1. D. 18. 71 reverses usual order. On 10. 8f. see Appendix.

3 D. 19. 87. The speech is dated to 343/2 by Dionysius, rightly; Phocion was general at the time (A. 2. 184), and he was serving Artaxerxes in Cyprus in 344/3 (the correct date for events described by Diod. 16. 42. 7; 46. 1). There is no reference in the speech to Philip's campaign in Epirus and threat to Ambracia; cf. n. 6. Autumn or winter 343/2 is indicated (cf. Beloch iii. 2. 291). For Megara cf. Appendix.

4 19. 204; 326. Perhaps on publication these passages were touched up to fit events rather later than the time of delivery; I believe that Demosthenes did this with many speeches.

5 7. 32.

6 Philip's operations in Cassopia should be after the expulsion of Arybbas from Epirus. Diod. 16. 72. 1 dated this to 342/1, but wrongly; from midsummer 342 Philip was fighting in Thrace (D. 8. 2 and 35). It cannot be later than spring 342. The threat to Ambracia provoked the Athenian expedition to Acarnania in 343/2 (D. 48. 24-6) and the embassies of the same year (p. 257 nn. 2; 4; 5), which is also that assigned to the speech On Halonnesus by Dionysius. Speusippus' letter which asserts Philip's right to Ambracia is usually dated just after the Persian recovery of Egypt in winter 343/2 (cf. Cawkwell ii. 122 n. 4), but I do not feel sure that the shortage of papyrus at Athens must have been an immediate effect of that event; we do not know what stocks were kept.

1 Both speeches presuppose much the same situation, but the eighth seems slightly earlier; the ninth is dated to 342/1 by 72, but is earlier than the liberation of Oreus; and both seem to belong to the beginning of a campaigning season.

2 A. 3. 86-102.

3 D. 18. 82, alleging that Aeschines was host to envoys from Clitarchus and Philistides, perhaps in summer 341; the tyrants, fearing that Philip would not be able to protect them because of the Thracian revolt, might then have sought to make terms with Athens. Cawkwell, ii. 207 n. 4; 211 n. 1, gravely underrates the political significance of the proxenia; cf. Perlman, S, C.Q. viii (1958), 185 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Kahrstedt, 75.

5 A. 2. 112 with D. 19. 22.

1 It seems that each Euboean city must previously have paid 5 talents to the Athenian league. In 448/7 Chalcis had been assessed at 5 talents, Eretria probably at 6; but these assessments may already have taken account of confiscation of land for Athenian cleruchs (see Anc. Society and In stitutions, St. pres. to V. Ehrenberg, 1966, 88 f.); if so, syntaxeis were less burdensome than the old pharos, even before the reassessment of 425/4, when Chalcis and Eretria were required to pay 10 and 15 talents respectively. There is no other evidence for the level of syntaxeis.Google Scholar

1 Schäfer, ii. 491, conjectured that Demosthenes lent Oreus money for war preparations, just as he and other Athenians were guarantors for Chalcis in respect of ships Chalcis borrowed from Athens (IG ii2. 809 c 42 ff.).

2 D. 8. 18, 9; 74.

3 F. 159. Cf. Cawkwell's plausible conjecture, ii. 212 n. 2.

4 The text is conveniently quoted by Jacoby, iii b Suppl., p. 535, together with Charax F. 19, who adds that the Megarians assisted.

5 The activity of Callias in capturing Thessalian places in the gulf of Pagasae was probably ancillary to the Oreus expedition; see D. 12. 5 where Philip calls him an Athenian general, doubtless because he had been given Athenian ships (n. 1 above).

6 F. 160-1; Diod. 16. 74. 1; Schol. Aesch. (n. 4 above). Ps.-Plut. 849F with 848 E seems to show that there was apprehension at Athens that Philip was going to send a fleet to Euboea and that Phocion's expedition also engaged in the relief of Byzantium; whether it did so before or after the overthrow of Clitarchus will depend on the date assigned to that event.

1 iii. I. 552; 2. 293.

2 Kahrstedt 77 f.; Wtist 112, n. 3.

3 iii b Suppl., p. 532, citing F. 121 for Kai.

4 F. 49-51 (certain), 54, 56, 157 (cf. Cawkwell ii. 121 ff.), 160 (the present case).

5 iii b Suppl., p. 530; cf. 330 (doubting his own doctrine on F. 54).

1 A. 3. 100; note .

2 D. 48. 24-6; 18. 244.

3 D. 14. 12; 2. 12; 9. 70 ff.

4 Curiously, only A. 3. 97 f. mentions Demosthenes' diplomacy in Acarnania. But the Acarnanians fought at Chaeronea on Athens' side (Tod 178).

5 D. 9. 72; IG ii2. 225; the scholiast quoted ad loc. or in Jacoby, iii b Suppl., P. 534 Puts Diopithes' attack on Cardia at the same time or subsequently (343/2, Philoch. F. 158); doubtless Diopithes was encouraged both by the revolt in Thrace and by the success of Athenian diplomacy.

1 D. 19. 75.

2 On Cawkwell's view we might also ex pect some reference to the embassies in the speech On Halonnesus: cf. pp. 252 f. for its date.

3 9. 66.

4 9. 71.

5 9. 74.

1 ii. 213.

2 D. 18. 79. Demosthenes himself went on embassies, (1) to Messene and Argos in 344 (6. 19 ff.); (2) to Ambracia, Acarnania, and the Peloponnese in 342 (p. 267 nn. 2, 4-5); (3) to Thessaly in a year that cannot be determined (18. 244, where he says with evident falsehood that it was successful); (4) to the Illyrians and Thracian kings, probably in 341 (ibid.); (5) to Byzantium in 341 or 340 (ibid.); (6) with Callias to the Peloponnese in 341/0; (7) to Thebes in 339 (18. 244). Of these in my view either (i) or (2) and (5) and probably (4) were authorized by decrees he moved himself (18. 79 f.). So was (7); cf. 18. 178, not mentioned in 79 f. Moreover, A. 3.91 -3 shows that Demosthenes must have proposed an embassy to Chalcis before the embassy to Euboea to which A. 3. 100 relates. D. 18. 79 names only one embassy to Euboea.

3 As Plato and Aristotle noted, and Thucydidesshows (e.g. 8. 63. 3), demagogues might easily turn into tyrants. It is misleading for Cawkwell to suggest that Philistides did not become a tyrant because he was the popular leader (ii. 203). It seems curious that one of Plato's pupils should have been the genuine democratic leader at Oreus, but for a parallel cf. Plut. Mor. 805 D; 1126 c (Phormio at Elis). Democratic ‘patriots’ could be discredited by charges of peculation; cf. D. 19. 294.

1 IG xii. 9. 190.

2 See p. 246 n. 5. Philip too in his letter to Athens does not dare defend his own interventions in Euboea or impeach those of Athens.

3 For dynasteiai see Thuc. 3. 62. 3, 4. 78. 3, and esp. Arist. Pol. 1292b5; 1293a30, where an oligarchy called dynasteia, in which the archontes and not the laws rule, is expressly assimilated to tyranny or monarchy. Cf. Thuc. 6. 60. I: Andoc. 2. 97 for Demophantus' decree of 410, equating the overthrow of democracy with the establishment of tyranny, with patent reference to events in 411; the equation reappears in the Athenian law against tyranny of 337/6 (Hesperia, 1952, 355 ff.): compare the appellation of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’. At Pharsalus Thrasydaeus cannot have been properly a tyrant (contra Theop. F. 209) in view of the position of Daochus (SIG 3 274 with notes), who is often linked with him (ibid., pp. 315; 444 f.; D. 18. 295; Plut. Dem. 18); a narrow oligarchy must be meant, though Arist. Pol. 1306a10 regarded it as beneficent and stable. A tyranny shared by members of one family is something different.

4 Head, Hist. Num.2 362 f.; Regling, IG xii. 9, p. 172, cf. Cawkwell ii. 211 n. 7.

5 Tod 124, 141, 153; IG ii2. 230a; A. 3. 100.

6 IG ii2. 149; cf. Cawkwell ii. 211 n. 7 (though the name Hestiaea is used even in non-Attic documents, see Tod 141; 172 v. 3).

7 The Chalcis treaty perhaps provided for the constitution of an Euboean koinon, rather as the lost treaty of Athens with Chios in 378 provided for the establishment of the second Athenian league (Accame, S., La Lega Ateniese, 1941, 34).Google Scholar

1 In the third Philippic ‘Hellas’ or ‘Hellenes’ occurs 29 times: in speeches 1-4 only 6 times; there D. refers mainly to Athenian interests.

2 Isocr. 5. 20; ep. 2. 20; D. 10. 67; 18. 43; Diod. 16. 69. 8. D. spoke of Thessalian jealousy of Philip's aggrandisement (5. 23) or of their enslavement (19. 260; 9. 26); he suggested that Philip could not rely on them (1. 22, cf. 23. in) and tried to win them over by diplomacy (p. 259 n. 2); Philip did need to intervene in Thessaly in 344 and perhaps 342 to strengthen his control; but in the main the Thessalians remained faithful to Macedon until the Lamian war.

3 Isocr. 5. 73 f.; D. 5. 18 (cf. Paus. 10. 8. 2); 6. 9 and 13 (with Hypothesis).

1 D. 19. 40 shows that it was Philip who asked for alliance.

2 D. 7. 18 ff. In defiance of the evidence Cawkwell makes the proposal for a koine eirene emanate from Philip.

3 Cawkwell, ii. 121 if., convincingly argues that the Persian envoys and Python ap peared at Athens at the same time; I feel less certainty that the date is summer 344 (cf. p. 256 nn. 3-5 with text for Jacoby's doctrine on which he relies); and I am sure that the second Philippic was delivered on an earlier occasion (perhaps, contra Dionysius, in 345/4), ‘as D. says not a word of Persia, and in the Hypothesis too there is no refer ence to a Persian embassy’ (Beloch iii. 22. 290, who mistakenly inferred that the speech was made later).

4 D. 7. 26 f.

5 D. 6. 17.

6 D. 19. 331.

7 See Appendix.

8 D. 19. 260; 294; 9. 27; 18. 295; Diod. 16. 63; Paus. 4. 28. 5; 5. 4. 9 (Philip's sub sidies); Plut., see p. 259 n. 3. The facts are obscure. There is no mention of Macedonian mercenaries.

9 See p. 257 n. 5. Cawkwell's suggestion (ii. 205 n. 9) that Messene, etc., made alliance with Athens ‘probably out of fear of Sparta, not of Philip’ is implausible; it contravenes the natural sense of the scholi ast, implies that Demosthenes was ready to offer help against Sparta, when he was bent on devoting all Athens' resources to the struggle with Philip, and neglects the probability that the Spartan danger had evaporated with king Archidamus' depar ture for Italy, which followed the stasis in Elis (Beloch iii. i2. 595 n. 1). With no fear of Sparta, Argos and Messene were again ready to join in action against Macedon in 323 (Diod. 18. 11).

1 Cawkwell ii. 212 n. 2.

1 The allies at Chaeronea included Achaeans (Paus. 7. 6. 5; cf. Cawkwell ii. 205 n. 9), Acarnanians (Tod 178), Corinthians (Strabo 9. 2. 37), Phocians (Paus. 10. 3. 3) Locrians of Amphissa (Ps.-Plut. 851 B; cf. Wüst 160; 163 n. 1), Euboeans, and perhaps Megarians; if D. 18. 237 (list of allies) relates to those who supplied troops in 338, we may add Leucadians and Corcyraeans and note that the list is incomplete, omitting Acarnanians, Phocians, and Locrians. We have only Aeschines' word (2. 97) that Demosthenes ever boasted that all the Peloponnesians would fight Philip. The absence of the Arcadians associated with Mantinea and of Phlius may, however, have disappointed him. Whether or not the conference convened for Anthesterion 340 met, he had obtained substantial successes by his diplomacy.

3 A. 2. 132 ff., esp. 141-5; cf. 106. In 133 A. suggests that the Theban decision was wrong; he has it both ways!

4 D. 18. 213; cf. Philoch. F. 56; Theop. ap. Plut. Dem. 18.

1 A. 3. 85; 87; Hyper, contra Dem. 20 (echoing A.'s unfair gibe in 3. 90 ); Dinarch. 1. 44. Other refugees, Tod 166; 173; 178; A. 3. 156.

2 Strabo 9. 2. 8; 10. 1. 8; cf. Schäfer iii. 33.

3 Garrisons (cf. generally Diod. 18. 10. 2) are attested in Thebes (Arr. Anab. 1. 7. 1), Ambracia (Diod. 17. 3. 3), and Corinth (Plut. Arat. 23); even if Strabo's report that Philip called Chalcis and Corinth the fetters of Greece (9. 4. 15) refers or should refer to Philip V (cf. Polyb. 18. 11), it seems intrinsically likely that Chalcis was garrisoned then, as later (Diod. 19. 77. 4, 312/11), by Macedon, especially as it was permitted to block passage through the Euripus (last note) and was a naval base under Alexander (Arr. 2. 2. 4).

4 Diod. 18. 11. 2; Paus. 1. 25. 4; Hyper. Epit. 11.

5 IG xii. 9. 207.